{
  "id": 2715858,
  "name": "Arthur R. Lindburg et al., Appellants, vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Springfield et al., Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lindburg v. Zoning Board of Appeals",
  "decision_date": "1956-03-22",
  "docket_number": "No. 33830",
  "first_page": "254",
  "last_page": "257",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 254"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "407 Ill. 588",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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        2640772
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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      ]
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    {
      "cite": "408 Ill. 556",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2644494
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/408/0556-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "368 Ill. 568",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2569488
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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    {
      "cite": "344 Ill. 82",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5258505
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/344/0082-01"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:03:48.840085+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Arthur R. Lindburg et al., Appellants, vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Springfield et al., Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice SchaEREr\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Zoning Board of Appeals of the city of Springfield permitted a variance from the requirements of the Springfield zoning ordinance with respect to two adjoining residential properties. Arthur R. Lindburg and 16 other owners of property in the vicinity instituted a proceeding in the circuit court of Sangamon County under the Administrative Review Act to review the action of the board. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the board, and this appeal followed.\nJurisdiction of this court upon direct appeal rests upon the appellants\u2019 contention that section 73 \u2014 4 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, chap. 24, par. 73 \u2014 4,) is unconstitutional. That section authorizes zoning boards of appeals to vary the application of zoning regulations \u201cin cases where there are practical difficulties or particular hardship in the way of carrying out the strict letter\u201d of the regulations. The appellants emphasize that this language is almost identical with that which was held invalid in Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill. 82. The Springfield ordinance follows the language of the statute, and appellants contend that it, too, is invalid, citing Speroni v. Board of Appeals, 368 Ill. 568. They urge also that the orders of the zoning board of appeals failed to comply with the command of the statute that \u201cEvery variation * * * shall be accompanied by a finding of fact specifying the reason for making the variation.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, chap. 24, par. 73 \u2014 4.) Other grounds are advanced for reversal but in the view we take of the case they need not be stated.\nWhile the question of the validity of the statute is properly presented and sustains the jurisdiction of this court upon direct appeal, the constitutional question should not be decided if the case can be disposed of on other grounds. (People ex rel. Downs v. Scully, 408 Ill. 556; Winston v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 407 Ill. 588.) The considerations which prompt judicial reluctance to pass upon the validity of legislation unless it is necessary to do so are here augmented by the fact that the statute in question has been amended since this case arose. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap. 24, par. 73 \u2014 4.) We turn, therefore, to the contention that the orders of the zoning board of appeals did not contain the findings required by statute.\nThe properties in question are located in the \u201cA\u201d residential and \u201cA\u201d area districts. One and two-family dwellings and apartment houses of two stories or less are among the uses permitted in the \u201cA\u201d residential district. In the \u201cA\u201d area district, a minimum of 3000 square feet of lot area is required for each family. The same uses and others are permitted in the \u201cB\u201d residential district, but the \u201cB\u201d area district requires a minimum lot area of only 580 feet per family. The owners of the properties filed petitions for variances which stated the dimensions of the respective lots, that each was improved with a two-story frame residence occupied as a dwelling by a single family and that the owners desired to remodel them into apartment houses of the type permitted in a \u201cB\u201d residential district. The board conducted a hearing and then entered the orders in question.\nExcluding formal portions, the orders read as follows:\n\u201cIt further appeared to the Board that there were at the present time other homes in the vicinity in which there were apartments for more than one family.\n\u201cThat there are practical difficulties and hardships in the way of carrying out to the strict letter the restrictions in the code pertaining to the \u2018A\u2019 residential use of the above described property, insofar as the use of the building or structure now located thereon.\n\u201cThat the proposed variation in use of said property would not impose any undue hardship or burden on the neighborhood or adjoining property.\u201d\nThese orders do not comply with the statute. They do not contain \u201cfindings of fact specifying the reason for making the variation.\u201d The requirement of the statute is not met by parroting the highly generalized statutory phrases, \u201cpractical difficulties\u201d and \u201cparticular hardship.\u201d The single statement that amounts to a finding of fact, \u201cthat there were * * * other homes in the vicinity in which there were apartments for more than one family\u201d is consistent with present \u201cA\u201d residential use of those other homes, because apartment houses of two stories or less are permitted in the \u201cA\u201d district. It is therefore meaningless as a basis for a zoning variation.\nThe order of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to proceed in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice SchaEREr"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "DeBoice, Greening & Ackerman, of Springfield, for appellants.",
      "A. M. Fitzgerald, and Walter T. Day, both of Springfield, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 33830.\nArthur R. Lindburg et al., Appellants, vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Springfield et al., Appellees.\nOpinion filed March 22, 1956.\nDeBoice, Greening & Ackerman, of Springfield, for appellants.\nA. M. Fitzgerald, and Walter T. Day, both of Springfield, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0254-01",
  "first_page_order": 254,
  "last_page_order": 257
}