{ "id": 5474382, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RONALD JEROME WEATHINGTON, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Weathington", "decision_date": "1980-10-17", "docket_number": "No. 52685", "first_page": "183", "last_page": "187", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 183" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1588345 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/115/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440503 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 F. Supp. 938", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 2782314 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "959" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/280/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S. Ct. 867", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 L. Ed. 2d 776", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 1083", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11425991, 11426121, 11425643, 11425709, 11425780, 11425846, 11426071, 11425915 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/1083-06", "/us/393/1083-08", "/us/393/1083-01", "/us/393/1083-02", "/us/393/1083-03", "/us/393/1083-04", "/us/393/1083-07", "/us/393/1083-05" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2855718 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-99" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3281624 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0173-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 442, "char_count": 6856, "ocr_confidence": 0.843, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5819847976299294e-07, "percentile": 0.8173082677793184 }, "sha256": "fcafaae606bb765e1d0c6153558624beb0069320fbc27a7a6f74b0d5c8c26827", "simhash": "1:fa88d1eaf32cb2ef", "word_count": 1121 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:05:09.345663+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RONALD JEROME WEATHINGTON, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Ronald Jerome Weathington, was convicted of aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4) and restricting or obstructing a police officer (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 31 \u2014 1) by a jury in the circuit court of Champaign County. After a hearing on a post-trial motion, the trial court vacated the judgment as to the aggravated battery conviction and denied the motion to vacate the judgment of conviction for resisting or obstructing a police officer. The defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed the trial court as to the resisting or obstructing charge. (76 Ill. App. 3d 173.) The State appealed pursuant to Rule 315(a). 73 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).\nOn September 8, 1978, at approximately 8 a.m., Champaign police officers in an unmarked car were patrolling in the area of Champaign Centennial High School. They observed some students crouching in the north parking lot who appeared to be gambling with dice. The officers drove over to the students, stopped and asked the defendant if he had any dice. The defendant replied he did not. One of the officers searched the defendant and found the dice. Another officer began talking with the defendant and \u201cpoked\u201d the defendant in the chest several times with his finger. The defendant attempted to push the officer\u2019s hand away and hit the officer\u2019s sleeve twice. The defendant was thereupon arrested for aggravated battery and transported to Champaign County jail.\nAt the jail, officer John Schuffert asked defendant for his name, address, birth date, birth place, social security number, occupation, and physical description. Initially, defendant refused to give any information to Schuffert, even though Schuffert asked for defendant\u2019s identification several times. Schuffert warned defendant that he was required by law to disclose the information, and after numerous requests, defendant gave his name, address, and date of birth. Defendant refused to disclose any further information. Defendant was then placed in a holding cell, and, after a few minutes, he agreed to provide the rest of the information.\nDefendant testified that he refused to answer the remainder of Schuffert\u2019s questions until after he was placed in the holding cell. Defendant also indicated that he twice requested the use of the telephone to call his mother, but Schuffert would not allow defendant to do so until he answered all of Schuffert\u2019s questions. After defendant answered the booking questions, he was allowed to place a telephone call to his mother. The officer testified he did not recall whether the defendant had asked to make a telephone call.\nOn appeal to the appellate court the defendant argued that the right to remain silent guaranteed by the United States and Illinois constitutions prohibits his prosecution for refusing to answer booking questions after arrest. The defendant also argued that his refusal to answer did not constitute the crime of resisting or obstructing a police officer. Section 31 \u2014 1 provides:\n\u201cA person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer of any authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 31 \u2014 1.)\nThe appellate court agreed that the defendant\u2019s conduct did not come within the elements of section 31 \u2014 1. The court also stated that \u201c[i]t would be incongruent to say that one may remain silent and yet must provide \u2018booking\u2019 information.\u201d 76 Ill. App. 3d 173, 177.\nIn People v. Roby (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 392, cert. denied (1969), 393 U.S. 1083, 21 L. Ed. 2d 776, 89 S. Ct. 867, we quoted with approval the following explanation of what constitutes a violation of section 31 \u2014 1:\n\u201c[T] he statutory terms [resisting or obstructing] \u2018convey commonly recognized meanings. \u201cResisting\u201d or \u201cresistance\u201d means \u201cwithstanding the force or effect of\u201d or the \u201cexertion of oneself to counteract or defeat.\u201d \u201cObstruct\u201d means \u201cto be or come in the way of.\u201d These terms are alike in that they imply some physical act or exertion. Given a reasonable and natural construction, these terms do not proscribe mere argument with a policeman about the validity of an arrest or other police action, but proscribe only some physical act which imposes an obstacle which may impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent or delay the performance of the officer\u2019s duties, such as going limp, forcefully resisting arrest or physically aiding a third party to avoid arrest.\u2019 (280 F. Supp. at 959.) We agree with these observations, and we hold that section 31 \u2014 1 is neither vague nor overbroad.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Raby (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 392, 398-99, quoting Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968), 280 F. Supp. 938, 959.\nIn the instant case, the defendant twice asked the officer if he could call his mother. The officer insisted that the booking questions be answered first. The defendant answered three of the questions and then refused to answer any more. The officer then placed the defendant in a detaining cell until, a few minutes later, the defendant agreed to answer the remaining questions. At that time, the defendant was permitted to make a telephone call to his mother.\nWe think that in these circumstances, where the defendant merely argued with the officer as to when he would answer the booking questions and then, after an indefinite but certainly a brief time, did answer the questions, no offense took place. No physical act of resistance or obstruction occurred; merely argument coupled with eventual cooperation. The defendant is therefore not guilty of violating section 31 \u2014 1. (People v. Holdman (1975), 73 Ill. 2d 213, 222; People v. Raby (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 392, 399, cert. denied (1969), 393 U.S. 1083; 21 L. Ed. 2d 776, 89 S. Ct. 867.) Because we decide that the defendant engaged in mere argument with the officer, we need not decide, as the State urges, whether an activity falling between mere argument and a physical act could constitute a violation of section 31 \u2014 1. (See People v. Gibbs (1969), 115 Ill. App. 2d 113, 118.) Accordingly, for the reason stated, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE CLARK" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Donald B. Mackay, Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., and Suzan Sutherland, of Chicago, Assistant Attorneys General, and Gary J. Anderson and Larry Wechter, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and David Bergschneider, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 52685.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RONALD JEROME WEATHINGTON, Appellee.\nOpinion filed October 17, 1980.\nWilliam J. Scott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Donald B. Mackay, Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., and Suzan Sutherland, of Chicago, Assistant Attorneys General, and Gary J. Anderson and Larry Wechter, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and David Bergschneider, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0183-01", "first_page_order": 195, "last_page_order": 199 }