{ "id": 5442891, "name": "ANTON KERNER, Appellant, v. STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS et al.-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Kerner v. State Employees' Retirement System of Illinois", "decision_date": "1978-09-19", "docket_number": "No. 50239", "first_page": "507", "last_page": "515", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 507" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2934533 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3231111 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/187/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 Ill. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2493225 ], "year": 1900, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/386/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 608", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 U.S. 179", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11299721 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181-82" }, { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/347/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966931 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437-38" }, { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 S. Ct. 3183", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 L. Ed. 2d 1146", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "417 U.S. 976", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1519393, 1519627, 1519573, 1519485, 1519999 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0976-02", "/us/417/0976-01", "/us/417/0976-03", "/us/417/0976-05", "/us/417/0976-04" ] }, { "cite": "493 F.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 198616 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/493/1124-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3392752 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0747-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 624, "char_count": 10613, "ocr_confidence": 0.874, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.30504304421836e-07, "percentile": 0.9582796139852169 }, "sha256": "7f5e35fdd506e96e86b6ee33ec8946d949b4aa2a0430b748a40ab96b0ee571c1", "simhash": "1:3c31cbfcece7c47f", "word_count": 1723 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:17.567922+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ANTON KERNER, Appellant, v. STATE EMPLOYEES\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS et al.-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe question on this appeal concerns the effect of a felony conviction upon the pension rights of the late Otto Kemer, Jr., former Governor of Illinois. The facts, which are undisputed, are included in the opinion of the appellate court (53 Ill. App. 3d 747) and will be restated here only so far as necessary for an understanding of our opinion.\nIn 1965, during his service as Governor, Otto Kemer applied for and was accepted into membership in the State Employees\u2019 Retirement System (hereinafter System) and by paying some $11,000 secured credit for his prior gubernatorial service. Following his 1968 resignation as Governor to accept appointment as a Federal judge, he applied for and was granted retirement benefits and subsequently received monthly pension checks. He was thereafter convicted of several felonies under the United States Code (see United States v. Isaacs (7th Cir. 1974), 493 F.2d 1124, cert. denied (1974), 417 U.S. 976, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1146, 94 S. Ct. 3183), which were related to his service as Governor. His monthly pension allowances were terminated by the System because of those convictions, resulting in a demand by him for resumption of pension payments and for all arrearages and benefits. The System, claiming that the convictions caused a loss of all rights in the pension plan except the right to a refund of the lump-sum payment and monthly contributions, filed a counterclaim seeking repayment of the difference between the total benefits paid and the amounts contributed by him.\nA hearing officer appointed by the secretary of the System recommended resumption of the pension payments and payment of all arrearages and benefits. The board of trustees of the System, however, rejected the hearing officer\u2019s recommendation and voted to refuse any further payments. Further, the board remanded the cause to the hearing officer for a determination concerning the System\u2019s counterclaim. Following Otto Kemer\u2019s death, his representative filed an administrative review proceeding in the circuit court of Sangamon County (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. IO8V2, par. 14 \u2014 200; ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.) attacking the board\u2019s termination of the monthly pension payments. The circuit court reversed the board and ordered payment of all arrearages and benefits accruing prior to Otto Kemer\u2019s death. The Appellate Court for the Fourth District, however, reversed the circuit court (53 Ill. App. 3d 747), effectively affirming the decision of the board of trustees. We granted leave to appeal. We note that the System\u2019s counterclaim for repayment of the amount paid to Otto Kemer in excess of his contributions is not included in this appeal.\nThe primary question presented is the construction of section 14 \u2014 199 of the Hlinois Pension Code:\n\u201cNone of the benefits herein provided for shall be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his service as an employee.\nThis section shall not operate to impair any contract or vested right heretofore acquired under any law or laws continued in this Article nor to preclude the right to a refund.\nAll future entrants entering service subsequent to July 9, 1955 shall be deemed to have consented to the provisions of this section as a condition of coverage.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd,par. 14-199.)\nIn construing this statute, as with any statute, our objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent as determined from the necessity or reason for the enactment and the meaning of the words employed. In re Roberts Park Fire Protection District (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 429,437-38.\nPlaintiff first contends that the phrase \u201cconvicted of any felony\u201d refers only to convictions of crimes which are felonies under Illinois law, and that since the convictions were actually violations of Federal law, not Illinois law, they are not within the statutory description of \u201cany felony.