{ "id": 3102094, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF RUTH M. COHN, Appellee, and STUART A. COHN, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Cohn", "decision_date": "1982-10-22", "docket_number": "No. 54978", "first_page": "190", "last_page": "207", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 190" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "634 P.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Wash. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1157650 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/96/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984190 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 13", 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"cite": "413 Ill. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313970 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2716524 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448796 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958499 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 P.2d 1299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1303" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Wash. 2d 922", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1113807 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/87/0922-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664976 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "7-8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5390430 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5435770 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448227 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490156 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428-29" }, { "page": "428-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5489841 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481762 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5468816 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2701740 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/4/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5450012 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572-73" }, { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3127019 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" }, { "page": "740" }, { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0732-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1039, "char_count": 30195, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.326115305315017e-07, "percentile": 0.9585400538795891 }, "sha256": "a80629c6db577c14981cd2b7549e1073f7c5a17c19213165c1436e334fdb4502", "simhash": "1:dcbec289c314d530", "word_count": 4894 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:22.658095+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF RUTH M. COHN, Appellee, and STUART A. COHN, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe circuit court of Lake County denied a motion by petitioner, Ruth Cohn, to vacate a judgment of dissolution of her marriage to respondent, Stuart Cohn. The appellate court reversed, vacating the judgment and remanding the cause for further proceedings. (94 Ill. App. 3d 732.) We granted respondent\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.\nThe issues raised by respondent on appeal can be condensed to two essential questions: (1) Did the trial court err in this case by entering a dissolution order while reserving property disposition, child custody, and maintenance issues for future consideration? (2) If so, did a legislative amendment, effective August 14, 1981, retroactively validate the trial court\u2019s action?\nThe following is a summary of facts. On May 1, 1979, Ruth Cohn filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to respondent. On May 14, after an uncontested hearing on grounds for dissolution, the trial judge made the following oral pronouncement, as indicated by the report of proceedings:\n\u201cThe Court will find sufficient evidence to establish the grounds of extreme and repeated mental cruelty without cause or provocation by the Petitioner and enters Judgment of Dissolution instanter.\nThe Court orders that the transcript be made a part of the file. This matter will be continued for disposition of property and custody to be determined by hearing or agreement to be brought up on notice for the same.\u201d\nOn the same day, the judge signed an order, which appears to be a standard form that included blank spaces for filling in specifics. The order (with the italicized words indicating the written-in portions) stated:\n\u201cThis cause coming on to be heard in open Court on Petition and Reply heretofore filed herein and the Court having heard evidence and being now fully advised in the premises, finds sufficient evidence to establish extreme and repeated mental cruelty without cause or provocation in behalf of the Petitioner.\nIt is thereupon ordered by the Court that said cause be and the same is hereby continued to prop. disp. custody & maint. either by hearing or agreement to be brought up on notice for entry of judgment.\u201d\nThe docket sheet entry for May 14 provides:\n\u201cHearing on Petition and Response \u2014 Court finds sufficient evidence to establish extreme and repeated mental cruelty without provocation of Petitioner \u2014 Cause continued to property disposition, child custody & support, maintenance etc. upon hearing or agreement to be brought up on notice for entry of Judgment (See Order).\u201d\nOn December 12, 1979, respondent filed a motion requesting the court \u201cto enter the attached Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage in accordance with the proceedings which were held on May 14, 1979.\u201d The proposed judgment included the notation \u201cENTERED Nunc Pro Tunc May 14, 1979.