{ "id": 3073388, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RICHARD HILLS, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hills", "decision_date": "1980-02-22", "docket_number": "No. 51771", "first_page": "500", "last_page": "511", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 500" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991562 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 Ill. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2514500 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/392/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2471064 ], "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/394/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448282 ], "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390104 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2965894 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5379499 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857760 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5391361 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394638 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937164 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5579855 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5305707 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/385/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2769351 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 Ill. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2465743 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/396/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2707271 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/6/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2851370 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ill. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2405148 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/273/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ill. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4865270 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/277/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ill. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2419509 ], "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/290/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 Ill. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460881 ], "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/398/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2766656 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5351670 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 Ill. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2514500 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/392/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2471064 ], "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/394/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448282 ], "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0458-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 782, "char_count": 16843, "ocr_confidence": 0.827, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.868301777381224e-07, "percentile": 0.9644948412050278 }, "sha256": "7cbb9a12e29222257a03c0b8c266b4ef7c2edede36f0e9a700964f95e6a3245a", "simhash": "1:a977c524ce9e68ff", "word_count": 2814 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:42.081030+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RICHARD HILLS, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn the circuit court of Knox County, defendant, Richard E. Hills, pleaded guilty to the offense of possesion of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56V4, par. 1401(b)), and was sentenced to two years\u2019 probation. A petition to revoke his probation was filed, and after a hearing the circuit court revoked probation and sentenced defendant to the penitentiary for a term of not less than two nor more than six years. The appellate court affirmed (71 Ill. App. 3d 461), and we allowed defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. The facts are adequately stated in the appellate court opinion and will be repeated here only to the extent necessary to discuss the issues.\nWe consider first defendant\u2019s contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing. The record shows that on January 5, 1976, defendant was sentenced to two years\u2019 probation. On April 13, 1977, a petition to revoke probation was filed, charging that defendant had burglarized a recreation center and had attempted to burglarize a drug store, both in Fulton County. The burglary of the recreation center was alleged to have occurred on March 10, 1977, and although the date of the attempted burglary was not alleged in the petition, the testimony shows that it occurred on March 14, 1977. A public defender was appointed to represent defendant.\nOn May 19, 1977, at the probation revocation hearing, the public defender moved for a continuance because he had not yet discussed the case with his client. He explained that he had been unable to reach defendant in the interval between his appointment and the hearing. Because a number of the People\u2019s witnesses were present, the circuit court denied the motion, and the parties then agreed to hear the testimony of the People\u2019s witnesses and continue the case for the defense to a later date.\nOver defendant\u2019s objection the People adduced testimony of a statement given by defendant in which he admitted the March 10, 1977, burglary. No motion to suppress the statement was filed before the hearing. The reason stated for defendant\u2019s objection to the statement was that at the time the statement was given defendant was \u201claboring under the difficulty of intoxication. \u201d The officer taking the statement, Gary Phillips of the Illinois State Police Criminal Investigation Bureau, testified that at the time the statement was given defendant was \u201cvery tired\u201d but \u201csober.\u201d Fulton County Deputy Sheriff James Elam, testified that at the time of defendant\u2019s arrest, approximately 12 hours before the statement was given, defendant was \u201cless than stable.\u201d\nAt the close of the People\u2019s case the revocation hearing was recessed until June 16, 1977. On that date, the only evidence offered in defense was the defendant\u2019s testimony. He was questioned about and denied only the allegations of count II of the petition to revoke probation, which involved the attempted burglary. Defendant did not testify as to count I, involving the burglary to which he confessed in his statement to Officer Phillips.