{ "id": 5516170, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RANDY RINK, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rink", "decision_date": "1983-10-04", "docket_number": "No. 57134", "first_page": "533", "last_page": "544", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 533" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "406 U.S. 715", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173472 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515941 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2905345 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5489449 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404227 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083469 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966794 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069192 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2865750 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490156 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481053 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3102094 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106258 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5408379 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427013 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "1981 Ill. Laws 2883", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098641 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3101623 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994807 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098795 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "1972 Ill. Laws 836", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 770, "char_count": 17840, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.64693812772825e-07, "percentile": 0.9771523359083869 }, "sha256": "ac71bfeb91058623c2cfc58c05efed63513031b1047993e4d9462bc5dc6c461f", "simhash": "1:cc32c4e5f19e0fb4", "word_count": 3040 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:40:22.409111+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RANDY RINK, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis direct appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County was brought by the defendant, R\u00e1ndy Rink, under Rule 603 (73 Ill. 2d R. 603). The circuit court held section 104 \u2014 28(a) of \u201cAn Act to add Sections *** 104 \u2014 10 through 104 \u2014 29 to *** the \u2018Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963\u2019 ***\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 28(a)) (hereafter referred to as the Act) to be unconstitutional. The Act became effective on December 28, 1979, and sets out a comprehensive scheme of procedures for defendants charged with a crime who are unfit to stand trial or to plead. The section held to be invalid established procedures in cases of defendants such as Randy Rink, who, before the effective date of the Act, had been found to be unfit.\nThe defendant was indicted on December 17, 1970, for the murder of his father, and for aggravated battery upon his mother. On February 10, 1971, he was found by a jury to be mentally unfit to stand trial. Pursuant to the then-effective provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 3, repealed by Pub. Act 77 \u2014 2097, sec. 8 \u2014 5\u20141 (eff. Jan. 1, 1973), 1972 Ill. Laws 836), he was committed to the Department of Mental Health for the duration of his condition. He has since been in the custody of that department and its successor, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (hereafter the Department).\nAs stated, the Act sets out a comprehensive scheme of procedures for criminal defendants who are found unfit to stand trial or to plead. In providing for those defendants who, prior to the effective date of the Act, were found to be unfit, section 104 \u2014 27 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 27) requires that, within 180 days of the effective date of the Act, the Department compile a report for the courts as to each unfit defendant in its custody on the effective date of the Act. Section 104 \u2014 28 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 28), part (a) of which was the provision held unconstitutional by the circuit court here, provides:\n\u201c(a) Upon reviewing the report, the court shall determine whether the defendant has been in the custody of the [Department] for a period of time equal to the length of time that the defendant would have been required to serve, less good time, before becoming eligible for parole or mandatory supervised release had he been convicted of the most serious offense charged and had he received the maximum sentence therefor. If the court so finds, it shall dismiss the charges against the defendant. If the defendant has not been committed pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 911/2, par. 1 \u2014 100 et seq.], the court shall order him discharged or shall order a hearing to be conducted forthwith pursuant to the provisions of the Code. ***\n(b) If the court finds that a defendant has been in the custody of the [Department] for a period less than that specified in paragraph (a) of this Section, the court shall conduct a hearing *** to redetermine the issue of the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial or to plead. If the defendant is fit, the matter shall be set for trial. If the court finds that the defendant is unfit, it shall proceed pursuant to Section 104 \u2014 20 or 104 \u2014 23 [which apply to those found unfit under the Act, and which are explained below], provided that a defendant who is still unfit and who has been in the custody of the [Department] for a period of more than one year from the date of the finding of unfitness shall be immediately subject to the provisions of Section 104 \u2014 23.\u201d (Emphasis added.).\nSection 104 \u2014 20 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 20) provides for periodic hearings to inform the court of the progress of defendants who are undergoing treatment. Section 104 \u2014 23 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 23), on the other hand, concerns the defendants who remain unfit one year after the initial finding of unfitness, or about whom the court has determined that there is no substantial probability of attaining fitness, within a year of the finding of unfitness.\nOne of the dispositions provided for in section 104 \u2014 23 is a \u201cdischarge hearing.\u201d This hearing may be requested by the defendant at any time, or by the State where the defendant has remained unfit for a year after the original finding of unfitness or where it has been found that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will attain fitness within a year of the finding of unfitness. The details of the hearing are set out in section 104 \u2014 25 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 25). Its purpose is \u201cto determine the sufficiency of the evidence\u201d of the defendant\u2019s guilt of the crimes with which he is charged. If the evidence presented at the hearing fails to establish the defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or if he is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the court is to enter a judgment of acquittal. If the State sustains its burden, however, the defendant may be remanded for a period of treatment longer than the one-year period from the finding of unfitness provided for in section 104 \u2014 23. If the State sustains its burden upon a charge of murder, the treatment period may be extended up to five years.