\u201d On the same date, petitioner filed a response to the motion, alleging that following the May 14 hearing she and respondent resumed cohabitation as husband and wife, that as a result she became pregnant, and that she was then six months pregnant. She also alleged that she resumed cohabitation with respondent in reliance upon his representations. She moved the court to vacate, hold for naught, and expunge the proceedings and testimony held on May 14,1979.\nAfter the hearing on the motion, the trial court entered the following order:\n\u201cON MOTION *** for respondent to enter judgment herein and the Court having considered the transcript of proceedings of May 14, 1979 and having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises,\nIt is hereby ordered that the Motion to enter the Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage is allowed.\nPetitioner is allowed thirty (30) days from this date to file Petition to Vacate and supporting Memorandum of Law.\u201d\nThe court also signed the judgment of dissolution which had been submitted by respondent which provided \u201cENTERED NUNC PRO TUNC May 14,1979.\u201d\nOn January 4, 1980, within the 30-day period, petitioner filed a motion to vacate the judgment, alleging that the court had no authority to enter a judgment of dissolution before the maintenance, child support, and other property rights were determined; that the court had no authority to enter the judgment nunc pro tunc May 14, 1979; and that the court erred in not making an express written finding that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. A hearing on the motion was held on January 25, and on January 31, 1980, the trial court denied the motion and expressly found there was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal.\nThe appellate court first determined that denial of the motion to vacate the judgment dissolving the marriage, but reserving property disposition, maintenance and child custody issues for future consideration, was appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (73 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). It then held that section 401(3) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 401(3)) allows reservation of child custody, support, maintenance or property disposition only under \u201cappropriate circumstances.\u201d (94 Ill. App. 3d 732, 739.) The court opined that appropriate circumstances included, but were not limited to, where the court does not have in personam jurisdiction over the respondent, where a party is unable to pay child support or maintenance if so ordered, where the court has set aside an adequate fund for child support pursuant to section 503(d) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 503(d)), or where the children do not reside with either parent. The court concluded that because the circumstances of this case do not provide \u201cappropriate circumstances\u201d for dissolving the marriage before adjudication of the other issues, the court was without authority to enter the dissolution judgment. The court also stated that the statutory prerequisites set forth in section 401(3) are not jurisdictional in the sense they cannot be waived. Finding that, in this case, petitioner had not waived the mandatory requirements of section 401(3), it granted her motion to vacate the judgment. (94 Ill. App. 3d 732, 740.) Following a legislative amendment to section 401(3), respondent filed a motion to discharge the appeal to this court and return the mandate to the appellate court. The motion was taken with the case.\nRespondent argues that the original 1977 act places no \u201cappropriate circumstances\u201d limitation on the circuit court\u2019s power to enter bifurcated judgments for dissolution of marriage, a limitation imposed by the appellate court. We disagree. At the time of the proceedings herein, section 401(3) of the Act provided:\n\u201cSuch judgment [of dissolution] shall not be entered unless, to the extent it has jurisdiction to do so, the court has considered, approved, reserved or made provision for child custody, the support of any child of the marriage entitled to support, the maintenance of either spouse and the disposition of property.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 401(3).)\nSection 401(3) is based upon section 302(a)(4) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (Uniform Act), which provides that a court shall enter a decree of dissolution of marriage if, \u201cto the extent it has jurisdiction to do so, the court has considered, approved, or provided for child custody, the support of any child entitled to support, the maintenance of either spouse, and the disposition of property; or has provided for a separate, later hearing to complete these matters.\u201d 9A Unif. Laws Ann. sec. 302(a)(4) (1979).\nAs pointed out in the historical and practice notes to section 401(3) of the Act, use of the word \u201creserved\u201d is consistent with the language in the Uniform Act that permits a judgment for dissolution if the court \u201chas provided for a separate, later hearing to complete these matters.\u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 401(3), Historical and Practice Notes, at 105 (Smith-Hurd 1980).) (This language was added to the 1970 draft of the Uniform Act.) In this respect, the intent of the Uniform Act was not to give the trial court unlimited discretion to enter a judgment and hold a later hearing for disposition of the other named factors. The commissioner\u2019s comment to section 302(a)(4) of the Uniform Act states:\n\u201cThe phrase, \u2018considered, approved, or provided for,\u2019 in subsection (a)(4) is intended to confer upon the court the authority to refuse to make any award, if the evidence justifies an outright denial, as well as the authority to make such allotment as the facts require. To avoid any doubt, the court is authorized expressly to provide for a later hearing to complete action on these matters, if necessary.