{ "id": 5480847, "name": "WILLIAM D. CROWELL, Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. BILANDIC, Mayor, et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Crowell v. Bilandic", "decision_date": "1980-09-15", "docket_number": "No. 52830", "first_page": "422", "last_page": "429", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 422" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "294 N.W. 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Iowa 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 4389024 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/229/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 A.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8042321 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/372/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 N.W.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10685919 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/282/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 F.2d 277", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 96566 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/322/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 F.2d 931", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2148605 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/396/0931-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2634715 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5382993 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/118/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 A.L.R. 576", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 2d 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1587072 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/116/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2916855 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3349558 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 849024 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/239/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ill. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5274658 ], "year": 1909, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/348/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" }, { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 979", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2715691 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3409990 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907483 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994719 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3292000 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2795345 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0552-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 700, "char_count": 11862, "ocr_confidence": 0.839, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.753128054927868e-07, "percentile": 0.832899524257978 }, "sha256": "ae44ec6902277f96d98c8285fa175567fa8d9a00a90ded3d2d3c105abf4011a0", "simhash": "1:f1ea9597b224fcc3", "word_count": 1897 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:57:25.292444+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILLIAM D. CROWELL, Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. BILANDIC, Mayor, et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, William D. Crowell, a patrolman in the Chicago Police Department, was charged in a complaint filed before the Chicago Police Board (Board) with attempting to obstruct a departmental investigation into a complaint that plaintiff had solicited a bribe. Following an extensive hearing before a hearing officer designated by the Board, that officer and the Board on January 18, 1973, unanimously discharged plaintiff, concluding that he made \u201cseveral attempts to impede, influence and obstruct said investigation by personally contacting William K. Neal [complainant] and attempting to persuade him not to cooperate with the Departmental Investigation and in furtherance of his attempts to impede the investigation he did execute a written note wherein it stated in substance that William K. Neal notified Director Conrad of the Internal Affairs Division of the Chicago Police Department that the Respondent was not the officer involved in his complaint, and Respondent urged Neal to present same either verbally or in writing to the Department, thereby impeding the Department\u2019s efforts of achieving its goal of maintaining honesty and integrity within the Department.\u201d\nOn July 17 the circuit court of Cook County, acting on administrative review, affirmed the Board\u2019s decision discharging plaintiff and on May 15, 1974, denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for a rehearing. The appellate court affirmed [Crowell v. Police Board (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 552), and this court denied leave to appeal.\nOn March 10, 1977, plaintiff filed a petition pursuant to section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 72) to vacate the circuit court judgment. He alleged that on December 15, 1976, he first discovered that Morgan Murphy, one of the members of the Board ordering plaintiff\u2019s discharge, was the uncle of William Murphy, one of plaintiff\u2019s superior officers and deputy chief of the third patrol area to which plaintiff had been assigned. It is clear that William Murphy\u2019s name had appeared on the original list of witnesses prior to the initial hearing, but he did not testify. However, the complaining witness, William K. Neal, on direct and cross-examination, testified that he had received a telephone call from William Murphy concerning Neal\u2019s complaint against plaintiff. Apparently the $200 which Neal stated he had paid plaintiff to avoid a drug charge had been repaid to Neal, and he was reluctant to pursue his complaint. The purpose of Murphy\u2019s call had been to urge Neal\u2019s cooperation with departmental officials in the prosecution. There was no mention made of William Murphy in plaintiff\u2019s testimony, and there does not appear to have been any additional reference to him during the hearing other than on a copy of a statement, presented as an exhibit, which was made by Neal to Sergeant William Hines and which referred to Neal\u2019s conversation with William Murphy.\nIn his section 72 petition plaintiff also alleged that William Murphy was \u201cone of the chief investigative officers in his case, and one of his superiors who had a substantial interest in the matter, a substantial prejudice against him and, was the moving force or at least one of the persons primarily responsible for the bringing of charges.\u201d Plaintiff also alleged that William Murphy had rejected the recommendation of Julius Watson, commander of the seventh district, to dismiss the case as \u201cunfounded\u201d or \u201cnot sustained,\u201d and had initiated his own investigation of the charges, ordering plaintiff to appear before the Office of Internal Affairs Division of the Chicago police department. It was further alleged \u201c[t]hat \u2018bad blood\u2019 or a personality conflict existed between Plaintiff and William Murphy\u201d as illustrated by allegedly unfair investigations ordered by Murphy regarding plaintiff\u2019s mistaken use of tear gas to effect an arrest and his failure to notify the station or his partner of his absence due to illness. Plaintiff also alleged that William Murphy attempted to transfer him after plaintiff refused to serve as Murphy\u2019s confidential informant on corruption in the third area, and that Murphy then stated \u201cthat there were only two (2) kinds of patrolmen, to-wit: \u2018those in my club and those out of my club. You are now out.\u2019 \u201d Plaintiff cited our Rule 67 providing for the disqualification of a judge in any case in which a close relative, including a nephew, \u201cis a party, has an interest, or appears as counsel.