{ "id": 5469875, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LEONARD MYERS, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People of Illinois v. Myers", "decision_date": "1981-06-04", "docket_number": "No. 53635", "first_page": "281", "last_page": "291", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 281" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464699 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5470220 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ill. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2426298 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/300/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 Ill. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2480424 ], "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/382/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 S. Ct. 1380", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 1644", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 U.S. 874", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 377059, 377221, 377317, 377320, 377070, 377211, 377213 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/328/0874-06", "/us/328/0874-07", "/us/328/0874-03", "/us/328/0874-01", "/us/328/0874-05", "/us/328/0874-04", "/us/328/0874-02" ] }, { "cite": "385 Ill. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5305738 ], "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/385/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5578818 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2713818 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/7/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Va. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 6808832 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/207/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 S.W.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10140349 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/438/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 P.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Wash. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1104389 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/90/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11071752 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/388/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2896442 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480573 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473887 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811945 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2895244 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454447 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. 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Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 894", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6405124, 6405222, 6405325, 6406317, 6405935, 6405421, 6405041, 6405555, 6404951, 6405786, 6405661, 6406111 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0894-03", "/us/434/0894-04", "/us/434/0894-05", "/us/434/0894-12", "/us/434/0894-10", "/us/434/0894-06", "/us/434/0894-02", "/us/434/0894-07", "/us/434/0894-01", "/us/434/0894-09", "/us/434/0894-08", "/us/434/0894-11" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809127 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 S. Ct. 2858", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 L. Ed. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 929", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531938, 1532133, 1531912, 1532010, 1532202, 1532170, 1532021, 1531990, 1532122, 1532092, 1531806 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0929-02", "/us/442/0929-01", "/us/442/0929-10", "/us/442/0929-11", "/us/442/0929-03", "/us/442/0929-08", "/us/442/0929-04", "/us/442/0929-09", "/us/442/0929-05", "/us/442/0929-06", "/us/442/0929-07" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994485 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073050 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185347 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 386", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163207 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 U.S. 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5719289 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/284/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 1073", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5556666 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/1073-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 881, "char_count": 15875, "ocr_confidence": 0.847, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.558942636347604e-07, "percentile": 0.9811792116065454 }, "sha256": "154decdb1d21f75d98621e0240891f986d3e62129b4a955fdb555838bf969f8b", "simhash": "1:a02059338da588d8", "word_count": 2643 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:29:00.213292+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LEONARD MYERS, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Leonard Myers, was convicted by a Will County jury of attempted murder, armed violence, armed robbery, and aggravated kidnaping. He received concurrent sentences of 20 years\u2019 imprisonment for each offense. The appellate court vacated the conviction and sentence for attempted murder and otherwise affirmed. (83 Ill. App. 3d 1073.) We granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal from the reversal of the attempted-murder judgment.