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (9A Unif. Laws Ann. sec. 302(a)(4), Commissioners\u2019 Comment, at 123 (1979).)\nThus, the provision providing for a later hearing is inserted to make clear that the court has authority to resolve matters relating to child custody, support, maintenance, and disposition of property, and, if necessary, a hearing after a dissolution order may be held to complete action on these matters. The historical and practice notes to section 401(3) of the Illinois act comport with this interpretation of the Uniform Act by providing that the court may reserve determination of these issues \u201cin appropriate circumstances.\u201d Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 401(3), Historical and Practice Notes, at 105 (Smith-Hurd 1980).\nThe historical and practice notes also provide that section 401(3) \u201cencourages the court to decide all matters incident to the dissolution in a single judgment, to the fullest extent of its authority, in order to achieve finality, promote judicial economy, and avoid multiple litigations and complications which can result from the entry of partial judgments, particularly judgments which dissolve the marriage but \u2018reserve\u2019 remaining issues for later determination.\u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 401(3), Historical and Practice Notes, at 105 (Smith-Hurd 1980).) Respondent recognizes that the purpose of section 401(3) is, in part, to promote judicial economy. He argues, however, that judicial economy can best be served by an \u201cinterim order\u201d that grounds for divorce exist. He asserts that, where grounds will not be contested, such an order would save an enormous amount of costly preparation and would permit both parties to concentrate on the remaining issues. Where grounds do exist, respondent asserts that the ability to bifurcate permits the court to terminate automatic spousal inheritance or pension claims which might conflict with a subsequent property division.\nIn response to these contentions, we believe that where grounds will not be contested, the parties will be equally able to concentrate on the remaining issues of custody, support and property division whether the grounds are disposed of in an interim proceeding followed by a \u201cjudgment\u201d of dissolution or are disposed of in the first stage of a trial followed immediately by the orderly disposition of the other issues at the second stage. Nor does section 403(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 403(e)) encourage, expressly or by implication, the entry of a judgment of dissolution of marriage that reserves the remaining issues for later trial. (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 403(e), Historical and Practice Notes, at 254-55 (SmithHurd 1980).) Although the section provides for a finding that grounds exist, it does not provide for multiple judgments.\nFurther, irrespective of whether the grounds are contested, entry of a bifurcated judgment of dissolution presents many potential complications. For example, as discussed by the historical and practice notes, where adjudication of property rights under section 503 of the Act has been reserved following a dissolution of marriage judgment, the court could likely be required to adjudicate marital-property rights that have become entangled with the supervening rights of third parties, including subsequent spouses. Additionally, entering a judgment of dissolution prior to property disposition would complicate, rather than simplify, matters with respect to the rights of a surviving spouse in the event of an intervening death. Other complications that can ensue if a judgment of dissolution is not deferred until disposition of the other matters include the loss of ability to file joint income tax returns, the loss of medical insurance coverage, and the loss of marital-property treatment for property accumulated during the intervening period between the entry of the judgment of dissolution and the final disposition of property rights. See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 401(3), Historical and Practice Notes, at 105-06 (Smith-Hurd 1980). See generally Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, 572-73.\nWe therefore believe that sound policy reasons militate against an interpretation of section 401(3) that gives a trial judge unfettered discretion to bifurcate a judgment of dissolution. We do, however, recognize that certain circumstances will justify bifurcating a judgment. We conclude, as did the appellate court based upon the historical and practice notes, that appropriate circumstances for entering a judgment of dissolution, while reserving questions of child custody, support, maintenance or property disposition, include, but are not limited to, the following: Where the court does not have in personam jurisdiction over the respondent; where a party is unable to pay child support or maintenance if so ordered; where the court has set aside an adequate fund for child support pursuant to section 503(d) of the Act; or where the parties\u2019-child or children do not reside with either parent. We do not attempt to envision all the possible appropriate circumstances. In this case, however, the record fails to disclose any justification at all for entering a judgment of dissolution and continuing the matter for disposition of issues of property disposition, custody and maintenance. There is nothing in the record to reveal that the trial court gave any consideration to the question of whether there was a need to reserve disposition of these matters.