{
  "id": 1589931,
  "name": "Edmund J. Skiba, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Earl S. Ruby, Defendant-Petitioner",
  "name_abbreviation": "Skiba v. Ruby",
  "decision_date": "1969-07-18",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 52,799",
  "first_page": "170",
  "last_page": "175",
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      "cite": "113 Ill. App. 2d 170"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
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    {
      "cite": "199 NE2d 618",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "49 Ill App2d 354",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5273370
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      "year": 1964,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/49/0354-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:40:28.735003+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Edmund J. Skiba, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Earl S. Ruby, Defendant-Petitioner."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. JUSTICE DEMPSEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is a petition by the defendant for leave to appeal from an order granting a new trial in a personal injury suit. The jury\u2019s verdict was in favor of the defendant but the trial court set the verdict aside on the ground that it was contrary to the weight of the evidence.\nThe suit arose out of a two-car collision which occurred about noon on Milwaukee Avenue, Chicago, at a point where the avenue is an eight-lane, two-way thoroughfare. The plaintiff was driving northwest in the fourth lane from the curb, having turned left onto Milwaukee Avenue from a side street. The defendant was moving from the curb lane, where he had been parked, toward the fourth lane when the two cars collided.\nThe plaintiff testified that he was driving at a speed of 15 to 18 miles per hour. He saw several cars parked along the curb. The front car had a driver (the defendant) but was motionless. When the plaintiff\u2019s auto was about ten feet to the rear of this car, the defendant moved forward and started to make a sharp turn to the left \u2014 the plaintiff\u2019s impression was that the defendant was going to make a left turn. The plaintiff swung his auto to the left and applied his brakes; his auto diagonally crossed the two yellow lines dividing the thoroughfare and came to a stop. As his auto stopped, the plaintiff looked to his right and saw the defendant\u2019s car coming at him at a 90\u00b0 angle. Its left front struck his auto to the rear of the right door. After the accident he and the defendant exchanged identification. According to the plaintiff the defendant said that he intended to turn left at the next intersection, that he had never seen the plaintiff\u2019s auto and wanted to know where it came from.\nThe defendant testified that he was parked at the curb and that he intended to drive northwest to the next corner and turn left. He started his motor, pulled forward a few inches and then \u2014 lacking an outside rearview mirror \u2014 turned his head completely to the side and rear. The closest vehicle moving northwest was about a half block away and he saw no auto about to turn left from a side street. He turned his head to the front and pulled out almost completely into the second lane. As he did so he turned on his left directional signal because he knew he would be veering toward the left. He looked into his rearview mirror and saw that the auto he had first seen a half block away was still \u201cquite a way\u2019s down\u201d and proceeding slowly. He then drove slowly across the second lane toward the third and fourth lanes. As he reached the fourth lane, he started to turn his wheels to the right to follow the path of Milwaukee Avenue. According to the defendant about 80% to 90% of his car was in the fourth lane when it collided with the plaintiff\u2019s auto. The collision damaged his left front fender and bumper and one left headlight. He admitted that he did not see the plaintiff\u2019s auto before the collision.\nA Chicago police officer investigated the accident shortly after it happened. He testified that he found the defendant\u2019s car parked at the curb and the plaintiff\u2019s auto in the center of the street. He saw skid marks made by the plaintiff\u2019s auto which showed that the auto was traveling northwest and upon impact slid to the side. The marks were straight and about six to eight feet long; from the point of impact, they extended sideways about one to two feet. The marks indicated to the officer that the plaintiff\u2019s auto stopped abruptly.\nThe officer also testified that a cement-like substance near the curb stuck to the right tires of the defendant\u2019s car and showed exactly the path of the car from the parked position to the point of the impact. The tracks showed that the vehicle was next to the curb when it started up, that the wheels were turned and the car more or less \u201carced in\u201d at an angle between 45\u00b0 and 90\u00b0 from the curb to the plaintiff\u2019s auto. The officer\u2019s impression was that the driver of the car was making a \u201cU\u201d turn. However, the officer\u2019s diagram of the scene and police report did not show that the defendant\u2019s car was making a \u201cU\u201d turn or was in an arc at the time of the accident. According to the officer, there was no indication that either vehicle exceeded the 30 miles per hour speed limit.