{ "id": 5474833, "name": "RAYMOND R. ESCHER, Appellant, v. NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Escher v. Norfolk & Western Railway", "decision_date": "1980-10-17", "docket_number": "No. 52777", "first_page": "110", "last_page": "115", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 110" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "240 F.2d 574", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 420079 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/240/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 F.2d 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 394514 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/248/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 U.S. 138", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166482 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/361/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 F.2d 996", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 141340 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/333/0996-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 F.2d 509", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1044212 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/538/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 U.S. 500", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6162070 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/352/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 967", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3288327 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0967-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 496, "char_count": 7851, "ocr_confidence": 0.849, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.401672320850959e-08, "percentile": 0.5159544050637701 }, "sha256": "9ef10baca16507b3f8a670e81f2a6d7efaee79213a2a204ecb039f1da634a876", "simhash": "1:5ca3ebaae23564cf", "word_count": 1341 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:05:09.345663+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RAYMOND R. ESCHER, Appellant, v. NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn the circuit court of Madison County, plaintiff, Raymond R. Escher, brought suit against the defendant, Norfolk & Western Railway Company, under the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act (Act) (45 U.S.C. sec. 51 et seq. (1976)), to recover for injuries he suffered while working for the defendant. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $30,000. The appellate court reversed, finding that plaintiff had failed in his burden of proof and that, consequently, the trial court had erred by not directing a verdict in favor of the defendant. (77 Ill. App. 3d 967.) The case is before us on a certificate of importance.\nThe sole issue to be determined is whether the plaintiff produced sufficient competent evidence to sustain the jury\u2019s verdict.\nOn March 26, 1974, the plaintiff, employed by defendant as a carman, was in the company roundhouse awaiting the 3 p.m. buzzer to signal the end of his shift. As soon as the buzzer sounded, plaintiff testified, he moved toward the exit door, following 2Vz feet behind another employee, Stanley Schneider. He was looking directly at Schneider\u2019s back as they approached the door. Plaintiff further testified that Schneider opened the door but that \u201cit didn\u2019t open like it normally should have, and I just *** bumped into him, and I stepped on the back of his foot.\u201d Plaintiff thought at the time that he had sprained his left ankle.\nStanley Schneider testified at trial and stated that he had no difficulty with the door at the time of the accident nor at any other time prior to the incident. He stated that he merely stopped in order to open the door and that plaintiff stepped on his heel.\nThe next day plaintiff returned to work, at which time he reported the incident to his supervisor, Joseph Whitley. Whitley testified that plaintiff had said he turned his ankle when he stepped on the back of Schneider\u2019s foot as they were going out the door the previous afternoon. Whitley prepared a report of the incident on March 27, 1974. He also tested the door and found it to be functioning properly.\nFour months after the incident, plaintiff went to the company physician, Dr. Diaz, who took X rays of the ankle and administered heat treatments. In January of 1976, approximately PA years after seeing the company physician, plaintiff went to Dr. Heidke at the request of his attorney. Dr. Heidke referred the plaintiff to Dr. Richard Koenig, who did not examine plaintiff until 13 months later, in February of 1977. Dr. Koenig testified that he based his opinion of plaintiff\u2019s condition on X rays taken earlier by Dr. Heidke, which X rays indicated mended breaks in three or four bones of plaintiff\u2019s ankle.\nRichard Bain, a general contractor, testified as an expert for plaintiff. Bain stated that he inspected the door in question in September 1977, three years and eight months after plaintiff was injured. He found, at that time, that a brass screw in the doorknob had worn out, causing the latch to slip, and that a metal strip at the top of the door was not properly welded and caused the door to jam. He also stated that the door in question was a light commercial variety which should be used only for light traffic. On cross-examination, Bain admitted that he had no knowledge of the condition of the door at the time of plaintiff\u2019s injury.