\nWe note parenthetically that Bremer v. Bremer (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 190, cited by respondent, involved the issue of whether a circuit court had jurisdiction to enter a supplemental decree fixing attorney fees following a divorce decree. This court held only that entering a divorce decree under the former Divorce Act did not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction to dispose of attorney fees, alimony, and property matters. (4 Ill. 2d 190, 192.) The issue of \u201cappropriate circumstances\u201d was not before the court. In addition, as noted by the historical and practice notes to section 401(3), this subsection has no counterpart in the repealed Divorce Act.\nBased upon the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the historical and practice notes to the Illinois act, and sound policy considerations, we believe the appellate court properly construed section 401(3) as originally contemplating that appropriate circumstances should exist before a trial judge enters a judgment of dissolution and reserves questions of child custody, support, maintenance, or property disposition. Inasmuch as the record is completely devoid of any appropriate circumstances when the trial judge reserved these questions, the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment of dissolution was improper under the 1977 statute.\nRespondent next argues that an amendment to section 401(3), Public Act 82\u2014197, effective August 14, 1981 (passed June 12, 1981), retroactively validates the trial court\u2019s action. That amendment added the following provisions to section 401(3):\n\u201cThe court may bifurcate the judgment for dissolution and reserve questions of child custody, the support of any child of the marriage entitled to support, the maintenance of either spouse and the disposition of property regardless of whether i) the court has in personam jurisdiction over the respondent, or ii) one of the parties would be unable to pay child support or maintenance if so ordered, or iii) the court has set aside an adequate fund for child support pursuant to subsection (d) of Section 503, or iv) the child or children of the parties do not reside with either parent.\nAll judgments for dissolution of marriage reserving any such questions entered prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1981 are declared to be valid as of the date of entry.\nIf any provision of this Section or application thereof shall be adjudged unconstitutional or invalid for any reason by any court of competent jurisdiction, such judgment shall not impair, affect or invalidate any other provision or application of this Section, which shall remain in full force and effect.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 401(3).)\nThe amendment also changed the first sentence in subparagraph (3), which had read \u201c[s]uch judgment shall not be entered unless ***,\u201d to \u201c[s]uch judgment may not be entered unless ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe language in the amendment gives the trial court discretion to enter a judgment of dissolution while reserving the remaining issues irrespective of the appropriate circumstances specifically delineated in the appellate court\u2019s decision in the instant case. (94 Ill. App. 3d 732, 739.) In addition, the amendment purports to validate any judgment for dissolution that reserved the remaining issues which was entered prior to the effective date of the amendment. It is evident that the amendment was enacted in order to reverse the result reached by the appellate court in this and other like cases. Any possible doubt is dispelled by the readings of the bill in both the Senate and House. On second reading of Senate Bill 377, Senator Marovitz stated:\n\u201cAmendment No. 1 deals with a situation that came up in committee. This is regarding the Cohn Case where a lot of bifurcated divorces were ruled invalid. This puts back a paragraph which says that all judgments for dissolution prior to the determination handed down in the Cohn Case are valid.\u201d (Senate Debates, April 30, 1981, at 32.)\nOn third reading, Senator Marovitz stated:\n\u201cSenate Bill 377 is in response to a ... a recent court decision in the Cohn Case, which caused a tremendous amount of consternation, regarding . . . bifurcated divorces. This bill clarifies the . . . validity of bifurcated divorces so that ... a judge . . . could validly . . . dissolve a marriage, issue a judgment for divorce, and reserve the question of child custody and maintenance, child support, disposition of property.\u201d (Senate Debates, May 20, 1981, at 189.)\nSimilarly, Representative Greiman stated on third reading in the House of Representatives:\n\u201cThere was a provision [in the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act] for a bifurcation of the issues of property and the issues of grounds. And the question happened, \u2018What happens if they do not have the appropriate bifurcation?\u2019 There was apparently a case . . . that indicated that the divorce might well be in question. And so this Bill provides that judgments for dissolution, where they reserve the questions and enter the decree, are valid as of the date of the entry of that decree. *** That\u2019s the significant part of this Bill.\u201d House Debates, June 12, 1981, at 60-61.