{ "id": 3115570, "name": "DEAN EDWARDS, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Blaw Knox Company, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Edwards v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1983-05-18", "docket_number": "No. 57497", "first_page": "278", "last_page": "283", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 278" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031773 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3102006 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5491043 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475227 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0087-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 410, "char_count": 7226, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.47132825118375626 }, "sha256": "b15fca6b2a11de3eb14eaeb3e78bdb8f4ce3827a8ecbdf4169696d15b9f1754e", "simhash": "1:72b1539ea7c2e639", "word_count": 1159 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:31:41.894296+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DEAN EDWARDS, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Blaw Knox Company, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nClaimant, Dean Edwards, sought workmen\u2019s compensation for an injury which he sustained while in the employ of respondent, Blaw Knox Company. An arbitrator awarded claimant compensation for temporary total disability and permanent partial disability to the extent of 2\u00bd% loss of use of the left foot. On review, the Commission reversed the arbitrator and the circuit court of Coles County confirmed the decision of the Commission. Claimant brought a direct appeal to this court. 73 Ill. 2d R. 302(a).\nThe sole issue is whether the Commission\u2019s finding, that claimant failed to prove he is temporarily or permanently disabled, is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAt the hearing before the arbitrator, claimant testified that he has been employed by respondent as a welder and electrician for the past 25 years. On September 27, 1978, a machine part that he was cleaning fell on his left foot. He stated that he experienced severe pain in his foot and ankle and consulted the plant nurse. She examined the affected area but did not render any medical treatment.\nOn October 2, 1978, claimant consulted Dr. Mack Hollowell. He X-rayed claimant\u2019s foot and prescribed pain medication. Claimant continued to see the doctor every two weeks until March 21, 1979. On that date, he telephoned Dr. Hollowell, requesting a note allowing him to resume light-duty work.\nClaimant further testified that the employees at respondent\u2019s plant went on strike on September 27, 1978, the date of his accident. The strike ended on March 21, 1979, the same day on which he sought a note allowing him to return to work. Claimant stated that, during the strike, he performed picket-line duty. He actually walked the picket line on some occasions, but primarily sat in his car.\nClaimant indicated that he has worked regularly since March 21, 1979, and performs the same duties as he did prior to his alleged accident. He \u201coccasionally\u201d wears an elastic bandage on his ankle and sometimes takes pain medication.\nDuring cross-examination, claimant testified that no one at the plant observed his accident. He further stated that he has not sought medical treatment since April 2, 1979.\nClaimant also introduced into evidence the deposition testimony of Dr. Hollowell. He stated that he examined claimant on October 2, 1978, at which time his ankle was swollen and painful. An X ray indicated that there was no fracture or dislocation. The witness diagnosed claimant\u2019s condition as a sprain in the left foot and a torn ligament. He stated that this could result in weakness and pain in his foot, \u201cor it may be none of these.\u201d The only pain medication prescribed was aspirin.\nDr. Hollowell examined claimant on six subsequent occasions. Other than some limitation in motion and a decreased swelling of the left foot, he made no objective findings. Because claimant complained of persistent pain, the witness wrapped his foot in an Ace bandage and continued to prescribe aspirin. On April 2, 1979, he examined claimant, found his condition improved, and discharged him from treatment.\nDuring cross-examination, respondent introduced into evidence an insurance report prepared by someone in Dr. Hollowell\u2019s office. The report, dated October 13, 1978, indicated that claimant\u2019s injury was not permanent, and that he could perform the same duties that he did prior to the alleged accident. Dr. Hollowell stated that he was uncertain as to whether he ever saw the report, or whether the statements contained therein accurately reflected his prognosis for claimant\u2019s recovery.\nOn further cross-examination, Dr. Hollowell testified that he never issued a release-from-work slip, and could not recall whether claimant requested one. He was also unable to recall if he ever restricted any of claimant\u2019s activities. However, he stated that he would probably advise against walking \u201clong distances or for protracted periods.\u201d Except for a minimal swelling, he stated that there were no objective findings to support claimant\u2019s subjective complaints. Finally, Dr. Hollowell agreed that the sprain may not result in any permanent damage.\nRespondent also introduced into evidence a doctor bill submitted by the witness. The bill indicated that claimant was examined on October 16, 1978, and that the sprain was healed. No additional evidence was produced at the hearing before the Commission.\nClaimant contends that the decision of the Commission is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues that the only medical evidence produced indicates that he is disabled due to a work-related injury which may have caused permanent damage. It is further implied that compensation was improperly denied because of the strike which occurred during the period of alleged disability.\nWe agree with claimant that there is no evidence contradicting his claim that he sustained a work-related injury. However, there was evidence from which the Commission could reasonably infer that he suffered no disability in connection with the accident.\nAs previously related, his symptoms were primarily subjective. During the time of his alleged disability he performed picket-line duty, which entailed some walking. A document which originated from Dr. Hollowell\u2019s office indicated that claimant\u2019s injury was healed in October of 1978. Another document stated that the injury was not permanent and that claimant could resume his regular employment. Although the doctor testified that claimant may have sustained a permanent injury, he also stated it \u201cwas equally true\u201d that there may be no permanent damage. He was unable to recall if he placed any restrictions on claimant\u2019s ability to return to work, and claimant performs the same duties as he did prior to the injury\nFinally, we perceive of no reason why the Commission could not consider the fact that claimant\u2019s alleged inability to work coincided exactly with the duration of the strike. This circumstance could be coincidental, as claimant suggests, but it may also serve to cast doubt upon the nature and extent of his alleged disability.\nIt is, of course, the function of the Commission \u201cto judge the credibility of witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony even where the Commission\u2019s findings differ from those of the arbitrator and no further evidence has been taken by the Commission.\u201d (Seiber v. Industrial Com. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 87, 97, citing Forrest v. Industrial Com. (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 86, 92-93.) The Commission\u2019s decision will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Spector Freight System, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1983), 93 Ill. 2d 507; Flores v. Industrial Com. (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 48.\nOn the record before us, we are not prepared to say that the Commission\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Coles County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MORAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ray Moss, of Clinton, for appellant.", "Stephen L. Corn and Rochelle A. Funderburg, of Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 57497.\nDEAN EDWARDS, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Blaw Knox Company, Appellee).\nOpinion filed May 18, 1983.\nRay Moss, of Clinton, for appellant.\nStephen L. Corn and Rochelle A. Funderburg, of Craig & Craig, of Mattoon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0278-01", "first_page_order": 290, "last_page_order": 295 }