\nPursuant to the foregoing provisions, the Department prepared a report on Randy Rink. The report stated that the defendant had been at Chester Mental Health Center for the past nine years. The circuit court of Du Page County then conducted a hearing and determined that the defendant had not been in the custody of the Department for a period of time equal to the length of time that he would have been required to serve, minus good time, before becoming eligible for parole- or mandatory supervised release, had the defendant been convicted of murder and received the maximum sentence. Too, the court found that the defendant was still unfit and that there was no substantial probability that he would become fit within a year.\nActing on requests by the defendant and the State, a discharge hearing was held. The court found that the State had proved that the defendant was sane at the time and was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found, too, that the defendant was in need of treatment, and the defendant was remanded to Chester Mental Health Center for five years of treatment.\nThe defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial was denied. The defendant then moved that his \u201csentence\u201d of five years of treatment be reconsidered. The court denied the motion to reconsider and at the same time, without specifying reasons, held that section 104 \u2014 28(a) was unconstitutional. In holding so, the court appears to have accepted an argument of the State that the provision in the section for dismissal of charges was in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.\nThe constitutionality of section 104 \u2014 28(a) is the principal issue here. The State contends that the circuit court correctly held the section unconstitutional, because the section is, in effect, a legislative grant of amnesty that encroaches upon the executive branch\u2019s power to pardon. Too, the State says that the section unconstitutionally trespasses upon and interferes with the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s power to charge the commission of crimes.\nThe State\u2019s argument is founded on its assumption, which apparently the trial court also acted on, that the dismissal required under the statute is to be a dismissal with prejudice. The State in oral argument before us acknowledged, though, that it would also be reasonable to interpret the section of the Act as providing for dismissal of charges with leave to reinstate. That interpretation would be constitutional, the State says. We judge that section 104 \u2014 28(a) does, in fact, provide for a dismissal with leave to reinstate.\nThe fundamental in statutory construction is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and then to give effect to it. (In re Griffin (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 48, 52; People v. Beam (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 240, 242.) Here, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the language of the Act, which is, of course, the best source for determining legislative intent. (Schutzenhofer v. Granite City Steel Co. (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 208, 211-12; People v. Brown (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 248, 255.) The section does not state whether the dismissal is to be with prejudice or with leave to reinstate. In other places in the Act where the legislature mandates the dismissal of charges, it specifies whether the dismissal is with prejudice or with leave to reinstate. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, pars. 104-23(b)(2),(3), 104-25(f)(2).\nAttempting to determine the intendment of the legislature in section 104 \u2014 28(a) by considering it in relation to other provisions of the Act also does not yield an answer. One may speculate that the dismissal called for in section 104 \u2014 28(a) was to be a final disposition of the charges against those found to have been unfit before the Act became effective. This would not be congruent, though, with the Act\u2019s provisions for those found unfit after the effective date of the Act. In the cases of those defendants committed to the Department pursuant to a hearing under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, the Act expressly requires that the criminal charges are to be dismissed with leave to reinstate. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, pars. 104\u201423(b)(3), 104\u201425(f)(2).\nThe legislature\u2019s intent was manifested, however, through an amendment to the Act, which was approved and became effective on September 24, 1981 (\u201cAn Act in relation to the fitness of criminal defendants to stand trial\u201d (Pub. Act 82\u2014577, 1981 Ill. Laws 2883)). In that amendment, the legislature amended section 104 \u2014 28(a) to provide expressly that the dismissal would be with leave to reinstate. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 28(a).\nAn amendment to a statute is an appropriate source for determining the legislative intent. (People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543; People v. Scott (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 353, 358.) The amendment here was enacted shortly after the circuit court\u2019s pronouncement of unconstitutionality. We have held in an analogous situation that if an amendment is enacted soon after there were controversies as to the interpretation of the statute it amends, it is logical and reasonable to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original statute. (Gill v. Miller (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 52, 58, quoting 1A A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 22.31 (4th ed. 1972).) (Of course, the legislature, after a final judicial interpretation of legislative intent, cannot effect a change in that construction by a later declaration of what it did intend (In re Marriage of Cohn (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 190, 203; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 136, 142; Roth v. Yackley (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 423, 428-29).) We are not unmindful that, in general, penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused (People v. Isaacs (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 205, 215), but \u201cthey must not be construed so rigidly as to defeat the intent of the legislature.\u201d People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 543.