\nIn his closing argument defense counsel said:\n\u201cI would ask the court to consider for a moment any reason for Mr. Hills in this case to prevaricate his testimony as to Count II. The court will \u2014 as the court well knows and as Mr. Kimbell pointed out we presented no evidence as to Count I. I think we are old enough, Your Honor, without contradictory testimony and knowing the nature of the evidence on behalf of the People as to Count I that the conclusion on that matter was foregone without evidence by way of answer. I think Mr. Hills testified truthfully as to Count II though realizing that the chances are quite great based on Count I alone that his probation may be revoked. \u201d\nThe circuit court found defendant guilty of violating probation as to both count I and count II. On July 28, 1977, a sentencing hearing was held and defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than two nor more than six years. Although the circuit court stated that defendant was \u201cto receive credit for all time spent in custody as a result of this offense,\u201d no mention was made whether defendant was to receive credit for the time spent on probation. On August 5, 1977, the circuit court convened another hearing in order to \u201cmake the record clear as it should be\u201d and ordered that defendant be denied credit for the time spent on probation.\nIn support of his contention that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel defendant cites the failure to move for a continuance prior to the hearing on May 19, 1977, on the ground that he had been unable to interview defendant. Defendant argues that counsel had ample time before the hearing to request a continuance and that he was unduly prejudiced by his failure to do so. He asserts that by waiting until the day of the hearing, when the People\u2019s witnesses were present, appointed counsel made it difficult for the trial judge to grant a continuance, since to do so would inconvenience the witnesses. Defendant argues that by reason of counsel\u2019s failure to investigate, or continue, the case, he was deprived of two clear bases for suppressing defendant\u2019s statement: defendant\u2019s intoxication and the State\u2019s failure to produce all of the material witnesses to the statement. Finally, defendant asserts that his counsel, in closing argument, admitted guilt as to count I and thereby deprived defendant of a defense on that count.\nIn order to prevail in a claim of incompetence, a defendant represented by court-appointed counsel must establish (1) actual incompetence and (2) substantial prejudice resulting therefrom. (People v. Witherspoon (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 18; People v. Goerger (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 403.) Proof of prejudice cannot be based on mere conjecture (People v. Thomas (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 39; People v. Gonzales (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 233) nor can a defendant rely upon speculation as to the outcome of his case had the representation been of higher quality (People v. Thomas (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 39; People v. Gonzales (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 233).\nIt is pure speculation to assume that any amount of prehearing investigation would have discovered evidence which could have altered the outcome here. Moreover, there is no indication that further effort could have kept out defendant\u2019s statement wherein he confessed to burglary. Testimony indicated that the attempted burglary took place at approximately 2 a.m. on March 14, 1979, and defendant was arrested shortly thereafter. Defendant\u2019s statement was made at 2:30 p.m. that same day. Assuming, based on Officer Elam\u2019s testimony, that defendant was intoxicated at the time of his arrest, we cannot assume that he was intoxicated when he gave his statement 12 hours later. In addition, the mere fact of intoxication is not enough, in itself, to render a statement involuntary. See People v. Hicks (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 390.\nWith regard to the People\u2019s failure to call all the witnesses to defendant\u2019s statement, defendant is correct in his statement of the general rule that where the voluntariness of a confession is challenged in a motion to suppress, all material witnesses to the confession should be produced. (See, e.g., In re Lamb (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 383; People v. Armstrong (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 471.) However, other than the fact that defendant had been drinking 12 hours prior to making his statement there is no evidence which suggests that it was coerced or otherwise involuntary. Defendant has failed to show that the result would have been altered had counsel required the People to produce all material witnesses.\nFinally, we axe unable to say that the closing remarks of defendant\u2019s counsel caused substantial prejudice. As the appellate court pointed out, given that defendant had made an ostensibly voluntary confession as to count I, and with respect to count II had admitted being in the immediate area of the attempted burglary, had admitted being intoxicated, and had admitted smoking marijuana, counsel did not have many options in choosing his remarks. Moreover, we cannot say, in light of the evidence, that a different approach taken in closing could have altered the result.\nThe record does not support defendant\u2019s contention that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel.\nDefendant contends next that the circuit court was without authority to deny him credit for the time served on probation. At the time of sentencing section 5 \u2014 6\u20144(h) of the Unified Code of Corrections provided in pertinent part:\n\u201cTime served on probation, conditional discharge or supervision shall be credited by the court against a sentence of imprisonment or periodic imprisonment unless the court orders otherwise.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20144(h).)\nThus, by the terms of section 5 \u2014 6\u20144(h), since the sentencing order entered on July 28, 1977, made no mention of credit, absent the \u201cclarification\u201d by the trial court eight days later, defendant would have received credit for the time spent on probation. Defendant contends that the circuit court\u2019s action on August 5, 1977, resulted in an improper increase in the length of his sentence, contrary to section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d) (now section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections), which provides:\n\u201cThe court may reduce or modify, but shall not increase the length of a sentence by order entered not later than 30 days from the date that sentence was imposed. This shall not enlarge the jurisdiction of the court for any other purpose.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(d); now par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(c). Pub. Act 80 \u2014 1099 (effective February 1, 1978).\nThe appellate court, while apparently agreeing that defendant\u2019s sentence was increased, held that the increase did not violate the prohibition of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d). Citing People v. Heil (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 458; People v. Watson (1946), 394 Ill. 177, and People v. Hamel (1946), 392 Ill. 415, it explained that the circuit court retains jurisdiction for 30 days after entry of a judgment in order to correct errors, subject to the restriction that in criminal cases the circuit court loses jurisdiction when the defendant begins serving his sentence in the penitentiary. In dealing with defendant\u2019s assertion that section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d) replaced the rule of Watson, Hamel and earlier cases, the appellate court added:\n\u201cWe interpret section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d) as giving the trial court the additional jurisdictional power to reduce or modify without increasing a sentence after defendant has begun serving his sentence until 30 days from the date sentence was imposed. We reach this conclusion in order to give effect to the last sentence of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d) ***. This sentence must mean that the preceding sentence was intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of reducing or modifying a sentence within 30 days, and the only way jurisdiction could be enlarged would be by eliminating the previous restriction.