\u201d (73 Ill. 2d R. 67.) Asserting that Rule 67 applies- also to members of a police board, plaintiff alleged that William Murphy\u2019s involvement in the department\u2019s investigation of plaintiff required Morgan Murphy to disqualify himself from participation in the Board action. Morgan Murphy\u2019s failure to do so, plaintiff alleged, denied him due process and equal protection despite the unanimous decision of the five-member board and the hearing officer. Plaintiff accordingly sought reversal of that decision and reinstatement with full pay and allowances.\nApparently no testimony was taken at the hearing on the section 72 petition. The trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition had not been filed within the 2-year limitation period. It found that William Murphy had instituted disciplinary action against plaintiff and that he was actively engaged in the investigation and prosecution of charges against the plaintiff. It also concluded that Supreme Court Rule 67 applied to the police board proceedings. Finding that William Murphy\u2019s uncle, Morgan Murphy, participated in those proceedings, the court vacated the Board\u2019s decision, ordered the reinstatement of plaintiff with full pay and allowances from the date of his suspension, and noted that \u201c[n] othing contained herein shall be construed as barring the Superintendent of Police from proceeding anew before the Police Board on the charges previously made against Plaintiff.\u201d The court indicated that its decision did \u201cnot imply that it found that undue influence was present but rather that the decision of the Police Board was tainted by the participation of Morgan Murphy in its deliberations and decision in light of Morgan Murphy\u2019s relationship to William Murphy.\u201d On appeal to the appellate court, that court held a section 72 petition to be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and found no abuse in that court\u2019s exercise of its discretion. The appellate court, however, reversed the trial court\u2019s reinstatement of plaintiff with full back pay, holding the proper remedy was to remand to the police board for a new hearing on the charges. 77 Ill. App. 3d 162.\nPetitions filed pursuant to section 72 are subject to the following time limitations:\n\u201c(1) Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in this Section. ***\n***\n(3) The petition must be filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment. Time during which the person seeking relief is under legal disability or duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed shall be excluded in computing the period of 2 years.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 72.)\nAs earlier noted, the trial court\u2019s final order, affirming the police board\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff, was entered on July 17, 1973, and plaintiff\u2019s motion for a rehearing was denied on May 15, 1974. Plaintiff\u2019s section 72 petition, however, was not filed until March 10, 1977. It is accordingly clear that plaintiff\u2019s petition was not filed within the 2-year limitation period. In that petition, plaintiff neither referred to the time limitation nor alleged any of the grounds provided in section 72 for tolling it. While the trial judge gave no reason for regarding the petition as timely, the appellate court, despite the absence of any reference by petitioner to the question of his petition\u2019s timeliness, found its allegations sufficient to support a finding of fraudulent concealment and therefore concluded that the trial court\u2019s determination was not an abuse of discretion.\nWe believe, however, that the 2-year limitation mandated by section 72 must be adhered to in the absence of a clear showing that \u201cthe person seeking relief is under legal disability or duress or the ground for relief is fraudulently concealed ***.\u201d (See People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 286, 317; People v. Colletti (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 135, 137; Agorianitis v. Ress (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 325, 328; Marin v. Grimm (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 979.) The purpose of this section\u2019s time limitation is a salutary one \u2014 to establish necessary stability and finality in judicial proceedings. (See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions sec. 18 (1970); 53 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions sec. 1 (1948).) Even if we were to adopt the generous construction given plaintiff\u2019s petition by the appellate court, the allegations of that petition do not support a finding of fraudulent concealment. It is well established that fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll a statute of limitations requires affirmative acts or representations designed to prevent discovery of the cause of action or ground for relief. (Chicago Park District, v. Kenroy, Inc. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 555, 561; Skrodzki v. Sherman State Bank (1932), 348 Ill. 403, 407; Lancaster v. Springer (1909), 239 Ill. 472, 482; Schmitz v. Hoffmann (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 130, 132; Johnson v. Hawkins (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 29, 32-33; Bush v. Continental Casualty Co. (1969), 116 Ill. App. 2d 94, 100.) In Kenroy we emphasized that \u201c[s] ilence alone on the part of the defendant, accompanied by the failure of the plaintiff to discover the cause of action, ordinarily does not constitute fraudulent concealment.\u201d (78 Ill. 2d 555, 561.) There, while discussing fraudulent concealment in the context of section 22 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 23), we followed a widely recognized exception to this general rule in those instances when the existence of a fiduciary relationship is clearly established. (Annot., 173 A.L.R. 576, 588 (1948); see Vigus v. O\u2019Bannon (1886), 118 Ill. 334, 346; County of Cook v. Barrett (1975), 36 Ill. App. 3d 623, 635; see also Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Casualty Hospital (D.C. Cir. 1967), 396 F.2d 931, 937-38 n.33; Sheets v. Burman (5th Cir. 1963), 322 F.2d 277, 279-80; Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Insurance Co. (Iowa 1979), 282 N.W.2d 639, 646-47; Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman (Del. 1976), 372 A.2d 168, 170-71; Higbee v. Walsh (1940), 229 Iowa 408, 423-24, 294 N.W. 597, 605-06; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions sec. 149 (1979).) Here, however, plaintiff has alleged neither the existence of a fiduciary relationship nor that the defendant engaged in affirmative acts or representations calculated to prevent discovery of the asserted ground for relief. In the absence of such allegations, plaintiff\u2019s petition was effectively barred by the 2-year limitation in section 72.\nRule 67, by its terms, does not apply to administrative agencies, and we do not reach the question whether a Board member\u2019s participation in the proceedings under these circumstances would be objectionable under ordinary due process considerations. We hold only that, under the circumstances present here, plaintiff\u2019s section 72 petition\" was barred by the 2-year limitation period.\nThe judgments of the circuit court of Cook County and of the appellate court are accordingly reversed.\nJudgments reversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD" } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Quinlan, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Robert Retke and Edmund Hatfield, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellants.", "Charles Locker, of Chicago (Leo T. McGonigal, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 52830.\nWILLIAM D. CROWELL, Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. BILANDIC, Mayor, et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed September 15, 1980.\nWilliam R. Quinlan, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Robert Retke and Edmund Hatfield, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellants.\nCharles Locker, of Chicago (Leo T. McGonigal, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0422-01", "first_page_order": 508, "last_page_order": 515 }