{ "id": 5494089, "name": "ELAINE LYONS, Appellee, v. HERITAGE HOUSE RESTAURANTS, INC., et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, Inc.", "decision_date": "1982-02-19", "docket_number": "No. 54655", "first_page": "163", "last_page": "171", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 163" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553522 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 Cal. Rptr. 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Cal. App. 3d 1008", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12141261 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3315776 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516-17" }, { "page": "517" }, { "page": "516-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3360658 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/216/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5536739 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 686, "char_count": 12880, "ocr_confidence": 0.818, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0571071784781054e-07, "percentile": 0.756067438680788 }, "sha256": "f8811ab4ded067760b482fdbd8afd99af099dd46a9047973439ee27d39616e8f", "simhash": "1:4a205bc7aa96de64", "word_count": 2030 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:33:34.158877+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ELAINE LYONS, Appellee, v. HERITAGE HOUSE RESTAURANTS, INC., et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Elaine Lyons, alleges she was dismissed by defendant Heritage House from her position as manager of kitchen operations because her superiors there learned that she had developed an early form of cancer of the uterus, a condition which she asserts would have had no effect on her ability to carry out her duties. Claiming the loss of her salary, her employee life and health insurance benefits and use of the company car, she brought suit in the Sangamon County circuit court. That court dismissed her complaint for failure to state a cause of action; the appellate court, however, reversed (92 Ill. App. 3d 668). We granted leave to appeal and now affirm the circuit court\u2019s dismissal.\nThe sole issue in this case is whether uterine cancer can be considered a \u201chandicap\u201d within the meaning of article I, section 19, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution or the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 65\u201421 et seq.), both of which prohibit employment discrimination against the handicapped. The 1970 Illinois Constitution, article I, section 19, states, \u201cAll persons with a physical or mental handicap *** shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer.\u201d The Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act similarly provides:\n\u201cIt is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:\n(1) to refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual *** because of such individual\u2019s physical or mental handicap, unless it can be shown that the particular handicap prevents the performance of the employment involved.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 65-23.)\nThe difficulty that arises here stems from the fact that the Constitution leaves the word \u201chandicap\u201d undefined, and the Act defined \u201chandicap\u201d somewhat circularly as \u201ca handicap unrelated to one\u2019s ability to perform jobs or positions available to him for hire or promotion.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 65\u201422.) It should be noted that after the conduct in question here occurred the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act was replaced by the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 68, par. 1\u2014101 et seq.), which uses a substantially different definition. It is clear that any conduct occurring hereafter will be governed by that act.\nBackground material on the two laws is scant. Transcripts of the constitutional convention indicate that delegates were unsure of the provision\u2019s scope, and because it was submitted from the floor of the convention, there is no official committee report to examine. When asked for his definition of physically handicapped, one of the provision\u2019s sponsors explained, \u201cWell I would say polio victim, loss of one arm, a leg, finger, one eye, things like this \u2014 physically handicapped,\u201d thus adopting a narrow definition of the term. Other delegates, however, suggested that a physical handicap might also include a lisp, shortness, hemophilia, or nearsightedness. None of these personal views on the meaning of the term, not even that of the sponsor, necessarily, however, reflects the intent of the convention as a body, and therefore none can be given controlling weight. (See Eddy v. Morgan (1905), 216 Ill. 437, 449.) Background material explaining the legislature\u2019s perception of the word \u201chandicap\u201d in the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act is even less helpful. In fact, it is nonexistent.\nHandicapped themselves by this lack of information, appellate courts have devised and applied their own definitions based on analogies to other Illinois statutes and administrative rules, Federal law and the law of other States. Unfortunately, and owing to the courts\u2019 lack of access to the lawmakers\u2019 actual intent, these efforts have not always been in complete harmony.\nIn Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 512, Sears refused to hire a graduating business student who suffered from chronic kidney ailments and who had recently had a kidney transplant. Sears considered him an uninsurable risk under its self-insurance program, although conceding that he was capable of any physical activity he wished to engage in except lifting heavy weights, a skill that the position for which he was rejected did not require.\nThe court began its analysis by defining handicap as the \u201cclass of physical and mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers upon the ability of an individual to perform major life functions\u201d (67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 516-17), a definition that it probably drew from the guidelines promulgated by the Fair Employment Practices Commission under the Fair Employment Practices Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 851 et seq.), which has also been replaced by the Human Rights Act, and from the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. sec. 706(6) (1976)). The court noted that the inability to perform major life functions must be inherent in the physical or mental condition; otherwise the word \u201chandicap\u201d could be construed to include any physical or mental condition, normal or abnormal, that might unfairly cause an employer not to hire. Such a result, it felt, was not in keeping with the ordinary meaning of the term. To emphasize this point, the court, without rejecting its first definition, alternatively defined \u201chandicap\u201d as \u201ca disability *** which is generally perceived as one which severely limits the individual in performing work-related functions.\u201d (67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 517.) Applying both definitions, the court concluded that the plaintiff\u2019s condition was not a handicap.