\nThe Supreme Court has clearly set out the standard to be applied, in FELA actions, to determine if a plaintiff has presented a jury question:\n\u201cUnder this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. (1957), 352 U.S. 500, 506, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493, 499, 77 S. Ct. 443, 448.)\nWe recognize that, under the Act, the right of the jury to pass upon the question of the employer\u2019s negligence must be liberally construed, since the jury\u2019s power to engage in inferences is significantly broader than that under the common law. (Eggert v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (2d Cir. 1976), 538 F.2d 509, 511; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Melcher (8th Cir. 1964), 333 F.2d 996, 999.) However, the plaintiff must produce some evidence of negligence on the part of the employer before the case may be given to the jury. (Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. (1959), 361 U.S. 138, 140, 4 L. Ed. 2d 198, 201, 80 S. Ct. 242, 243; Milom v. New York Central R.R. Co. (7th Cir. 1957), 248 F.2d 52, 54.) Also, a nonnegligent employer cannot be held liable for an ordinary accident which occurs in a reasonably safe work environment. Burch v. Reading Co. (3d Cir. 1957), 240 F.2d 574, 580.\nThe plaintiff argues that the appellate court erred in its finding that part of Bain\u2019s testimony regarding the \u201cbrass screw\u201d and \u201cmetal strip\u201d of the door was inadmissible. The appellate court so held because the inspection was made more than 314 years after the time of the accident, during which time the door had been used over 80,000 times. We agree with the appellate court\u2019s conclusion, in that the condition of the door 314 years after the time of plaintiff\u2019s injury is irrelevant absent a foundation in the evidence to show that the condition of the door was the same at the time of Bain\u2019s inspection as it was at the time of the incident.\nThe remaining portion of Bain\u2019s testimony, in which he commented that the door was one of a light commercial variety, amounts to a volunteered conclusion. It does not address the question for which his testimony was elicited, i. e., the safety of the door at the time of plaintiff\u2019s injury. The fact that a heavier door might have been used does not prescribe a conclusion that a lighter one was unsafe.\nOther than Bain\u2019s testimony, the only remaining evidence is plaintiff\u2019s own statement that the door \u201cdidn\u2019t open like it should have, and [he] just *** bumped into [Schneider] and *** stepped on the back of his foot.\u201d However, plaintiff\u2019s own statement also made it clear that he could not have observed the actual opening of the door, because his view was blocked by Schneider\u2019s back. Schneider, who clearly saw the door function, testified that he had no trouble opening the door. We therefore conclude that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE MORAN" }, { "text": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH,\ndissenting:\nI dissent. The majority, although accurately stating the test to determine whether the plaintiff presented a jury question, has not correctly applied it to the evidence in this case.\nThe transcript shows that plaintiff testified that, for a period of approximately two months prior to the occurrence, \u201cthe door would jam a lot of times and the door knob would not turn. It was just a bad door in my opinion.\u201d He also testified: \u201cAs we got to the door I did not open the door. Like I say, Mr. Schneider opened the door, but it didn\u2019t open like it normally should have ***.\u201d\nOn cross-examination he stated: \u201cMr. Schneider was right at the door. The door did not open.\u201d \u201cHe bumped into the door and thereafter we got the door opened and walked out.\u201d\nMr. Schneider\u2019s testimony did not conflict with plaintiff\u2019s testimony, and, under the controlling cases, whether the defendant employer\u2019s negligence played any part in causing plaintiff\u2019s injury was a question of fact for the jury. I would reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate the judgment entered on the jury verdict.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Morris B. Chapman, of Chapman & Carlson, of Granite City, for appellant.", "Karl D. Dexheimer, of Pope & Driemeyer, of Belleville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 52777.\nRAYMOND R. ESCHER, Appellant, v. NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee.\nOpinion filed October 17, 1980.\nGOLDENHERSH, C.J., dissenting.\nMorris B. Chapman, of Chapman & Carlson, of Granite City, for appellant.\nKarl D. Dexheimer, of Pope & Driemeyer, of Belleville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0110-01", "first_page_order": 122, "last_page_order": 127 }