\nTestimony of the State\u2019s witnesses, Melvin Schmidt, Kevin Jensen and Dr. William Sims, as to the following events was uncontradicted. On the night of June 15, 1978, three young men, Rick Landeen, Jensen, and Schmidt, were returning, in Jensen\u2019s Thunderbird, from a baseball game in Chicago. Jensen offered a ride to three men, Elijah Barfield, Jerry DeLooch, and the defendant, who were walking along 1-55. The three accepted, and Jensen proceeded to deliver Landeen to his home in La Grange. The other five then continued, making one stop so that Jensen, Barfield, DeLooch, and defendant could steal some gas. The auto traveled generally southward, with Jensen driving, Schmidt in the right-front passenger seat, and the other three in the rear seat. Realizing that he would not have enough gas to reach his own home if he took the three hitchhikers any farther toward their Joliet-Lockport destination, Jensen stopped the car near an 1-55 interchange to let them out.\nAt that point, defendant, who was seated behind Schmidt, and who apparently had concealed in his clothing an old rusty machete with a blade approximately 10 to 12 inches in length, placed the machete against Schmidt\u2019s throat and held it there with his hands cupped, underhanded, cutting the neck almost immediately. Jensen then agreed to take the defendant farther and pulled onto 1-55. Barfield, who was seated behind Jensen, held a gun to Jensen\u2019s head. Schmidt had instinctively grabbed defendant\u2019s wrists and struggled for approximately a minute in an attempt to pull the machete away from his throat, but submitted when defendant told him, \u201cGet your hands down or I am going to cut your head off.\u201d After Schmidt lowered his hands, he testified that defendant started \u201cyanking\u201d even harder \u201ctwisting or working the knife into me.\u201d Defendant ignored Schmidt\u2019s ruse in requesting a cigarette, as well as his appeal that defendant put the knife down.\nAccording to Jensen\u2019s testimony, the defendant twice moved the knife from Schmidt\u2019s throat in order to menace Jensen. Defendant, apparently fearing that consulting a map was intended to enable those in passing cars to see him with a knife at Schmidt\u2019s throat, first threatened Jensen with the knife when Jensen started to turn on the car\u2019s map light. Jensen did not turn on the light at that point, but both Jensen and Schmidt testified that, when Jensen later turned it on, defendant moved the knife from Schmidt\u2019s throat and cut Jensen\u2019s fingernail by \u201cflicking\u201d the knife across Jensen\u2019s thumb. Defendant then moved the knife back to Schmidt\u2019s throat and gave \u201ca pretty hefty yank\u201d on it. Schmidt asked the defendant if he could spit blood out the window, because it felt as if his throat was filling with blood, and he couldn\u2019t breathe. Although defendant refused permission, Schmidt tried to spit anyway. Jensen then told defendant to take the car, \u201cJust take it, let us off.\u201d Defendant, however, told Bar-field, referring to Schmidt, to \u201cKnock him out\u201d or \u201cPut him out.\u201d Barfield then struck Schmidt\u2019s head approximately six times with the gun, while defendant was vigorously \u201cyanking\u201d on Schmidt\u2019s throat with the knife. As the gun was taken from Jensen\u2019s head to strike Schmidt, Jensen heard air whistling through Schmidt\u2019s wound, indicating that the windpipe had been cut.\nDefendant then ordered Jensen to drive off 1-55 onto a highway, and onto a side road, and the car then began to run out of gas. Defendant lowered the knife from Schmidt\u2019s throat and asked for his wallet, which Schmidt gave him. Thereafter Schmidt used both hands to try to hold his neck together. The car stopped completely at a point on the road where some house lights were visible in the distance. Defendant then dragged Schmidt by the neck from the car, frisked him, and took him to the front of the car, Schmidt stumbling several times against it. There Schmidt leaned against Jensen, whom Barfield had forced to stand in front of the still-burning headlights. Defendant told Jensen and Schmidt, \u201cDon\u2019t run towards the lights or you will be finished off.\u201d\nBoth Jensen and Schmidt testified that they had believed that Schmidt would die of his injuries. Schmidt testified that he had been \u201creally woozy\u201d and unable to walk to the lights. Since the cars on the road would not stop for them, Jensen finally jumped in front of one in order to stop it. Schmidt got into the car and asked to be taken to a hospital. At the hospital he was taken immediately to an operating room because of the seriousness of his injuries. The surgeon who treated him testified that he had suffered a 414 inch wound, which was \u201cgaping wide.\u201d The wound, which was approximately 5/8 inch to 3/4 inch deep at its deepest point, had opened Schmidt\u2019s windpipe, and, had it penetrated just a little more deeply, would have hit the carotid artery and jugular vein. The surgeon testified that there was an immediate danger of suffocation from blood being taken into the lungs. It is apparent from the testimony and exhibits, including Schmidt\u2019s blood-soaked shirt and T-shirt and photographs of the interior and exterior of the car that he had lost a substantial amount of blood.\nThe definitions of the crimes of attempt, armed violence, and aggravated battery are relevant in our consideration of this case:\n\u201cSec. 8 \u2014 4. Attempt, (a) Elements of the Offense.