{ "id": 3111584, "name": "RUSSELL DEAN SHARP, Appellee, v. ROBERT GALLAGHER et al., Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Sharp v. Gallagher", "decision_date": "1983-03-25", "docket_number": "No. 54980", "first_page": "322", "last_page": "328", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 322" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "97 S. Ct. 1328", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 L. Ed. 2d 594", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 916", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12145120, 12144579, 12144933, 12145029, 12145290, 12144656, 12144722, 12145459, 12144854, 12144791, 12145210, 12145374 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0916-08", "/us/430/0916-01", "/us/430/0916-06", "/us/430/0916-07", "/us/430/0916-10", "/us/430/0916-02", "/us/430/0916-03", "/us/430/0916-12", "/us/430/0916-05", "/us/430/0916-04", "/us/430/0916-09", "/us/430/0916-11" ] }, { "cite": "543 F.2d 22", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1024914 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/543/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5346703 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490227 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11718564 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469643 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2775597 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 1128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3126323 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/1128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 611, "char_count": 10114, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.9493579496303417e-07, "percentile": 0.9037586747335462 }, "sha256": "c6fb6303a0e15363fa1079c2db1c43ea125305a4acc7a6230660cff07345e3fd", "simhash": "1:50a227d4c92ee6b2", "word_count": 1582 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:06:26.298041+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RUSSELL DEAN SHARP, Appellee, v. ROBERT GALLAGHER et al., Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Russell Dean Sharp, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, Robert Gallagher and Daniel Henry, individually and as partners doing business as Orchard Hill Building Company (Orchard Hill). Count I alleged violations of the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 60 et seq.). Count II was based on common law negligence. Defendants moved to dismiss both counts, contending they were plaintiff\u2019s employer and, therefore, the suit was barred by section 5(a) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a)). The circuit court of Cook County granted defendants\u2019 motion. A majority of the appellate court reversed on the basis of the dual-capacity doctrine (94 Ill. App. 3d 1128), and we allowed defendants leave to appeal.\nOn January 16, 1978, plaintiff was working as a carpenter-helper at a residential construction site. While building a garage, he slipped and fell from an icy scaffold and was injured. He filed an application for adjustment of claim before the Industrial Commission, naming Farmingdale Millwork (Farmingdale) as his employer. He then brought the instant suit against defendants.\nDefendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending Orchard Hill and Farmingdale were the same legal entity and that the partnership, doing business as Orchard Hill, was plaintiff\u2019s employer. On this basis, defendants argued the instant suit was barred by the Act. In response, plaintiff argues that Orchard Hill and Farmingdale were separate legal entities. In the alternative, plaintiff claims the partners acted in different capacities under these assumed names and, therefore, defendants should be liable under the dual-capacity doctrine.\nIn support of his position, plaintiff attached a copy of defendant Gallagher\u2019s deposition in which Gallagher stated Orchard Hill was the general contractor for the job and owned, through a land trust, the beneficial interest in the construction-site property. Gallagher described Farmingdale as a service organization, a \u201cconduit\u201d by which Orchard Hill obtained windows. He said that while Farmingdale was plaintiff\u2019s employer, Orchard Hill owned Farmingdale, and Orchard Hill and Farmingdale were \u201cthe same thing.\u201d\nBoth parties filed affidavits. Plaintiff\u2019s attorney attached to his affidavit quarterly Federal income tax withholding forms which showed that Farmingdale and Orchard Hill had separate Federal identification numbers for tax purposes.\nDefendant Gallagher\u2019s affidavit stated that Orchard Hill absorbed all of Farmingdale\u2019s losses and profits and paid the premiums for Farmingdale\u2019s workmen\u2019s compensation insurance policy. Defendants also submitted an affidavit of Orchard Hill\u2019s accountant which stated that no Federal or State income tax return was prepared on behalf of Farmingdale. Farmingdale was not a separate business entity for general accounting or Federal income tax purposes, and it never had any reportable income for tax purposes. Its costs and expenses were reimbursed in total by Orchard Hill.\nThe trial court found that the Gallagher and Henry partnership doing business as Orchard Hill and Farmingdale were the same, as a matter of law, and granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that they were the same and that Orchard Hill was plaintiff\u2019s employer. However, the court reversed, concluding that under the dual-capacity doctrine, defendants\u2019 capacity as landowners conferred upon them a duty independent of that owed to plaintiff as an employer.\nInitially, we note the record supports the trial and appellate courts\u2019 determination that Farmingdale and Orchard Hill were the same and that the partnership doing business as Orchard Hill was plaintiff\u2019s employer. The parties do not question this finding in their briefs. Indeed, in response to a question at oral argument, plaintiff admitted there is only one legal entity \u2014 the Gallagher and Henry partnership doing business as Orchard Hill and Farmingdale. The remaining question is whether a contractor-employer that also owns the land on which an employee is injured is immune from common law or statutory suits under the exclusive-remedy provision of the Act.\nThe legislature enacted the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act to abrogate the common law rights and liabilities which previously governed an injured employee\u2019s ability to recover against his employer. The Act established a new \u201csystem of liability without fault, designed to distribute the cost of industrial injuries without regard to common-law doctrines of negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the like.