\nKubik v. CNA Financial Corp. (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, which involved a man recovering from the removal of a malignant tumor in his colon, loosely followed the reasoning in Advocates. Without referring to the second definition given in that case, the court found that the plaintiff\u2019s condition did not come within the class of physical or mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers upon the ability of the individual to perform major life functions and therefore did not constitute a handicap.\nThe appellate court\u2019s analysis in the present case contrasts with these two. First, it rejected the second definition of \u201chandicap\u201d formulated by the court in Advocates. It stated that to define \u201chandicap\u201d as a \u201cdisability which is generally perceived as one which severely limits the individual in performing work-related functions\u201d would nullify the force of the law entirely because, under both the statute and the Constitution, handicaps that interfere with the applicant\u2019s ability to do the job are expressly exempted. Instead, the appellate court apparently opted to apply the first definition proposed in Advocates. Contrary to Kubik v. CNA Financial Corp. and perhaps to Advocates itself, however, the appellate court in this case held that cancer was indeed such a physical condition and therefore a handicap within the meaning of the laws in issue.\nThe one thing the three cases appear to agree upon is that the first definition of handicap set forth in Advocates, \u201ca class of physical and mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers upon the ability of an individual to perform major life functions\u201d (67 Ill. App. 3d 512, 516-17), is a fair one. Except for the fact that the definition calls for \u201csevere barriers\u201d rather than \u201csubstantial\u201d ones, it is identical to the definition given in the guidelines promulgated under the Fair Employment Practices Act, which was similar in purpose, although different in remedy, to the laws in question, and similar to that given in the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prevents recipients of Federal funds from discriminating on the basis of a handicap. We think that the analogy drawn by the courts to these statutes is sensible; even though both came into effect after the laws in question, both were in existence at the time the actions complained of occurred.\nMoreover, we believe the definition itself comports with the ordinary understanding of the term. It refers to physical conditions that impede normal, everyday activities, rather than to any medical condition or illness. See Cal. Gov\u2019t Code sec. 12926 (Deering 1981 Supp.) (distinguishes handicap from medical condition, both of which are separately protected); American National Insurance Co. v. State of California Fair Employment Practice Com. (1981), 114 Cal. App. 3d 1008, 170 Cal. Rptr. 887 (holding that high blood pressure by itself is not a handicap); GASP v. Mecklenburg County (1979), 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (persons allergic to cigarette smoke are not handicapped); but see Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976), 14 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 344 (BNA) (affirming an administrative finding that leukemia is a handicap).\nNot all physical conditions that may give rise to discriminatory treatment are physical handicaps within the meaning of the law. Race, sex, age, although physical conditions, are not handicaps. That is one reason why they are provided for elsewhere in employment discrimination law. Not all abnormal physical conditions are handicaps. Some impose no limitations at all on everyday activity such as the lack of tonsils or an appendix, acne or dandruff; others are so temporary in effect that they cannot be considered a substantial limitation on activity, such as colds, flu or mumps. These cannot be called handicaps.\nThe problem with this definition is that it has proved itself difficult to apply to specific situations. The Kubik court found that it did not apply to cancer; the appellate court in this case held that it did. The appellate court based its decision to include cancer in the definition on its belief that the Federal Rehabiliatation Act specifically included cancer as a handicap and that the Fair Employment Practices Commission Guidelines also specifically provide as such. Nowhere does the court consider independently whether or not plaintiff\u2019s illness falls within the literal meaning of the definition.\nContrary to the appellate court\u2019s belief, the Federal Rehabilitation Act does not specifically include cancer in its list of handicaps. Rather, in defining \u201csevere handicap,\u201d it includes disabilities which require extra services and which result from blindness, cancer, cerebral palsy or a variety of other conditions. (29 U.S.C. sec. 706(13) (1979 Supp.).) It does not call cancer by itself a handicap. The Fair Employment Practices Commission Guidelines similarly do not specifically classify cancer as a handicap. Rather they offhandedly mention recovered cancer victims as persons who sometimes have experienced .trouble readjusting to employment because of their record of a handicap. Nowhere does the Commission say that cancer victims necessarily come within the definition of the handicapped. Even if it had, this court would not feel bound by such an interpretation in this case, in which we are applying the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act and the Illinois Constitution, both of which predate the laws discussed above. We do not believe it is in accord with the ordinary understanding of the term.\nThe proper approach to applying the definition of handicap, in our judgment, lies not in the analysis the appellate court developed in this case but in independently applying the following definition: the class of physical and mental conditions which are generally believed to impose severe barriers upon the ability of an individual to perform major life functions (the first definition set forth in Advocates). We note that the Fair Employment Practices Commission Guidelines define \u201clife activities\u201d to include communication, self-care, socialization, education, employment, transportation, and the like. Similarly, the United States Department of Health and Human Services defined major life activities to include activities such as caring for one\u2019s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. (45 C.F.R. 84.3(j) (2) (ii) (1980).) The plaintiff has not alleged that her cancer has substantially hindered her in any of these activities or any other activities or that her employer perceived her condition as causing such a hindrance. In our judgment, she is not handicapped within the meaning of the Illinois Constitution or the Equal Opportunities for the Handicapped Act.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SIMON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Carol J. Hansen Fines of Griffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk, Cohen & Bodew;es, of Springfield, for appellants.", "James M. Drake, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 54655.\nELAINE LYONS, Appellee, v. HERITAGE HOUSE RESTAURANTS, INC., et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed February 19, 1982.\nCarol J. Hansen Fines of Griffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk, Cohen & Bodew;es, of Springfield, for appellants.\nJames M. Drake, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0163-01", "first_page_order": 175, "last_page_order": 183 }