\nA person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 4.\n\u201cSec. 33A \u2014 2. Armed violence \u2014 Elements of the offense. A person commits armed violence when, while armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois Law.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch.\n38, par. 33A \u2014 2.\n\u201cSec. 12 \u2014 4. Aggravated Battery.\n(a) A person who, in committing a battery, intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement commits aggravated battery.\n(b) A person who, in committing a battery either:\n(1) Uses a deadly weapon;\ncommits aggravated battery.\n(d) Sentence.\nAggravated battery is a Class 3 felony.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12-4.\nThe appellate court held that the attempted murder here was a lesser included offense in the armed-violence charge, a holding which the parties and we agree is incorrect. Regardless of whether attempted murder is ever a lesser included offense of armed violence (see Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed. 306,52 S. Ct. 180; Gore v. United States (1958), 357 U.S. 386, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405, 78 S. Ct. 1280; Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410, 65 L. Ed. 2d 228, 100 S. Ct. 2260), it clearly was not so here (People v. Smith (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 298, 306; People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 329, 346-47, cert. denied (1979), 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 296, 99 S. Ct. 2858). The armed-violence conviction here was based upon the underlying felony of aggravated battery, which does not require proof of the intent to kill necessary for the attempted-murder conviction. People v. Trinkle (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 198.\nWhile defendant does not claim any violation of double jeopardy principles, the case does present a question whether defendant\u2019s behavior, under the doctrine of People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, cert denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 273, can support convictions and concurrent sentences for attempted murder and for armed violence based on aggravated battery. Defendant argues that both offenses were based on the same physical act, the cutting of Schmidt\u2019s neck. In King, this court stated:\n\u201cPrejudice results to the defendant only in those instances where more than one offense is carved from the same physical act. Prejudice, with regard to multiple acts, exists only when the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, some of which are, by definition, lesser included offenses. Multiple convictions and concurrent sentences should be permitted in all other cases where a defendant has committed several acts, despite the interrelationship of those acts. \u2018Act,\u2019 when used in this sense, is intended to mean any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense. We hold, therefore, that when more than one offense arises from a series of incidental or closely related acts and the offenses are not, by definition, lesser included offenses, convictions with concurrent sentences can be entered.\u201d (66 Ill. 2d 551, 566.)\nIn King this court abandoned the \u201cindependent motivation\u201d test with respect to multiple convictions and concurrent sentences (see People v. Scott (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 85) and effectively broadened the circumstances under which they could be imposed. (Compare People v. Stewart (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 310.) As long as there are multiple acts as defined in King, their interrelationship does not preclude multiple convictions and the imposition of concurrent sentences based upon them. For example, one \u201cstickup,\u201d involving armed robbery of several victims, supports multiple convictions. People v. Thomas (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 388.\nAccording to Jensen, the defendant moved the knife from Schmidt\u2019s neck twice while threatening Jensen. The distinctness of the first movement is unclear. However, it would seem logical that it amounted to a physical act, since the fact that Jensen felt sufficiently menaced that he did not turn on the light indicates the action would have supported an assault conviction (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 1). In any event, the record is clear from testimony of both Jensen and Schmidt that, when Jensen did turn on the map light, defendant moved the knife a sufficient distance from Schmidt\u2019s throat to cut Jensen\u2019s fingernail. That movement clearly amounted to \u201can overt or outward manifestation sufficient to support a different offense,\u201d since the cutting necessarily involved a movement of some distance and would support a charge of battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 3). Each movement toward Jensen interrupted the attack on Schmidt. Since the movement toward Jensen was a distinct physical act, there were at least two physical acts with respect to Schmidt.