\u201d (Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry. Co. (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 460, 463.) \u201cBalanced against the imposition of no-fault liability upon the employer are statutory limitations upon the amount of the employee\u2019s recovery, depending upon the character and the extent of the injury. As part of this \u2018balancing,\u2019 the Act further provides that the statutory remedies under it shall serve as the employee\u2019s exclusive remedy if he sustains a compensable injury.\u201d McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 352, 356.\nSection 5(a) of the Act provides in relevant part:\n\u201cNo common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer *** for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a).\nPlaintiff argues the Gallagher and Henry partnership held itself out as a business having two capacities, one as employer under the Farmingdale Millwork designation and the other as landowner under the name Orchard Hill Building Company. He supports this contention by again asserting that Farmingdale and Orchard Hill had separate Federal identification numbers for purposes of the employer\u2019s quarterly Federal income tax withholding forms. On this basis, plaintiff maintains the defendants\u2019 partnership existed in a dual capacity and the instant suit against defendants in their capacity as landowners is not barred by the Act. Plaintiff relies on Reed v. Steamship Yaka (1963), 373 U.S. 410, 10 L. Ed. 2d 448, 83 S. Ct. 1349, Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 313, and Marcus v. Green (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 699.\nIn Reed, a longshoreman was injured loading a ship his employer had chartered. The court held the exclusivity provision of the Federal Longshoremen\u2019s and Harbor Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. sec. 901 et seq. (1976)) did not preclude suit against the employer, as ship charterer, for injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel. The court\u2019s holding hinged upon peculiarities of maritime law and the lack of congressional action to change the court\u2019s long line of cases in this area. However, as noted in Kottis v. United States Steel Corp. (7th Cir. 1976), 543 F.2d 22, cert. denied (1977), 430 U.S. 916, 51 L. Ed. 2d 594, 97 S. Ct. 1328, not only did Congress limit the Reed decision by amending the Longshoremen\u2019s and Harbor Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, but in addition, Reed does not control the interpretation given to a State statute by the courts of that State.\nSmith, and Marcus are distinguishable from the case at bar. There the doctrine of dual capacity was applied to the defendants on the basis that the employer, in each instance, was found to be acting as a separate legal entity. As this court has earlier noted, \u201cA mere separate theory of liability against the same legal person as the employer is not a true basis for use of the dual capacity doctrine; the doctrine, instead, requires a distinct separate legal persona.\u201d (Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 313, 319.) The underlying rationale for this statement has been stated by Professor Larson:\n\u201cIt is held with virtual unanimity that an employer cannot be sued as the owner or occupier of land, whether the cause of action is based on common-law obligations of landowners or on statutes such as safe place statutes or structual work acts.\nApart from the basic argument that mere ownership of land does not endow a person with a second legal persona or entity, there is an obvious practical reason requiring this result. An employer, as part of his business, will almost always own or occupy premises, and maintain them as an integral part of conducting his business. If every action and function connected with maintaining the premises could ground a tort suit, the concept of exclusiveness of remedy would be reduced to a shambles.\u201d 2A A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation sec. 72.82 (1982).\nSince the facts in the instant case reveal but one legal entity, the application of the dual-capacity doctrine is unavailable to the plaintiff.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAppellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MORAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Hinshaw, Culberton, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (Stanley J. Davidson and Charles H. Cole, of counsel), for appellants.", "Cooney & Stenn, and William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte, of counsel), for appellee.", "John M. Cannon, Susan W. Wanat, and Ann P. Sheldon, of Mid-America Legal Foundation, of Chicago, for amici curiae Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, Illinois Construction Industry Committee, Association of Commerce and Industry of McLean County, and Mid-America Legal Foundation.", "George W. Gessler, Terence E. Flynn, and David M. Levy, of Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar & Poust, of Chicago (Benjamin F. Cornelius and Douglas F. Stevenson, of counsel), for amicus curiae United States Steel Corporation.", "Wayland B. Cedarquist, George E. Bullwinkel, and Henry C. Szesnay, of Chicago (Boodell, Sears, Sugrue, Giambalvo & Crowley, of counsel), for amicus curiae Republic Steel Corporation." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 54980\nRUSSELL DEAN SHARP, Appellee, v. ROBERT GALLAGHER et al., Appellants.\nOpinion filed March 25, 1983.\nHinshaw, Culberton, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, of Chicago (Stanley J. Davidson and Charles H. Cole, of counsel), for appellants.\nCooney & Stenn, and William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte, of counsel), for appellee.\nJohn M. Cannon, Susan W. Wanat, and Ann P. Sheldon, of Mid-America Legal Foundation, of Chicago, for amici curiae Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, Illinois Construction Industry Committee, Association of Commerce and Industry of McLean County, and Mid-America Legal Foundation.\nGeorge W. Gessler, Terence E. Flynn, and David M. Levy, of Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar & Poust, of Chicago (Benjamin F. Cornelius and Douglas F. Stevenson, of counsel), for amicus curiae United States Steel Corporation.\nWayland B. Cedarquist, George E. Bullwinkel, and Henry C. Szesnay, of Chicago (Boodell, Sears, Sugrue, Giambalvo & Crowley, of counsel), for amicus curiae Republic Steel Corporation." }, "file_name": "0322-01", "first_page_order": 346, "last_page_order": 352 }