\nUpon this evidence the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The trial court disagreed with the jury; the court was of the opinion that the evidence preponderated in favor of the plaintiff and for this reason granted the plaintiff a new trial. It is the trial court\u2019s duty to set aside a verdict if it is not sustained by the greater weight of the evidence. A motion for a new trial is addressed to the discretion of the judge and his judgment will not be reversed except for a clear abuse of discretion, which must affirmatively appear in the record. Potter v. Ace Auto Parts and Wreckers, Inc., 49 Ill App2d 354, 199 NE2d 618 (1964).\nThe standard to be applied in reviewing the trial court\u2019s judgment is whether the jury\u2019s verdict was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence \u2014 not, as suggested by both parties in their briefs, whether the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The manifest weight of the evidence standard prevails in a court of review when a jury\u2019s verdict is approved by the trial judge, not when it has met his disapproval. Rodriguez v. Chicago Transit Authority, 58 Ill App2d 150, 206 NE2d 828 (1965).\nThe evidence on both the issues of the defendant\u2019s negligence and the plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence preponderated in favor of the plaintiff. The evidence showed that the defendant crashed into the side of the plaintiff\u2019s auto after having failed to keep a proper lookout while shifting lanes (and perhaps while making an illegal turn). There was evidence that he swung from the curb to the fourth lane at a 45\u00b0 to 90\u00b0 angle and he admitted that he did not see the plaintiff\u2019s auto until the impact. He notes that in pulling away from the curb and in shifting lanes, he looked behind him once by turning his head and once by means of a rearview mirror, but these precautions were inadequate in view of the width of the street and the number of lanes he was traversing. The defendant claims that he could not watch southeast bound traffic which was turning left in front of him and look out for traffic behind him at the same time, but if this is true he should have continued forward without changing lanes until adequate caution was possible \u2014 even if this meant missing the street where he wanted to turn. He also contends that his turn signal was on but this did not give him a license to change lanes without adequate precaution.\nOn the issue of the plaintiff\u2019s contributory negligence, the evidence just as clearly shows that the plaintiff was not negligent \u2014 that he drove within the speed limit, kept a proper lookout and took appropriate action when he saw the defendant coming. To establish the plaintiff\u2019s negligence, the defendant relies on the skid marks left by the plaintiff\u2019s auto, the plaintiff\u2019s failure to sound his horn and his alleged failure to bring his car under control. However, the officer testified that there was no evidence of speeding and that the skid marks merely indicated that the plaintiff\u2019s auto stopped abruptly. The plaintiff testified that he put on his brakes, swung to the left and was stopped when the defendant hit him. This testimony was supported by the path of the skid marks and the location of the damage on the cars. Although he did not sound his horn, the defendant cannot complain that the plaintiff failed to take all steps which might have prevented the accident. The plaintiff had to react quickly to an emergency created by the defendant and he did take affirmative measures to avoid the collision.\nThe trial judge did not abuse his discretion in setting aside the verdict and the petition for leave to appeal from the order granting a new trial will be denied.\nPetition denied.\nSULLIVAN, P. J. and SCHWARTZ, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. JUSTICE DEMPSEY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Joseph A. Bailey and Jerome H. Torshen, of Chicago, for plaintiff-respondent.",
      "Hubbard, Hubbard, O\u2019Brien & Hall, of Chicago (Alvin G. Hubbard, George S. Miller, and Frederick W. Temple, of counsel), for defendant-petitioner."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Edmund J. Skiba, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Earl S. Ruby, Defendant-Petitioner.\nGen. No. 52,799.\nFirst District, Third Division.\nJuly 18, 1969.\nJoseph A. Bailey and Jerome H. Torshen, of Chicago, for plaintiff-respondent.\nHubbard, Hubbard, O\u2019Brien & Hall, of Chicago (Alvin G. Hubbard, George S. Miller, and Frederick W. Temple, of counsel), for defendant-petitioner."
  },
  "file_name": "0170-01",
  "first_page_order": 176,
  "last_page_order": 181
}