\nFurther, both the movement of the knife from Jensen\u2019s fingernail to Schmidt\u2019s throat, and the subsequent \u201cpretty hefty yank\u201d on the neck, which the jury could reasonably conclude was the blow which severed the windpipe, were sufficient to constitute physical acts separate from the first cut on Schmidt\u2019s neck. Two separate invasions of Schmidt\u2019s body, even though closely related by reason of the fact that they attacked the same area of his body and were close in time, were not one physical act. If a jury believes that a defendant wounds a victim, then, after an intervening attack on a third person, attacks the original victim again, whether there is only one physical act cannot depend, as defendant implies, upon whether the defendant was careful to insert the knife through the same open wound.\nDefendant also contends that it was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to kill Schmidt. As earlier noted, a conviction for attempted murder must be supported by proof that the defendant had a specific intent to kill the victim. The instructions in the present case, to which no objection has been raised, adequately informed the jury of that requirement. People v. Barker (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 319; People v. Jones (1979), 81 Ill. 2d 1.\nThe specific intent to kill, a state of mind, may be shown by circumstances. (People v. Barker (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 319; People v. Jones (1979), 81 Ill. 2d 1; People v. Koshiol (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 573.) Here, the jury could have concluded from the testimony and exhibits that the defendant believed, as did Jensen and Schmidt, that Schmidt would bleed to death from his injuries and that defendant had done all that was necessary to achieve that result. (See Zickefoose v. State (1979),---Ind.---, 388 N.E.2d 507.) Or, possibly, the jury could have accepted the argument that the machete was so dull and rusty that defendant found it difficult to accomplish his purpose and did not want to use Barfield\u2019s gun because of the possibility of attracting attention. Or the jury might have regarded defendant as a sadist who preferred leaving his victim to suffocate or bleed to death, a not inconceivable situation in view of the evidence. In Jones even instructions containing error with respect to specific intent were held harmless, because the intent to kill was blatantly evident from circumstances, including the fact that the victim was shot four times in the back of the head. While it may be argued that four shots in the victim\u2019s head are more clearly indicative of intent to kill than is cutting the victim\u2019s throat and leaving him, with a cut windpipe, bleeding severely, and without transportation on a side road at night, the latter evidence is, in our opinion, ample to warrant a properly instructed jury inferring that defendant had formed the intent to kill Schmidt.\nEven if it could be shown that the defendant did, at the end of the incident, abandon his intent to kill Schmidt, that would not affect our decision. There is no indication that the rule in Illinois is not in accord with the majority rule (State v. Workman (1978), 90 Wash. 2d 443, 450, 584 P.2d 382, 386; State v. Thomas (Mo. 1969), 438 S.W.2d 441; Howard v. Commonwealth (1966), 207 Va. 222, 148 S.E.2d 800; 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law sec. 110 (1965), 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law sec. 76 (1961)) that once the elements of attempt are complete, abandonment of the criminal purpose is no defense. People v. Hiller (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 465, 470;People v. Davis (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 454, 456. See People v. Kruse (1943), 385 Ill. 42, cert. denied (1946), 328 U.S. 874, 90 L. Ed. 1644, 66 S. Ct. 1380; People v. Anderson (1943), 382 Ill. 316;People v. Lardner (1921), 300 Ill. 264.\nDefendant also, on the basis of the arguments presented to us in People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261, asserts the unconstitutionality of the armed-violence statute, alleging it violates the due process clauses of both the Federal and State constitutions. That issue, however, was not reached by us in Har\u00f3n, and in this case was not presented to either the trial or appellate courts. It has, therefore, been waived. People v. Williams (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 179.\nThe judgment of the appellate court is accordingly reversed insofar as it vacated the conviction and sentence for attempted murder; it is affirmed insofar as it affirmed the other convictions and sentences. The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAppellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Tyrone C. Fahner and William J. Scott, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and, Edward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., and David Cassorla, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and John X. Breslin and Kenneth A. Wilhelm, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and G. Joseph Weller, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 53635.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LEONARD MYERS, Appellee.\nOpinion filed June 4, 1981.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied October 19, 1981.\nTyrone C. Fahner and William J. Scott, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and, Edward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., and David Cassorla, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and John X. Breslin and Kenneth A. Wilhelm, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and G. Joseph Weller, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0281-01", "first_page_order": 411, "last_page_order": 421 }