\nAs we stated above, the State has no constitutional objection to that construction. There is a suggestion faintly advanced in the State\u2019s brief that such an interpretation could nevertheless be invalid as an interference with the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s authority to charge the commission of crimes, but there is no merit to such a position. No decision is cited by the State in which a statute was held unconstitutional on that ground. We do not perceive how the statute here would be any more vulnerable in this regard than a statute of limitations or a speedy-trial statute. The circuit court erred in holding the provision to be unconstitutional.\nApart from the question of constitutionality, the defendant has raised several other questions relating to the discharge hearing and the disposition of his cause. As to the hearing, he claims that the evidence was insufficient to show him sane and guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The record rejects the claim. The evidence was overwhelming that the defendant stabbed his father to death and injured his mother when she intervened in the straggle between the defendant and her husband. As to sanity, there was competent, expert testimony that the defendant could not be considered insane on the night of the killing. Moreover, all of the testimony regarding the defendant\u2019s behavior on that night, namely testimony by the defendant\u2019s mother and police officers, was that the defendant was coherent, able to communicate clearly, and understood what was happening. These witnesses testified that except for the altercation with his father, the cause of which is unknown, the defendant exhibited no unusual behavior on that night. The decision of the finder of fact on the issue of the defendant\u2019s sanity will not be reversed unless the determination made is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of its correctness. People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 580; People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 559, 568.\nThe defendant claims, too, that there were several evidentiary errors at the hearing. Three of the claims involve statements of the prosecutor in closing argument that the defendant says were misrepresentations of the evidence. While those statements appear to have been legitimate argument and not misrepresentations of evidence, we need not decide the defendant\u2019s claims. He did not object to any of the statements and thus waived the questions. By failing to object in a timely manner in the trial court, a defendant waives any irregularities in the argument of the prosecutor (People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 149; People v. Dukett (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 432, 442) or errors in the admission of evidence (People v. Carraro (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 75, 81; People v. Linus (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 349, 354).\nAnother matter complained of is that the State\u2019s expert witness was permitted to state that the defendant\u2019s expert\u2019s opinion as to sanity was not based upon medically accepted practice. This question, too, was waived. Though the defense objected to the line of questioning, the ground of objection was that the questions focused upon the defense psychiatrist\u2019s examination report rather than on the opinion he had given in his testimony at the hearing. It is axiomatic that when a specific objection is made all other grounds of objection are waived. People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252, 288; E. Cleary & M. Graham, Illinois Evidence sec. 103.2, at 6 (3d ed. 1979).\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, as we have stated, the circuit court found that the State had proved the defendant sane and guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Both sides agree that the discharge hearing provided for in the concerned section is to be an \u201cinnocence only\u201d hearing, that is to say, a proceeding to determine only whether to enter a judgment of acquittal, not to make a determination of guilt. The question of guilt is to be deferred until the defendant is fit to stand trial. This is clear from the language of section 104 \u2014 25 of the Act. Because the court here, in its judgment, made an express finding of the defendant\u2019s guilt, we remand the cause with directions to vacate the finding and to modify the judgment in conformity with the Act.\nAs a final contention, the defendant says, as he did in his motion to reconsider his \u201csentence,\u201d that considering the years he has been in custody, the five-year term of extended treatment exceeds the maximum term permitted under the Act. Section 104\u201425(f)(5) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 25(f)(5)) provides: \u201cIn no event may the treatment period be extended to exceed the maximum sentence to which the defendant would have been subject had he or she been convicted in a criminal proceeding.\u201d The argument is grounded upon a calculation as to when the defendant would have been eligible for parole had he been convicted of murder and sentenced and, apparently, his opinion that parole eligibility marks the maximum allowable term of custody and treatment.\nWe need not interpret the meaning of section 104\u2014 25(f)(5) in this respect. The State, mindful of the due process concerns regarding the confinement of unfit defendants discussed in Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435, 92 S. Ct. 1845, agrees with the defendant\u2019s claim that he has now been in custody for an excessive time under the Act and recommends that he be released and that a hearing be conducted regarding commitment under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 911/2, par. 1\u2014100 et seq.). Accordingly, we direct the circuit court, on remand, to vacate the order for extended treatment and to enter an order in keeping with the State\u2019s suggestion.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment of the circuit court holding section 104 \u2014 28(a) of the Act unconstitutional is reversed, and the cause is remanded with the directions set out herein.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin (Marilyn Martin, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield, and J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Phyllis J. Perko, Deputy Director, and Marshall Stevens, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 57134.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. RANDY RINK, Appellant.\nOpinion filed October 4, 1983.\nG. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin (Marilyn Martin, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nTyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield, and J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Phyllis J. Perko, Deputy Director, and Marshall Stevens, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Elgin, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0533-01", "first_page_order": 545, "last_page_order": 556 }