{ "id": 3123399, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MARK L. WATTS, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Watts", "decision_date": "1983-10-21", "docket_number": "No. 56519", "first_page": "70", "last_page": "74", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 70" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5470064 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378640 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480573 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031235 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" }, { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994954 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3421448 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 1212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 410, "char_count": 6963, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.3291202332302674e-08, "percentile": 0.33568424259483853 }, "sha256": "4b3608480ea2bf42929d3c247294e6ce9ea1ec82e4bbd3f83a45f98b8fc4324c", "simhash": "1:b224720a26a41ab3", "word_count": 1143 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:49:16.901998+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MARK L. WATTS, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CLARK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 16, 1981, an information was filed in the circuit court of Whiteside County charging the defendant, Mark L. Watts, with two counts of burglary. The defendant was accused of having burglarized the Sullivan Eye Clinic in Sterling on two separate occasions, once on July 11, 1980, and again on August 31, 1980. Watts was found guilty of the July 11 burglary, count I, and not guilty of the August burglary, count II. The defendant had a history of1 prior criminal activity and was therefore sentenced to seven years of imprisonment under the extended-term provisions of section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20142(a)(4)).\nOn appeal, the appellate court, in a Rule 23 order (87 Ill. 2d R. 23), affirmed the conviction and sentencing order entered in the circuit court and remanded for correction of the mittimus to indicate that the defendant was convicted of only one and not two counts of burglary (104 Ill. App. 3d 1212). A petition for rehearing was filed in the appellate court, and the original appellate court order was modified to address the defendant\u2019s arguments on the grounds of waiver. However, the appellate court denied the relief requested. We granted the defendant leave to appeal.\nThe evidence consisted of the defendant\u2019s fingerprints found on the bottom of a desk drawer at the scene of the crime and the defendant\u2019s possession of stereo equipment similar to that taken during the July 11 burglary. However, the victim was unable to positively identify the stereo equipment as his own.\nThe question before us is whether the failure of the trial court to give the instruction conforming to Hlinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI), Criminal, No. 3.02 (2d ed. 1981), constituted reversible error. We affirm the appellate court in finding that it did not.\nAs a starting point, it is clear that the evidence in this case was entirely circumstantial. While the State argues that direct evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was introduced, there is no support for such an assertion in the record. The State asserts that stereo equipment found by the police at the defendant\u2019s home was identified at trial as equipment taken from the Sullivan Eye Clinic. In fact, the equipment was not positively identified, and it is therefore circumstantial and not direct evidence.\nThe defendant tendered the following instruction, which substantially conformed to IPI Criminal No. 3.02:\n\"Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances which give rise to a reasonable inference of other facts which tend to show the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Circumstantial evidence should be considered by you together with all the other evidence in the case in arriving at your verdict.\nYou should not find the defendant guilty unless the facts and circumstances proved exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.\u201d\nThe prosecutor tendered an instruction which conformed with the first paragraph of IPI Criminal No. 3.02 but differed with the second paragraph in stating:\n\u201cYou should not find the defendant guilty on the basis of entirely circumstantial evidence which may or may not connect the defendant to the commission of each crime charged, unless the facts and evidence exclude every reasonable doubt of innocence as to each crime charged.\u201d\nThe court tendered the modified instruction after recalling the disapproval of the second paragraph of IPI Criminal No. 3.02 voiced by the appellate court in People v. Godsey (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 364, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 64.\nThe appellate court determined in the instant case that the IPI version of the instruction is misleading and at odds with what this State\u2019s courts had previously said. We disagree. In People v. Evans (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 77, 83, this court, as part of its review, examined a trial court\u2019s failure to include the second paragraph of IPI Criminal No. 3.02, and the court said that \u201c[t]his paragraph should be given when the proof of guilt, as to each element of the offense, is circumstantial.\u201d Because the conviction in the Evans case was based solely upon circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that paragraph two of IPI Criminal No. 3.02 \u201cshould have been given to the jury.\u201d 87 Ill. 2d 77, 83.\nWe do not, however, agree with the defendant\u2019s asser-. tion that the tendering of the modified version of the IPI requires a reversal because it misstates the law. The defendant contends that such an instruction requires the jury to determine whether or not the evidence was entirely circumstantial before applying the appropriate standard of proof. The second paragraph of the given instruction clearly indicated that the jury was considering entirely circumstantial evidence. The instruction tendered also properly cautioned the jury that in its deliberation such circumstantial evidence does not provide a sufficient basis for a guilty verdict unless every reasonable theory of the defendant\u2019s innocence is excluded.\nWe are in agreement with the defendant that the instruction should have employed the expression \u201creasonable theory of innocence\u201d as opposed to \u201creasonable doubt of innocence.\u201d\nThe word \u201ctheory\u201d is defined as \u201ca speculative idea or plan as to how something might be done.\u201d (Webster\u2019s New World Dictionary of the American Language 1475 (1974).) The word \u201cdoubt\u201d means \u201ca wavering of opinion or belief, lack of conviction, uncertainty.\u201d (Webster\u2019s New World Dictionary of the American Language 721 (1974).) While we recognize a difference between the two terms and find the word \u201ctheory\u201d in the context of the instruction to be preferable as a clearer, less likely to be misunderstood term, we feel that the differences in semantics between the two words did not prejudice the defendant.\nIn view of the circumstantial evidence of the defendant\u2019s fingerprints found on the bottom of a desk drawer at the scene of the crime, we find that any error in using the term \u201cdoubt\u201d was harmless. People v. Jones (1979), 81 Ill. 2d 1, 9; People v. Truelock (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 189, 192; see People v. Rhodes (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 241, 249.\nIn conclusion, because we have found any error in the instruction given to be harmless, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the conviction and sentencing order entered in the circuit court of Whiteside County and remanded for correction of the mittimus.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CLARK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli, of Ottawa, and G. Joseph Weller, of Elgin, Deputy Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.", "Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Gary L. Spencer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morrison (John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 56519.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. MARK L. WATTS, Appellant.\nOpinion filed October 21, 1983.\nRobert Agostinelli, of Ottawa, and G. Joseph Weller, of Elgin, Deputy Defenders, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.\nTyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Gary L. Spencer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Morrison (John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0070-01", "first_page_order": 82, "last_page_order": 86 }