{ "id": 3121800, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LAURA EXLINE, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Exline", "decision_date": "1983-10-21", "docket_number": "No. 57401", "first_page": "150", "last_page": "158", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 150" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "380 U.S. 102", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524630 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S. Ct. 725", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6163485, 6163782 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0257-01", "/us/362/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 U.S. 257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163485 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Vt. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 4676389 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/132/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 A.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8032647 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/340/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 U.S. 214", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167502 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/381/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3650729 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/358/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 1879", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1890" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 U.S. 160", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3943769 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "1310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/338/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 U.S. 89", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728831 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/379/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11317375 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" }, { "page": "645" }, { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 108", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165107 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "729" }, { "page": "1514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 L. Ed. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" }, { "page": "2332" }, { "page": "552-53" }, { "page": "2335-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3009301 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 L. Ed. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "2327" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "2361" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 715, "char_count": 13157, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.114873014629945e-07, "percentile": 0.7636723222087465 }, "sha256": "b2889721bb4061a508e2656a57138b8680e27af2602b85ebca49045b1396d577", "simhash": "1:aa3a1f214ef4db97", "word_count": 2128 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:49:16.901998+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LAURA EXLINE, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Laura Exline, was charged by information with the offenses of possession of a controlled substance, possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver, and the unlawful use of weapons (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 56\u00bd, pars. 1402(b), 705(d); ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(7)). Following her pretrial motion, the circuit court of Will County quashed a search warrant and suppressed evidence recovered by narcotics agents pursuant to the warrant. A divided appellate court affirmed, holding that the State failed to establish the credibility of the informant whose information provided the basis for the warrant. (108 Ill. App. 3d 926.) We granted the State leave to appeal.\nThe sole issue raised for review is whether the affidavit in support of a search warrant contained sufficient information to sustain a determination of probable cause.\nOn October 10, 1980, a search warrant was issued authorizing police to search the apartment of Jeff Smith for the purpose of recovering cannabis and drug-related paraphernalia. Defendant resided in the apartment with Smith. The affidavit in support of the warrant stated that the affiant, an agent with the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad (MANS), met with a confidential informant within the previous 10 days. The informant advised him that he could purchase cannabis from Smith, who, he said, resided in apartment No. 110 at 1860 B, Aycliff Court in Joliet. He further stated that Smith sold him \u201cquantities of cannabis\u201d in the past.\nThree controlled purchases were subsequently conducted. On the first two occasions, the informant was searched for contraband or money, and none was found. He was then furnished with prerecorded funds, for the purpose of purchasing cannabis, and was driven by a MANS agent to 1860 B, Aycliff Court, a three-story multi-family apartment complex. The informant entered the building through the main entrance, and returned shortly thereafter to the agent\u2019s vehicle. He advised the agent that he could purchase cannabis and was told to do so. He then reentered the building, again through the main entrance, and was next seen when he exited the doorway and returned to the vehicle. Upon returning to a pre-arranged location, the informant produced a tinfoil packet containing a substance which field tests revealed to be cannabis. The informant was then searched and no contraband, or money, was found.\nA third controlled purchase was conducted five days prior to the issuance of the search warrant. On this occasion, the informant made but a single visit to the building and purchased cannabis. Otherwise, the circumstances of the three purchases were substantially similar. The complaint for a search warrant further related that the Joliet telephone directory listed Jeff Smith as residing at 1860 Aycliff Court, Apartment No. 110.\nWhen the police subsequently executed the warrant, defendant was present. After establishing that she resided in the apartment with Smith, she was arrested and charged with the prior-related offenses.\nSince this case was taken under advisement, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. _, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317, abandoning the frequently cited Aguilar-Spinelli test. In its stead, the court adopted a \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d approach for determining when there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. The opinion does not indicate whether this new rule should be given retroactive or prospective application. We need not resolve this question here since, under either approach, the affidavit contained sufficient information to sustain a determination of probable cause. Because the parties\u2019 arguments are based upon Aguilar-Spinelli, we first address the issue in accordance with that test.\nUnder Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 S. Ct. 1509, and Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 89 S. Ct. 584, a warrant may issue based upon information supplied by a confidential informant if the magistrate is \u201cinformed of [1] some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and [2] some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant *** was \u2018credible\u2019 or his information \u2018reliable.\u2019 \u201d (Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 729, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514.) No question is raised as to the basis of the informant\u2019s knowledge that the narcotics were where he claimed they were. Rather, defendant contends that the affidavit failed to set forth sufficient facts establishing the reliability of the informant or the credibility of his information. She points out that, since the police officers did not actually observe the informant enter Smith\u2019s apartment, it is conceivable that he obtained the cannabis from another resident of the building.\nDefendant\u2019s argument ignores the well-settled distinction between the quantum of proof necessary to obtain a criminal conviction, and that which is required to show probable cause for an arrest or search. Only the probability of criminal activity, and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is the standard for assessing probable cause. (Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 419, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 645, 89 S. Ct. 584, 590, citing Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 85 S. Ct. 223.) The question, therefore, is one of probabilities which \u201care not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.