{ "id": 1601090, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Plodzien, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Plodzien", "decision_date": "1968-12-31", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 52,260", "first_page": "336", "last_page": "343", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 Ill. App. 2d 336" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "243 NE2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill2d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853826 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 NE2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2885820 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 NE2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill App2d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2604666 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/60/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 NE2d 474", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill App2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2595942 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/68/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 NE2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill App2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5280823 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/52/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 NE2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill App2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2587228 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/71/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 NE2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill App2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5172530, 5172325 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/14/0261-02", "/ill-app-2d/14/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 NE2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill App2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2604815 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/60/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 Ill 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2491663 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/384/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 Ill 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2615531 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/402/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 NE2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5315332 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ill 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4784658 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/266/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2844382 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/97/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ill 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4862821 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/277/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 NE 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4958470 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/288/0044-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 638, "char_count": 10423, "ocr_confidence": 0.578, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2888028709272846e-07, "percentile": 0.786001616310449 }, "sha256": "57ad763b0b496dd264fb6d090f0aaca3ce824f11996090a8f8284cd042b3bace", "simhash": "1:0f0d3c115200cee1", "word_count": 1811 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:36:31.522259+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "DRUCKER and ENGLISH, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Plodzien, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE McCORMICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nCRIME CHARGED: Robbery.\nJUDGMENT: After a bench trial defendant was found guilty and sentenced to the Illinois State Penitentiary for a term of not less than three nor more than eight years.\nCONTENTIONS ON APPEAL:\n1) Defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\n2) Sentence was excessive.\nEVIDENCE: Terrell Fondren, the complaining witness, testified as follows: On December 21, 1966, he was at his place of business at 3059 North Sheffield Avenue, Chicago, when the defendant entered the store about 10:30 a. m. with another man. They stayed five or ten minutes and left. Fondren was able to get a good look at the defendant. At about 2:30 p. m. that same day the defendant returned to the shop, at which time Fondren was alone, seated at his desk in the rear of the store. Fondren went to the front to greet the defendant, who ignored the greeting and walked behind Fondren. At that time the bell on the shop door rang and a man entered, whom the witness recognized as the person who had accompanied the defendant in the morning. As he looked at the man Fondren was struck on the head from behind, and the next thing he remembered was lying on the floor and being struck in the face by the defendant. He then became unconscious, and when he awakened he felt the defendant going through his pants pockets. He told him the only money he had was in his raincoat in the back of the store. The defendant and his companion then picked him up, pulled him to the rear of the shop and bound him to a large grinding wheel. The defendant then took Fondren\u2019s billfold containing $3, identification and credit cards, including one for Marshall Field & Company, after which the two men left. Fondren identified People\u2019s Exhibit 1 as the Marshall Field credit card.\nLynn Bischak testified for the State that he was a special investigator for Marshall Field & Company; he identified the defendant in court, stating that he first saw him on December 21, 1966, when he attempted to purchase goods with a charge plate which had been reported stolen earlier that day. He was shown People\u2019s Exhibit 1, the credit card issued by Marshall Field, and testified that it was in the possession of the defendant when he was arrested.\nThe defendant testified that a friend of his told him he \u201cknew a queer up on Belmont and Sheffield who might give them some money.\u201d They went to Fondren\u2019s shop after visiting a tavern, and the friend went into the back room and talked to Fondren. He returned and said he didn\u2019t believe Fondren had any money, so they started to leave. The defendant said Fondren came to him and \u201capproached like he was a queer\u201d and the defendant knocked him down and left. The defendant\u2019s friend told him that Fondren had given him the credit card for Marshall Field\u2019s; defendant said he used the card, but denied taking other identification cards from Fondren, or robbing him.