\nThe narrow question presented, then, is whether the amendment can be retroactively applied to validate judgments of dissolution that would be invalid, if not waived, under the appellate court decision in the case at bar. This court has held that an amendment may be applied retroactively if its purpose is to clarify an existing law that is ambiguous, rather than to change the law. (Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Department of Local Government Affairs (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 495. See O\u2019Connor v. A & P Enterprises (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 260.) This court has also observed that a material change in a statute made by an amendatory act is presumed to change the original statute. (O\u2019Connor v. A & P Enterprises (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 260, 271; Hoover v. May Department Stores Co. (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 93, 107. See 1A A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 22.30, at 178-79 (4th ed. 1972).) Although the legislature may change the law as interpreted by the courts prospectively, it cannot retroactively alter a statute to overrule a decision of a reviewing court. Roth v. Yackley (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 423, 428-29; see Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Department of Local Government Affairs (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 495, 505.\nIn the instant case, it is clear that the amendment (Pub. Act 82\u2014197) was an attempt to change the law as interpreted by the appellate court. This is clear from the specific factors delineated in the amendment, identical to those appropriate circumstances set forth by the appellate court, as well as from the debates in both the Senate and House of Representatives alluded to above.\nWe believe the legislature\u2019s attempt to retroactively alter a reviewing court\u2019s interpretation of the statute (section 401(3)) is similar to the situation presented in Roth v. Yackley (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 423. In Roth, the legislature deleted language in the original statute that a court was to place \u201creasonable terms and conditions\u201d on probation and replaced it with language cataloging certain conditions, including the imposition of fines and costs \u2014 two conditions which this court found, in People v. DuMontelle (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 157, not to be reasonable. The amendatory act also attempted to apply the amendments to events that occurred before its effective date. In holding that the amendments violated the separation of powers principle embodied in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution, this court stated:\n\u201cThis court\u2019s explication of the statute had become, in effect, a part of the statute until the General Assembly changed it. City of Decatur v. Curry (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 350, 359; Mitchell v. Mahin (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 452, 456.\n* * *\nThe General Assembly\u2019s declaration that the amendatory act applies to events which occurred before the effective date of the amendatory statute represents a legislative attempt to retroactively apply new statutory language and to thereby annul a prior decision of this court. This is an assumption by the General Assembly of the role of a court of last resort in contravention of the principle of separation of powers embodied in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides: \u2018The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.\u2019 (See Federal Express Corp. v. Skelton (1979), 265 Ark. 187, 199, 578 S.W.2d 1, 7-8; Johnson v. Morris (1976), 87 Wash. 2d 922, 926, 557 P.2d 1299, 1303; 1A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction sec. 27.04 (4th ed. 1972).) While the General Assembly has the power to draft legislation and to amend statutes prospectively if it believes that a judicial interpretation was at odds with its intent (see Bruni v. Department of Registration and Education (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 6, 12; Mitchell v. Mahin (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 452, 456), it is the function of the judiciary to determine what the law is and to apply statutes to cases. (See People v. Nicholls (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 166, 179; Belfield v. Coop (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 293, 307.) The cases cited by the State do not recognize that the General Assembly may retroactively overrule a decision of a reviewing court. Instead they recognize only the power of the legislature to establish laws prospectively and to alter for future cases interpretations of statutes by reviewing courts. See Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue (1952), 413 Ill. 55, 66; State v. Bowman (1962), 116 Ohio App. 285, 286-87, 187 N.E.2d 627, 629; cf. People ex rel. Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 18, 28.\u201d 77 Ill. 2d 423, 428-29.\nIn this case, as in Roth, the legislature invaded the province of the judiciary by retroactively overruling a decision of a reviewing court. This constitutes a violation of article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution, which embodies the principle of separation of powers.\nRespondent argues that this case should be compared to Schlenz v. Castle (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 196, rather than to Roth v. Yackley. In Schlenz, this court rejected a separation of powers challenge to section 318.1 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 799.1), which validated property assessments published after the existing statutory time limits had expired. Prior to the amendment, this court, in Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 13, 23-24, held that publication dates in section 103 of the Revenue Act were mandatory and that failure of timely publication is not an \u201cinformality or clerical error.