\u201d (71 Ill. App. 3d 461, 469.)\nWe do not agree. Under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d) the circuit court had jurisdiction to \u201creduce or modify\u201d the sentence for a period of 30 days \u201cfrom the date sentence was imposed\u201d without regard to when it may have been executed. [People ex rel. Carey v. Rosin (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 151, 157.) Increase of the sentence is, however, expressly proscribed, and the circuit court was without power to increase the sentence after it was imposed.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that his sentence was excessive. Taking into account that defendant will receive credit for the time spent on probation, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149.\nFor the reasons stated the judgments of the appellate court and circuit court are affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Knox County with directions to issue a corrected mittimus containing no provision for denial of credit for the time defendant was on probation.\nAffirmed and remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" }, { "text": "MR. JUSTICE RYAN,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI agree with the majority\u2019s holding on all issues except its interpretation of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(d), now par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(c), Pub. Act 80 \u2014 1099 (effective Feb. 1, 1978)). In my opinion, the reasoning of the appellate court on this issue is correct.\nIn Illinois the common law rule permitted a trial court to retain jurisdiction over a judgment until the adjournment of the term, except that in criminal cases the trial court lost jurisdiction before the end of the term when the defendant\u2019s sentence was executed. Under the practice in this State, when a person accused of a crime was convicted, sentenced and delivered into the custody of the proper penitentiary officer under a mittimus, the sentence was considered executed and the court lost jurisdiction. That rule was later changed so that the court\u2019s jurisdiction ended 30 days from the entry of the judgment rather than the expiration of the term; however, in criminal cases, trial courts lost their jurisdiction as soon as the sentence was executed, if prior to 30 days. Therefore, in criminal cases, the trial court retained jurisdiction to vacate, modify or set aside a judgment until the sentence was executed, or 30 days after the sentence was imposed, whichever occurred first. People v. Heil (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 458; People v. Lance (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 455; People v. Wakeland (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 265; People v. Putnam (1947), 398 Ill. 421; People v. Watson (1946), 394 Ill. 177; People v. Hamel (1946), 392 Ill. 415; People ex rel. Fensky v. Leinecke (1919), 290 Ill. 560; People ex rel. Huber v. Whitman (1917), 277 Ill. 408; People ex rel. Lucey v. Turney (1916), 273 Ill. 546.\nThe majority opinion holds that section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d) changes the common law rule by restricting the trial court to modifications which do not increase the defendant\u2019s sentence. I cannot agree with this interpretation. The primary purpose of statutory construction is ascertainment of the legislative purpose and intent. When interpreting new legislation a court should consider the necessity for the law, the previous condition of the law on the subject, and the defects, if any, that are intended to be remedied. (People ex rel. Cason v. Ring (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 305, 310; Livingston v. Meyers (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 325; Anderson v. City of Park Ridge (1947), 396 Ill. 235.) The common law serves as a valuable aid to furnish guidance in determining legislative intent or the meaning that the text of the statute is to convey. (2A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction sec. 50.01, at 268 (4th ed. 1973).) It is also an elementary rule of statutory construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous. Mid-South Chemical Corp. v. Carpentier (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 514; Morris v. Broadview, Inc. (1944), 385 Ill. 228.\nApplying these rules of construction, I interpret section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d) as giving the trial court the additional jurisdiction to reduce or modify, without increasing, a sentence after the defendant has begun serving his sentence until 30 days from the date sentence was imposed. This interpretation gives effect to the last sentence of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(d), which states: \u201cThis shall not enlarge the jurisdiction of the court for any other purpose.\u201d (Emphasis added.) By this sentence, the legislature, being fully cognizant of the common law jurisdiction of the trial courts, sought to enlarge the court\u2019s jurisdiction for the purpose of reducing or modifying a sentence within 30 days, thus partially eliminating the previous restriction. However, there is no indication that it sought to limit the court\u2019s jurisdiction.\nIn the present case the defendant\u2019s sentence was unexecuted when the trial court entered an order denying the defendant credit for probation time. I would hold that the common law rule is still applicable and that the trial judge\u2019s denying the defendant credit for probation time served was perfectly proper.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "MR. JUSTICE RYAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Thomas Lilien, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Carl \u00a3. Hawkinson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg (Donald B. Mackay and David Cassorla, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and James E. Hinterlong, of the State\u2019s Attorney Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 51771.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RICHARD HILLS, Appellant.\nOpinion filed February 22, 1980.\nRYAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Thomas Lilien, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Carl \u00a3. Hawkinson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg (Donald B. Mackay and David Cassorla, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and James E. Hinterlong, of the State\u2019s Attorney Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0500-01", "first_page_order": 534, "last_page_order": 545 }