{ "id": 5443610, "name": "KEYSTONE STEEL & WIRE COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.-(Rufus Alexander, Appellee.)", "name_abbreviation": "Keystone Steel & Wire Co. v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1978-10-06", "docket_number": "No. 49322", "first_page": "474", "last_page": "485", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 474" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2858028 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463557 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2891391 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2839898 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 Ill. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313887 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/414/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5355871 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5813822 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443995 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2878680 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246-47" }, { "page": "247-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454958 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5430137 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2910859 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971208 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0535-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 787, "char_count": 15369, "ocr_confidence": 0.877, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5345136764626202e-07, "percentile": 0.6717380048025966 }, "sha256": "76c6b0dd4db1aecf50fd255ce02fae69cbed664399ffedd5c07b5402d5f41d88", "simhash": "1:ec3f935d53ce24bb", "word_count": 2514 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:17.567922+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KEYSTONE STEEL & WIRE COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.-(Rufus Alexander, Appellee.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is a direct appeal from the circuit court of Cook County (58 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)), which confirmed an award by the Industrial Commission to the claimant, Rufus Alexander, who was injured in the course of his employment with Keystone Steel & Wire Co. (hereafter Keystone). The arbitrator, having found timely notice and sustention of accidental injuries, concluded the claimant was entitled to $78 per week for 323 weeks, $6 for one week, and thereafter an annual pension of $3,024 for the claimant\u2019s \u201ccomplete disability\u201d making him \u201cwholly and permanently incapable of work.\u201d The arbitrator further concluded that the claimant should receive $5,488.81 as compensation, which had accrued since the date of the injury, and $40 \u201cfor necessary medical services.\u201d The Commission affirmed.\nKeystone raises three issues. It contends that the Commission\u2019s finding of total and permanent disability and occupational hernia was against the manifest weight of the evidence; that the claimant failed to give Keystone notice within 15 days after the accident as is required in cases of hernia; and that Keystone was not liable for the $40 in medical services because the claimant elected to get those services at his own expense. Keystone also charges that the claimant is not entitled to permanent disability benefits because he refused to submit to a hernia operation.\nThe claimant, a utility man or janitor, was - carrying boxes weighing 30 to 40 pounds, up steps to Keystone\u2019s main office on March 22, 1973, around 7 or 8 p.m., when, as he testified, he made \u201can awkward move or slip\u201d and noticed \u201cpain in my back and down my legs and in my groin.\u201d He also testified that on the following day he reported the accident to the company nurse but failed to tell her about pain in his groin, because of embarrassment. She sent him to the company doctor, whom he saw two or three days later. Claimant said that he observed swelling in the area of the groin, and that he indicated to the company doctor he had \u201ca funny feeling in my groin,\u201d although the doctor did not examine the claimant\u2019s groin. Thereafter, the claimant was examined by Dr. Churl Soo Suk, who confined him to the hospital for five days and ran a myelogram on him. The claimant\u2019s back was operated on by Dr. Suk during a second hospitalization. In early 1974, the claimant visited Dr. D.G. Sereleas because of severe pain. Dr. Sereleas examined him and took X rays; he also suggested that the claimant go to the hospital. In addition, several other doctors had examined the claimant. In the fall of 1974, Keystone terminated the claimant\u2019s employment for refusing to undergo corrective hernia surgery.\nAt the hearing before the arbitrator, Dr. Robert Busch, an orthopedist, testified that his diagnosis of the claimant\u2019s condition was left inguinal hernia and \u201cbilateral lumbosacral sprain with sciatic radiation of spasm to both hips and down the posterior aspect of both thighs.\u201d His examination of the claimant, he said, also showed \u201coperative scarring, laminectomy changes, fusion changes, myelography residue, intraspinal canal.\u201d Dr. Busch concluded that the back and hernia conditions of the claimant were causally related to the accident of March 22, 1973, and that those conditions were permanent, preventing his return to work as a janitor; he could do no \u201clifting, bending, twisting, turning. \u201d Dr. Ben Lichtenstein, a psychiatrist and neurologist, also on behalf of the claimant, testified he believed the claimant was neither a psychotic, a neurotic, nor a malingerer, but was sincere in his fear of any more surgery including corrective surgery for the hernia and his back. Such fear, Dr. Lichtenstein intimated, is not unusual and is the prerogative of a patient. He admitted he was unable to diagnose the existence of a hernia, but he attested to limitations on the movement of the claimant\u2019s back because of pain; hence, he concluded that claimant could not adequately perform janitorial chores because of the necessity of bending.