\u201d Contrary to respondent\u2019s argument, however, the basis of this court\u2019s decision in upholding section 318.1 in Schlenz reveals that the instant case is far more similar to Roth than to Schlenz. After the court in Schlenz pointed out that section 318.1 was enacted before the circuit court judgments in the case, the court stated:\n\u201cThe statute *** in Roth is clearly distinguishable from that here involved. The General Assembly did not amend section 103 of the Revenue Act, and section 318.1 does not attempt to attribute to section 103, at the time of our opinion in Andrews, a meaning different from that declared in that opinion.\u201d (84 Ill. 2d 196, 206-07.)\nIn Schlenz, then, the legislature did not attempt to retroactively interpret the statute. In the instant case, like Roth and unlike Schlenz, the legislature by amendment attempted to attribute to the original statute, at the time of the reviewing court\u2019s opinion, a meaning different than that declared in the opinion.\nPetitioner also cites Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, for the proposition that the legislature may enact legislation for prospective application in pending cases so long as it does not attempt to tell a court how to apply the new law to the facts of a particular case. Although this proposition is correct, the amendment in the instant case, unlike the legislation in Kujawinski, does attempt to specify a particular result to this court, not only in this case, but in any case where a judgment of dissolution was entered while reserving disposition of property, custody, support, and maintenance. In contrast, the statute in Kujawinski provided that the Act \u201capplies to all pending actions and proceedings commenced prior to its effective date with respect to issues on which a judgment has not been entered.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 801(b).) This court, in rejecting a separation of powers challenge, properly found that this section \u201cdoes not dictate the resolution of facts in pending actions; it merely mandates which law the court is to apply to the facts in pending cases.\u201d (71 Ill. 2d 563, 570.) As stated above, the amendment here, like the amendment in Roth, but unlike the above statute in Kujawinski, attempts to attribute to a statute, at the time of the reviewing court\u2019s opinion, a meaning different than that declared in the opinion and attempts to validate all judgments reserving such questions that were entered prior to the effective date of the amendment.\nWe also note that dissolution of marriage is entirely statutory in origin and nature, and that the court\u2019s authority is limited thereby. (Strukoff v. Strukoff (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 53, 60.) However, we are not ruling on the legislature\u2019s authority to pass legislation relating to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Rather, we hold only that portion of the amendment that purports to retroactively validate all judgments of dissolution reserving questions of custody, support, maintenance, and property disposition entered prior to the effective date of the amendment unconstitutional.\nDue to our disposition of the issues concerning the requirements of the original statute and the effect of the amendment, it is unnecessary to address the questions raised by petitioner.\nWe are cognizant of the potential complications that could arise as a result of this opinion. The appellate court held that the provisions of section 401(3) requiring appropriate circumstances are mandatory, yet they do not present a jurisdictional requirement in the sense that they cannot be waived. Here, petitioner did not waive the mandatory requirements because she made timely objections at the trial court level. Today\u2019s decision, however, does not affect the validity of bifurcated judgments that were entered under the statute prior to its amendment by Public Act 82\u2014197, where no objection on this basis was made and where no appeal was taken. In such cases, the mandatory provisions of section 401(3) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 401(3)) are deemed to have been waived. See Little v. Little (1981), 96 Wash. 2d 183, 197-98, 634 P.2d 498, 506.\nTo summarize, we hold that under the circumstances of this case, the trial court could not, under section 401(3) of the Act, as originally enacted, enter a judgment of dissolution while reserving questions involving property distribution, maintenance, and custody. In addition, the portion of Public Act 82\u2014197 attempting to validate prior judgments of dissolution was an unconstitutional attempt to retroactively invalidate the action of a reviewing court. Finally, the trial court\u2019s error in entering judgment was not waived inasmuch as petitioner timely objected and appealed.\nFor the above-stated reasons, petitioner\u2019s motion to vacate the judgment of dissolution should have been granted. Respondent\u2019s motion to discharge the appeal and return the mandate to the appellate court is denied. The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Lake County for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nMotion denied; judgment affirmed; cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MORAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen H. Katz, Peter F. LoMonaco, Gregg I. Minkow, and Rawles, Katz & McKeown, Ltd., of Waukegan, for appellant.", "Gomberg, Schaps & Goldberg, Ltd., of Chicago (Vincent F. Vitullo, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 54978.\nIn re MARRIAGE OF RUTH M. COHN, Appellee, and STUART A. COHN, Appellant.\nOpinion filed October 22, 1982.\nStephen H. Katz, Peter F. LoMonaco, Gregg I. Minkow, and Rawles, Katz & McKeown, Ltd., of Waukegan, for appellant.\nGomberg, Schaps & Goldberg, Ltd., of Chicago (Vincent F. Vitullo, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0190-01", "first_page_order": 202, "last_page_order": 219 }