\u201d We disagree. When faced with an analogous question in the context of a Federal statute, the United States Supreme Court chose a broad interpretation of the word \u201cany\u201d:\n\u201cNor can we hold that the Act bars use of committee testimony in United States courts but not in state courts. The Act forbids use of such evidence \u2018in any criminal proceeding *** in any court\u2019. Language could be no plainer. Even if there could be legislative history sufficiently strong to make \u2018any court\u2019 mean United States courts only, there is no such history. The few scraps of legislative history pointed out tend to indicate that Congress was well aware that an ordinary person would read the phrase \u2018in any court\u2019 to include state courts. To construe this phrase as having any other meaning would make the Act a trap for the unwary.\u201d (Adams v. Maryland (1954), 347 U.S. 179, 181-82, 98 L. Ed. 608, 612, 74 S. Ct. 442,445.)\nThere is similar authority from this court that, absent contextual implications to the contrary, a broad interpretation of the word \u201cany\u201d is to be favored. E.g., Patteson v. City of Peoria (1944), 386 Ill. 460, 464-65; People ex rel. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. VanCleave (1900), 187 Ill. 125, 134-35.\nIn our judgment the legislature\u2019s choice of the word \u201cany\u201d evinces an intent to include all felonies, State or Federal, so long as the offense was a \u201cfelony relating to or arising out of or in connection with\u201d service as a State employee. \u201cThe language of the [Illinois Pension] Code is clear and there is no need for this court to construe it so as to give it any meaning other than the one which is clearly stated. It is the duty of the court to enforce the law as enacted according to its plain and unmistakable provisions.\u201d (Peterson v. Board of Trustees (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 260, 264.) This literal interpretation accords with the obvious purpose of the statute, to discourage official malfeasance by denying the public servant convicted of unfaithfulness to his trust the retirement benefits to which he otherwise would have been entitled. This construction accords, too, with the related purpose of implementing the public\u2019s right to conscientious service from those in governmental positions. In view of this legislative goal it seems to us plainly immaterial whether the felony involved is defined by the laws of this State, a sister State, or the Federal government as long as it arose from, was connected with, or related to the State service; that it was so related here is undisputed. We believe the offenses of which Otto Kemer was convicted are clearly felonies within the ambit of section 14 \u2014 199.\nPlaintiff also contends that because Otto Kemer\u2019s rights were vested, at least by the time preceding his convictions when he began receiving monthly payments, they were \u201cheretofore acquired\u201d within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 14 \u2014 199 and thus could not be impaired by this statute. Our reading of the statute, however, indicates the phrase \u201cheretofore acquired\u201d means acquired prior to the enactment of the felony provision and does not refer to the date of vesting or contracting in the case of each individual member. This second paragraph protects the right of employees whose pension rights had vested before the 1955 enactment of this provision. It is not applicable to Otto Kerner, whose pension rights vested long after the section\u2019s effective date. The flaw in plaintiff\u2019s reading of the statute was emphasized by the appellate court when it noted that under plaintiff\u2019s theory, an employee need only retire prior to his conviction of a felony in order to render the entire statute meaningless. (53 Ill. App. 3d 747, 751.) Certainly such easy circumvention of the law\u2019s purpose cannot have been intended.\nWe believe section 14 \u2014 199 is clearly applicable here and by its terms operated to deny Otto Kerner the retirement benefits to which he would have been entitled, absent the convictions, under the Illinois Pension Code. Plaintiff urges, however, that this conclusion renders the statute unconstitutional under article XIII, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides:\n\u201cMembership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.\u201d\nThe difficulty with plaintiff\u2019s position is that the very section of the Constitution upon which he relies provides that membership in the retirement system is \u201can enforceable contractual relationship.\u201d Section 14 \u2014 199 was, of course, in effect years before Otto Kerner became a member of the retirement system, and it became, by its terms, a condition of the contractual relationship to which he consented by applying for membership. As the commentary accompanying the Constitution states: \u201cOf course, the \u2018contractual relationship\u2019 is governed by the actual terms of the contract or pension.\u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. XHI, sec. 5, Constitutional Commentary, at 302 (Smith-Hurd 1971).) Plaintiff does not explain how enforcement of this condition, to which the parties agreed and which has existed throughout the duration of the contract, can become an unconstitutional impairment of the benefits of that contract. (See In re Roberts Park Fire Protection District (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 429, 441.) Membership in the System was sought with knowledge of this condition, and it clearly cannot be said to impair or diminish the benefits within the meaning of the constitutional provision.\nWe have also reviewed plaintiff\u2019s claims relating to corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 11), cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const., amend. VIH), and due process (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV). We hold that the termination of payments here violates none of these provisions.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the appellate court sustaining the Board\u2019s denial of pension benefits is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nWARD, C.J., and CLARK and MORAN, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Weiner, of Springfield (Terry Lee Fields, of counsel), for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield (Paul J. Bargiel and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 50239.\nANTON KERNER, Appellant, v. STATE EMPLOYEES\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS et al.-Appellees.\nOpinion filed Sept. 19, 1978.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied Dec. 1, 1978.\nWARD, C.J., and CLARK and MORAN, JJ., took no part.\nRobert Weiner, of Springfield (Terry Lee Fields, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield (Paul J. Bargiel and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0507-01", "first_page_order": 519, "last_page_order": 527 }