\nDr. William Kane, an orthopedic surgeon testifying for Keystone, \u201ctook a history\u201d and performed a physical examination of the claimant almost a year after the injuries were sustained. Two months later Dr. Kane again examined the claimant, who complained of a \u201cknot\u201d in the area of his groin (hernia) for which Dr. Kane suggested the claimant see a specialist. He also testified that, although he felt additional surgery would have helped alleviate pain in the claimant\u2019s low-back area, given the claimant\u2019s pessimism regarding the success of such an operation, he declined to persist in recommending it to the claimant. He also testified that the claimant could return to work but with restrictions, especially on lifting and bending.\nDr. Suk, who treated the claimant for almost a year beginning shortly after the injuries occurred, testified the claimant suffered from a ruptured disc \u201cwith a right sciatica.\u201d During that period of treatment and examination, the claimant complained of no injury other than the low-back pain, Dr. Suk said. Dr. Suk concluded that the claimant could perform \u201clight duty, less than fifty pound weight lifting\u201d chores. Also for Keystone, Dr. George Cooper, who first examined the claimant well over a year and a half later, testified that the claimant could not squat without pain and had \u201ca well healed lumbar surgical scar,\u201d and that he tested for but found no hernia. His conclusion was that the claimant \u201chad a postoperative back that was not associated with any neurological deficit\u201d and could work so long as there was no heavy lifting or extensive bending.\nThis court has repeatedly held that \u201ca court on review will not disturb a finding of the Industrial Commission unless its finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d (E.g., Beloit Foundry v. Industrial Com. (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 535, 538.) Although there are conflicting opinions by medical experts in this case, it is for the Industrial Commission \u201cto resolve disputed questions of fact, including those of causal connection, and to draw permissible inferences and decide which of conflicting medical views is to be accepted.\u201d (Ford Motor Co. v. Industrial Com. (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 267, 271.) Moreover, the findings of the Commission will not be reversed merely because the court might draw different inferences. (Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 312, 318; accord, C.R. Wikel, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 273, 279.) We believe the record sufficiently supports the findings of the Commission that the claimant suffered total and permanent disability and sustention of an occupational hernia. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.8(d).\nAlternatively, Keystone argues that because the claimant refused to submit to additional surgery for his hernia conditions, he is not entitled to total permanent disability benefits. The claimant, the argument continues, was not reasonably exercising his freedom of choice. While one might agree with that assessment, we must point out three things. First, section 19(d) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.19(d)) gives to the Commission the discretion to reduce or suspend compensation where a claimant has refused \u201cto submit to such medical, surgical, or hospital treatment as is reasonably essential to promote his recovery.\u201d Second, a claimant\u2019s refusal should be in good faith. (Rockford Clutch Division v. Industrial Com. (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 240, 246-47.) Third, the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act is \u201cdesigned for employees with divergent personalities, beliefs, and fears. If a claimant\u2019s response to an offer of treatment is within the bounds of reason, his freedom of choice should be preserved even when an operation might mitigate the employer\u2019s damages.\u201d (34 Ill. 2d 240, 247-48.) Exercising its discretion, the Commission concluded the claimant was not acting in bad faith but sincerely feared the surgery; and the record supports the Commission\u2019s award on this point. The arbitrator herself pointedly inquired into the motives and fears behind a patient\u2019s psychological state apropos of injury and recovery. Dr. Lichtenstein testified that he concluded the claimant was not malingering and not neurotic but genuinely feared the risk in further surgery. Even Dr. Kane, for Keystone, did not believe surgery was desirable for the claimant because the claimant displayed such a pessimistic outlook on the success of such prospective surgery. Hence, the claimant\u2019s refusal to undergo surgery in these circumstances should not deprive him of the benefits awarded by the Commission.\nThe second issue raised by Keystone is that the claimant failed to give \u201cnotice of the hernia *** to Keystone within the required time.\u201d Both the claimant and Keystone stipulated that \u201cnotice of said accident was given said respondent [Keystone] within the time required under the provisions\u201d of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.6(c)). They further stipulated that in \u201cdispute is whether or not notice of a hernia arising out of said accident was given within the provisions of said Act.\u201d The relevant provisions of section 6 are:\n\u201c(c) No proceedings for compensation under this Act shall be maintained unless notice of the accident has been given to the employer as soon as practicable, but not later than 45 days after the accident. Provided:\n(1) In cases of hernia, notice shall be given the employer within 15 days after the accident.\u201d\n(The special hernia notice requirement has since been deleted (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975 & 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.6(c)).) Keystone\u2019s contentions apparently are that section 6(c)(1) requires not merely notice of the accident but notice of the hernia condition within 15 days, and that the claimant\u2019s notice was insufficient in that respect.