\nOPINION: The defendant first argues that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The case was tried before the court without a jury. In People v. Schoop, 288 Ill 44, at 47, 122 NE 836, the court said:\n\u201cThis court will not reverse a judgment of conviction on the evidence merely because only one witness testifies to the commission of the crime and is contradicted by the accused. (People v. Zurek, 277 Ill 621.) In Gainey v. People, 97 Ill 270, this court said: \u2018The most important and useful function which the jury is required to perform is to determine on which side of a controversy the real truth lies where the testimony as to the material facts is directly in conflict and irreconcilable, and its conclusion in such case of necessity depends largely upon the credit to be given to the opposing witnesses, hence it is universally admitted to be the peculiar province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses.\u2019 It is only when this court is able to say, from a careful consideration of the whole testimony, that there is clearly a reasonable and well founded doubt of the guilt of the accused, that it will interfere on the ground that the evidence does not support the verdict. (People v. Grosenheider, 266 Ill 324; Graham v. People, 115 id. 566.) This must necessarily always be the rule where the court has committed no error in its ruling or where no such errors are complained of and no other improper conduct of the jury or of counsel is shown, as it was never the intention of the law that the court should usurp the province of the jury.\u201d\nThis has been the law in Illinois for many years.\nThe defendant cites and quotes from People v. Kirilenko, 1 Ill2d 90, 115 NE2d 297 (a case which really supports the State\u2019s position), where the court said at page 97:\n\u201cThe sufficiency of the evidence in this case depends, as it so often does, upon the credibility of the prosecuting witness. Where the evidence relating to material facts in issue is in direct conflict and cannot be reconciled, we have stated many times that it is the duty of the jury, or of a court sitting without a jury, to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and, in such function, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury or court. (People v. Sheppard, 402 Ill 411; People v. Langer, 384 Ill 608.) In criminal cases it is the duty of this court to examine the evidence, and, if there is not sufficient credible evidence, if it is improbable or unsatisfactory, or not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt and create an abiding conviction that he is guilty, the conviction will be reversed.\u201d\nIt has also been held that the testimony of one credible witness is sufficient for the trier of the fact to conclude that the defendant had been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Webb, 60 Ill App2d 365, 208 NE2d 639. The sufficiency of the evidence depends solely upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. People v. Riddle, 14 Ill App2d 261, 144 NE2d 466 (abst). Also see People v. Carpenter, 71 Ill App2d 137, 217 NE2d 337; and People v. Bray, 52 Ill App2d 384, 202 NE2d 152.\nIn the instant case there was strong corroboration of the testimony of the State\u2019s witness by the showing that defendant was in possession of the Marshall Field credit card. Considering the above rules, a careful examination of the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe second contention of the defendant is that the sentence of three to eight years in the penitentiary is excessive, and he asks that this court reduce the sentence. In section 18-1 (b), chapter 38, Ill Rev Stats 1965, the penalty for robbery is set out as follows: \u201cA person convicted of robbery shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary from one to twenty years.\u201d\nIn the case before us the evidence in the record shows that the alleged crime was committed by the defendant on December 21, 1966. In their briefs both the State and the defendant agree that in January 1954, the defendant had received one year\u2019s probation for petty larceny; that in April 1964, he received 90 days in the House of Correction for petty thievery; that in June 1964, on two counts of burglary, he was given concurrent sentences of from one to two years in the penitentiary; that on December 22, 1966, on the charge of deceptive practices, he received four months in the House of Correction, and on the same date, on a charge of battery, an additional four months in the House of Correction, to run consecutively.\nIt is true that the Supreme Court Rules of Criminal Appeals (Ill Rev Stats 1967, c 110A, \u00a7 615(b) (4)) allow for reduction of sentence by reviewing courts; however, this power should be used sparingly and only in cases where it appears that some substantial prejudice to the rights of the defendant has occurred. In People v Davidovic, 68 Ill App2d 216, 215 NE2d 474, the court cites with approval and quotes from People v. Valentine, 60 Ill App2d 339, 355, 208 NE2d 595, where Mr. Justice Dempsey said:\n\u201cWe believe that the power to reduce sentences should be used with caution and that a sentence imposed by the trial judge, who sees the defendant and is in a far better position to appraise him and to evaluate the likelihood of his rehabilitation than a reviewing court, should not be reduced unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. The penalty decided upon by the trial court, if within statutory limits, should not be changed merely because of judicial clemency or just because the reviewing court would have imposed a different one if it had been in the trial court\u2019s position.\u201d\nIn People v. Gray, 33 Ill2d 349, at 356, 211 NE2d 369 the court said:\n\u201cThe final question herein is whether the sentence, which is concededly within the statutory limit (Ill Rev Stats 1961, chap 38, par 18-2, provides for an indeterminate term, the minimum sentence for armed robbery being one year) was so unduly severe as to warrant reduction by us under Ill Rev Stats 1963, chap 38, par 121-9 (b) (4). It is clear that in passing sentence upon a guilty criminal, the trial judge is invested with judicial discretion within the limits of punishment fixed by law. (ILP, Criminal Law, \u00a7 815.) While the sentence herein is severe, we believe it to be justified under the circumstances shown. Defendant had been twice previously convicted of felonies and had violated probation granted after his first conviction. In addition to the penitentiary terms served on these convictions, he was sentenced to the State Penal Farm on a third offense and had been released only some four months prior to this armed robbery.\u201d\nSee also People v. Nelson, 41 Ill2d 364, 243 NE2d 225.\nConsidering the defendant\u2019s prior criminal record and his failure to rehabilitate himself, the sentence should not be reduced. The judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDRUCKER and ENGLISH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE McCORMICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender of Cook County, of Chicago (Herbert Becker, Norman W. Fishman, and James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "John J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Plodzien, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 52,260.\nFirst District, Fourth Division.\nDecember 31, 1968.\nGerald W. Getty, Public Defender of Cook County, of Chicago (Herbert Becker, Norman W. Fishman, and James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJohn J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0336-01", "first_page_order": 342, "last_page_order": 349 }