{ "id": 3101662, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. WILLIAM HOCKADAY, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hockaday", "decision_date": "1982-12-17", "docket_number": "No. 55873", "first_page": "279", "last_page": "285", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 279" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5305475 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2696677 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861845 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857846 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2965915 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990291 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440986 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5498939 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" }, { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0762-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 437, "char_count": 9343, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5657055424026134e-07, "percentile": 0.8157769043677836 }, "sha256": "660090f8e51a43b6071ebd748f471088b551b049a3c49d60da939e43a08c70a4", "simhash": "1:b970f7e6863be1f4", "word_count": 1552 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:22.658095+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. WILLIAM HOCKADAY, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue here is the sufficiency of an information charging the defendant, William Hockaday, with the offense of forgery by delivery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 17\u20143(a)(2)). The challenged portion of the information reads:\n\u201cBILLY BOB HOCKADAY *** committed the offense of FORGERY, in that the said defendant, with the intent to defraud, knowingly delivered to Debbie Saylor a document apparently capable of defrauding another, in that it purported to have been made by another, Robert Owens and Tom Hanson, a copy of the document is attached and made a part hereof by reference thereto, said document being a check numbered 1633 of Energy Specialty Products, Inc., a corporation licensed to do business in the State of Illinois, drawn on the River Forest State Bank and Trust Company of River Forest, Illinois, dated March 12, 1980, payable to Stephanie A. Morrow in the amount of Four Hundred Seventy-five and no/100 Dollars ($475.00) and signed as maker Robert Owens and Tom Hanson, knowing the document to have been thus made, in violation of Section 17\u20143a2 of Chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe defendant attacked the sufficiency of the information by several motions to dismiss or quash the information, all of which were denied. After a jury trial in Rock Island County, the defendant was found guilty of forgery by delivery and sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, concluding that the information did not sufficiently describe the elements of the forgery-by-delivery offense. 100 Ill. App. 3d 762.\nSection 111\u20143(a)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that a charging instrument must set forth \u201cthe nature and elements of the offense charged.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 111\u20143(a)(3).) When, as here, the defendant properly raises the issue of the sufficiency of the information in the trial court, the information must be scrutinized to determine whether it conforms to this statutory requirement. (See People v. Lutz (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 204.) If the information fails to properly set forth the elements of the offense charged, the trial court must grant the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss or motion in arrest of judgment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 114\u20141(a)(8), 116\u20142(b)(1).\nThe appellate court in this case properly identified the five elements of the forgery-by-delivery offense as follows:\n\u201c(1) a document apparently capable of defrauding another; (2) a making or altering of such document by one person in such manner that it purports to have been made by another; (3) knowledge by defendant that it has been thus made; (4) knowing delivery of the document; and (5) intent to defraud.\u201d (100 Ill. App. 3d 762, 765.)\nIt then held that the information was insufficient because it did not adequately set out elements (2) and (3).\nThe appellate court based this conclusion on its interpretation of the language in the information. The relevant language states that the \u201cdefendant *** delivered *** a document apparently capable of defrauding another, in that it purported to have been made by another *** knowing the document to have been thus made ***.\u201d The appellate court interpreted the word \u201cpurported\u201d to indicate that the check appeared to be made by another without charging that the check was falsely so made. Thus, the court concluded that the information failed both to describe the check as a forgery and to allege that the defendant knew of the check\u2019s forged character. 100 Ill. App. 3d 762, 766.\nWe do not interpret the charging language as the appellate court did. \u201cThis court has consistently held that an indictment which charges an offense in the language of the statute is sufficient if the words of the statute particularize the offense so that an accused is apprised, with reasonable certainty, of the precise offense.\u201d (People v. Banks (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 383, 392, citing People v. Dickerson (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 580, 582; People v. Mills (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 4, 11.) In this case the information closely follows the language of the statute that defines the offense of forgery by delivery.\nSection 17 \u2014 3(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:\n\u201cA person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly:\n(1) Makes or alters any document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another ***; or\n(2) Issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 17\u20143(a).\nThe information in this case alleges that the defendant, \u201cwith the intent to defraud, knowingly delivered *** a document apparently capable of defrauding another, in that it purported to have been made by another, *** knowing the document to have been thus made.\u201d The defendant argues that this language does not follow the language in the statute because the phrase \u201ccapable of defrauding another in that it purported to have been made by another\u201d does not appear in the description of the offense of forgery by delivery described in section 17\u20143(a)(2). What this argument overlooks is that the definition of forgery by delivery in section 17\u20143(a)(2) makes no sense standing alone. It has to be read in connection with the definition of forgery set forth in section 17\u2014 3(a)(1). \u201c[S]uch document\u201d in section 17\u20143(a)(2) thus refers to a \u201cdocument apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another,\u201d which is the kind of document described in section 17\u20143(a)(1). When this language is read as a part of section 17\u20143(a)(2) it is apparent that the information alleges each of the five elements of the forgery-by-delivery offense in almost the same language as the statute.\n\u201cAn indictment which charges an offense in the language of the statute is deemed sufficient when the words of the statute so far particularize the offense that by their use alone an accused is apprised with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he or she is charged.\u201d (People v. Patrick (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 255, 258.) In determining whether the forgery-by-delivery statute sufficiently particularizes that offense, a court must consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language used in the charging instrument as read and interpreted by a reasonable person. (See People v. Banks (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 383, 392-93.) We believe that the statutory language incorporated in the information in this case sufficiently advised the defendant of all the elements of the forgery-by-delivery offense. In particular it alleged that the check was forged and that the defendant knew of the forgery. See People v. Young (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 455, 457 (\u201cthe forgery statute does define \u2014 particularize\u2014the elements of forgery \u2014 thus a charge which uses the same language is valid\u201d).\nIn charging that the check \u201cpurported to have been made by another,\u201d the information describes the type of fraudulent character that the check possessed. If the check were not a forgery, the defendant has not shown us how it would be capable of defrauding another in view of the fact that the information charged that \u201cit purported to have been made by another.\u201d A check may be capable of defrauding another for reasons other than forgery, insufficient funds for example, but that type of fraudulent document is not included within the language of this information. Although the word \u201cpurport\u201d does not always imply a false appearance, that is certainly one of its common meanings (see Webster\u2019s New World Dictionary 1154 (1976)) and when used to describe why a check is \u201ccapable of defrauding another\u201d the word is sufficient to inform the defendant that the document was forged. See People v. Mager (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 306, 309 (\u201cThe indictment alleged that [the document] was '*** apparently capable of defrauding another in that it purported to have been made by another ***,\u2019 i.e., that the [document] bore a forged signature\u201d).\nThe information also sufficiently alleges that the defendant knew of the forgery when it states that he delivered the check \u201cknowing the document to have been thus made.\u201d The word \u201cthus\u201d refers to the language that we have already construed as meaning that the document was forged.\nThe information is sufficient. It follows the language of the statute that defines the forgery-by-delivery offense, and that statute sufficiently particularizes the offense so as to advise the defendant of the precise nature of the charges against him. We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment and sentence imposed by the circuit court.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SIMON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (Marcia L. Friedl and Kenneth A. Fedinets, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, of the State's Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Frank W. Ralph, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 55873.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. WILLIAM HOCKADAY, Appellee.\nOpinion filed December 17, 1982.\nTyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James T. Teros, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (Marcia L. Friedl and Kenneth A. Fedinets, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, of the State's Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Frank W. Ralph, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0279-01", "first_page_order": 291, "last_page_order": 297 }