\nThere are no cases which have considered the precise issue of whether section 6(c)(1) required notice of the accident or notice of the hernia condition. However, neither syntax nor logic supports Keystone\u2019s construction of the statute, as a close reading shows. First, section 6(c) refers to \u201cnotice of the accident\u201d; there is no reason to assume that the legislature intended, in the very next paragraph (par. 6(c)(1)), a requirement of notice of hernia condition by its use of the word notice. The reasonable view is that section 6(c)(1) simply required that notice of the accident be given within 15 days where hernias are (later) diagnosed. It seems the legislature, in explicitly setting out for cases of hernias a different time limit for notice, would have been similarly explicit in additionally burdening the claimant with a notice of hernia condition had it intended that. Second, we find it unlikely that the legislature intended that the claimant himself diagnose a hernia or rush out to have a diagnosis made in order to meet a 15-day requirement. A hernia may develop gradually, with symptoms not obvious within 15 days. (See Crow\u2019s Hybrid Corn Co. v. Industrial Com. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 168.) The 15-day limit in which to give notice of the accident simply enables the employer to investigate the accident (Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 137, 143) and discourages frivolous or fraudulent claims. To hold any other way would, moreover, contravene the liberality which \u201cshould be allowed to the extent that it is consistent with the protection of the employer against unjust concealment of claims.\u201d Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 32,41.\nKeystone apparently challenges the sufficiency of the notice of the accident because the claimant failed to fuHy describe his hernia symptoms. Again we disagree. It is true that the claimant\u2019s testimony was contradictory as to what he told the nurse, company doctor and Dr. Suk about pain in his groin. However, the claimant, of limited education, maintained on both direct examination and cross-examination that he indicated to the company doctor, four days after the examination, he \u201chad some kind of funny feeling up in there\u201d and \u201churted [sic] right in here,\u201d referring to his groin. This court has held that the intention of the legislature, as far as notice is concerned, is \u201cto require an employee *** to place the employer in possession of all known facts\u201d within the time limit, (Quaker Oats Co. v. Industrial Com. (1953), 414 Ill. 326, 336-37.) This the claimant attempted to do. Although there were inconsistencies in the claimant\u2019s testimony, such conflicts of testimony are for the trier of fact to resolve; the Commission is in a better position to judge credibility. (U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 68, 74.) Hence, we find the claimant\u2019s notice to the employer met the requirements of the Act.\nThe last issue raised by Keystone is whether or not the claimant is entitled to reimbursement by Keystone of $40 for X rays and an examination of the claimant performed by Dr. D.G. Sereleas on February 7, 1974, because the claimant \u201celect[ed] to secure his own physician *** at his own expense.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a).) (Section 8(a) of the Act has since been amended to allow a claimant to elect such services at the employer\u2019s expense (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a)).) The claimant maintains that at the time he was receiving no treatment but was in much pain. If medical services are necessary and an employer is aware of the claimant\u2019s desire or need for such medical services, \u201cthe employer\u2019s liability for reimbursement would be clear.\u201d (Barricks Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 9, 14.) Those elements of necessity and awareness or notice of the desire for medical services are present here. Dr. Suk had released the patient from his \u201cacute care\u201d; yet the claimant continued to have pain, as he testified. A week before his visit to Dr. Sereleas, the claimant had informed Dr. Suk, who was no longer treating him, that he wished to see another doctor. (See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 247, 256, where an employer was held liable for medical services sought by a claimant because a doctor in its employ was aware of the claimant\u2019s condition.) Moreover, the claimant notified Keystone the following day of the visit to Dr. Sereleas. Having determined that Keystone would not pay for further consultation with or work by Dr. Sereleas, the claimant did not go to him again but apparently submitted to Keystone\u2019s services, including another examination by Dr. Suk a week later. We simply are unable to determine, as Keystone wishes us to, that there was an \u201celection\u201d to receive medical services since he was no longer being treated and yet was apparently experiencing pain. (See Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Com. (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 180, 183.) Hence, we find Keystone is liable for the $40.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE CLARK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert E. Maciorowski, of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fair-weather & Geraldson, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Timothy F. Sullivan, of Horwitz, Anesi, Osmon & Associates, of Chicago (Sidney Z. Karasik, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 49322.\nKEYSTONE STEEL & WIRE COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.-(Rufus Alexander, Appellee.)\nOpinion filed October 6, 1978.\nRobert E. Maciorowski, of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fair-weather & Geraldson, of Chicago, for appellant.\nTimothy F. Sullivan, of Horwitz, Anesi, Osmon & Associates, of Chicago (Sidney Z. Karasik, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0474-01", "first_page_order": 486, "last_page_order": 497 }