\u201d Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160, 175, 93 L. Ed. 1879,1890, 69 S. Ct. 1302,1310.\nThe facts set forth in the instant affidavit were sufficient to indicate that, more probably than not, narcotics would be found on the premises in question. The affiant had first-hand knowledge of all the facts to which he attested except that Smith was the actual perpetrator of the offense. Police investigation verified Smith\u2019s residence and corroborated the informant\u2019s statement that he could purchase cannabis there. That certain details of the informant\u2019s information proved true lends credence to those details which were not confirmed. Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 79 S. Ct. 329. See Jaben v. United States (1965), 381 U.S. 214, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345, 85 S. Ct. 1365 (it is not necessary that every factual allegation be independently confirmed).\nMore importantly, it has been recognized that \u201ccorroboration will suffice to show veracity [where] the informant has not been working independently, but rather has cooperated \u2022 closely with the police, as is true when the informant makes a controlled purchase of narcotics.\u201d (1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 3.3, at 559 (1978); see also State v. Gamage (Me. 1975), 340 A.2d 1; State v. Barrett (1974), 132 Vt. 369, 320 A.2d 621.) This close police surveillance in controlled purchases of drugs serves to minimize the risk of falsehood and reduce reliance on the informant\u2019s credibility.\nIn the instant case, the entry into defendant\u2019s apartment was the only unobserved activity on the part of the informant. To require police officers, in cases involving multiple-dwelling units, to be present and witness the informant enter a defendant\u2019s apartment would obviate the need for a search warrant. Where a police officer \u201chas reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense\u201d no warrant is required. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 107 \u2014 2(c).\nFor these reasons, we hold that the informant\u2019s credibility was sufficiently established, and the warrant was therefore not obtained in violation of Aguilar and Spinelli. It follows that the affidavit complied with the less rigid standard for determining probable cause set forth in Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. _, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317.\nAs previously related, Gates abandoned the so-called \u201ctwo-prong\u201d test, wherein both the informant\u2019s basis of knowledge and his credibility must be independently established. Under the new \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d analysis, \u201c[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the \u2018veracity\u2019 and \u2018basis of knowledge\u2019 of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.\u201d 462 U.S. _, _, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332.\nHere, there was at least a \u201cfair probability,\u201d based upon the corroborated informant\u2019s tip, that narcotics would be discovered in Smith\u2019s apartment. The three controlled purchases so decreased the opportunity for falsehood as to provide the requisite indicia of reliability. Cf. Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. _, _, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 552-53, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2335-36 (police corroboration of innocent details provided a sufficient basis to credit the informant\u2019s statement that defendants were engaged in illegal activity).\nIn view of the deference accorded the decision of the issuing magistrate (Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. _, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 103 S. Ct. 2317; see Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725), and recognizing that, in doubtful cases, the warrant should be upheld (United States v. Ventresca (1965), 380 U.S. 102, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 85 S. Ct. 741), it cannot be said that the magistrate erred in his assessment of probable cause. Accordingly, the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Will County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nJudgments reversed; cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MORAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH,\ndissenting:\nI dissent and would affirm the judgment of the circuit and appellate courts. Assuming, arguendo, that the majority has correctly construed the opinion in Gates, the Supreme Court did not obviate the requirement that there appear in \u201cthe totality of the circumstances\u201d a basis for attributing some degree of reliability to the unnamed informant. The Supreme Court said:\n\u201cWe agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an informant\u2019s \u2018veracity,\u2019 \u2018reliability\u2019 and \u2018basis of knowledge\u2019 are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report.\u201d (Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S._,_, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 543, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2327.)\nThe problem here is that there is no evidence of the informant\u2019s reliability which can support the issuance of a warrant to search a particular apartment. Admittedly, the entrance through which the informant entered the building after leaving the police officer led to a number of apartments. During the time that the informant was inside the building he was not within sight of the police officer, who had no knowledge as to which apartment, if any, he entered.\nThe fact that the police officer verified that a tenant with the name given him by the informant occupied one of the apartments did not indicate that the informant had entered that apartment or contacted the defendant. The after-the-fact corroboration by the discovery of contraband is of no value in determining the validity of the information which was presented to the magistrate at the time of the issuance of the warrant. To quote from Justice Stevens\u2019 dissent in Gates, \u201cI must surmise that the Court\u2019s evaiuation of the warrant\u2019s validity has been colored by subsequent events.\u201d 462 U.S. _, _, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 584, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2361.\nI agree with the appellate court that the affidavit did not contain sufficient information to support the issuance of a search warrant.\nThere is another aspect of the case which the majority did not consider. This court decided Gates on the basis of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article I, section 6, of the Constitution of Illinois. As was pointed out in both the majority opinion and Justice White\u2019s concurrence in Gates, we are not required to blindly follow the action taken by the Supreme Court in determining the standards applicable under our own constitution. In his eloquent dissent in Gates, Justice Brennan has stated far better than can I the reasons for rejecting the holding in Gates and retaining the tests and standards enunciated in Aguilar and Spinelli. I would retain those tests and standards as constitutional requirements in Illinois.\nJUSTICE SIMON joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil E Hartigan and Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Edward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Ellen M. Flaum and Kenneth A. Fedinets, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and John X. Breslin and Gerry R Arnold, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.", "Gray, Kleczek & Kielian, P.C., of Joliet (Gerald G. Kielian, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "No. 57401.\nTHE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LAURA EXLINE, Appellee.\nOpinion filed October 21, 1983.\nGOLDENHERSH and SIMON, JJ., dissenting.\nNeil E Hartigan and Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorneys General, of Springfield, and Edward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Ellen M. Flaum and Kenneth A. Fedinets, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and John X. Breslin and Gerry R Arnold, of the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.\nGray, Kleczek & Kielian, P.C., of Joliet (Gerald G. Kielian, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0150-01", "first_page_order": 162, "last_page_order": 170 }