{
  "id": 1583491,
  "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Russell, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Russell",
  "decision_date": "1970-03-11",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 69-138",
  "first_page": "197",
  "last_page": "202",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "120 Ill. App. 2d 197"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "233 NE2d 93",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1967,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "89 Ill App2d 120",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2546111
      ],
      "year": 1967,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "122"
        }
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/89/0120-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:28:55.675631+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Russell, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe defendant was charged with speeding, tried be-, fore the court, found guilty, fined $25 plus $10 costs, and appeals.\nThe evidence consisted of the testimony of two State troopers. Trooper Quist testified that he parked his squad car, which had a radar unit attached, on Route 64 about one-quarter of a mile east of the Pheasant Run Motel entrance. The radar equipment had been tested for accuracy prior to and shortly after the occurrence in question and was in good operating condition on both occasions. The defendant\u2019s car was clocked at 76 m. p. h. in a 55 m. p. h. speed zone. This information was relayed, by radio, to Trooper Scalf in a second squad car, called the \u201ccatch\u201d car, which was parked at the entrance to the motel. The defendant was stopped and given a ticket for exceeding the speed limit.\nDuring cross-examination, Quist testified that his squad car was parked within 6 inches of a speed limit sign which had marked upon it, \u201cSpeed Limit 55 m. p. h.\u201d At the moment this answer was given, the defendant moved for judgment for the defendant based upon section 49.01. The motion was denied. Thereafter, Scalf testified, was not cross-examined and the State closed proofs. No evidence was introduced by the defendant and the court found for the State.\nSection 49 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Ill Rev Stats 1967, c 95 1/2, \u00a7 146) sets forth the general speed restrictions for public highways within this State. The maximum speed limit, outside of an urban district, is 65 m. p. h. The location in question will be considered such an area since the State has not, by way of argument or evidence, controverted the defendant\u2019s position on this point.\nSection 49.01 of the same Act allows the Department of Public Works and Buildings, after an engineering and traffic investigation, to alter the speed restrictions by either increasing or decreasing the limit that is generally prescribed by law. This determination becomes effective \u201cwhen appropriate signs giving notice of the limit are erected . . . along such part or zone of the highway.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn 1959, this section was amended to include:\n\u201cElectronic speed-detecting devices shall not be used within 500 feet beyond any such sign in the direction of travel; if so used in violation hereof, evidence obtained thereby shall be inadmissible in any prosecution for speeding.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe briefs and arguments before this Court were chiefly centered about whether the testimony of Quist, who monitored the radar speed-detection unit within 500 feet of a speed limit sign, was admissible.\nIt is the defendant\u2019s position that \u201cany such sign,\u201d emphasized above, refers to \u201cappropriate signs,\u201d also emphasized above, which is plural and therefore the legislature intended the provision with regard to the placing of electronic speed-detecting devices to mean any sign which denotes the speed limit.\nThe State argues that the prohibition against the use of such devices is applicable only to one sign, that being the first sign, in what may prove to be a series of signs, upon entry into a changed speed zone.\nWithout deciding between these two interpretations, but for the purpose of this opinion, we still must reverse, since the State failed to meet its burden of proof upon the evidence introduced.\nAs stated previously, the defendant, during cross-examination of Trooper Quist, established that the electronic device was being operated within 6 inches of a speed limit sign. Upon receiving this answer, the defendant immediately moved for judgment on behalf of the defendant. This was premature since the State had not closed its proof and a motion to strike Trooper Quist\u2019s testimony would probably have been more appropriate since it was based upon section 49.01. Nevertheless, an affirmative defense was placed in issue which should have put the State on notice that it would have to sustain the burden of proof on this issue, as well as the elements of the offense involved. See, People v. Powers, 89 Ill App2d 120, 122, 233 NE2d 93 (1967). The denial of the motion by the trial court did not relieve the State of its burden.\nThe State draws our attention to the further testimony of Quist, elicited during cross-examination, which was as follows:\n\u201cQ. Officer, you testified that there are posted speed limit signs along Route 64?\n\u201cA. That is correct.\n\u201cQ. And what are those speed limit signs?\n\u201cA. 55 miles per hour.\u201d\nand also calls our attention to an answer given by Trooper Scalf which was:\n\u201cA. I was working radar out by Pheasant Run and got a call from Trooper Guist (sic) that there was a white Chevrolet, 1961, two-door hard top, doing 76 miles per hour in a 55-mile zone. I stopped the car.\u201d\nBased upon the above, the State claims that \u201cthe People met their burden by showing that although the radar equipment was 6 inches to the west of \u2018a\u2019 55 mile per hour speed sign, there were other 55 mile per hour speed signs along Route 64, and that the defendant was not entering a different speed zone when he was observed by the radar device.\u201d\nThe fact that there were other 55 m. p. h. speed signs along Route 64 does not establish whether the one in question was or was not the first in a series of such signs. The record does not disclose if these other signs were to the east or to the west of the one in question and we cannot conclude, as the State does, that this particular sign was not the first of a series of like signs.\nIn another portion of its brief, the State argues, \u201c(T)here is no evidence in the record that the sign in question reduced the speed from 65 miles per hour. This conclusion was defendant\u2019s.\u201d\nSince it is the State\u2019s position that the prohibition called for in the quoted section of the statute applies only to the first sign in what may prove to be a series of signs, then the specific sign in question becomes of paramount importance, especially when the defendant placed in issue his affirmative defense based upon section 49.01. The burden was on the State, under its own interpretation of the statute to prove that the sign in question was not the first in a series. By its own statement, it admits that there was no evidence in the record (and we agree from our review) that the sign reduced the speed. The point is that there should have been some evidence on the part of the State, once the defense was raised, to show that the sign was not the first in a series. Having failed to do so,' the State, even on its own theory of interpretation of the statute, did not meet its burden of proof to overcome the affirmative defense and therefore the judgment must be reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nDAVIS, P. J, and ABRAHAMSON, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert J. Bourell, of Wheaton, for appellant.",
      "William V. Hopf, State\u2019s Attorney of Wheaton, and A. E. Botti, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Russell, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 69-138.\nSecond District.\nMarch 11, 1970.\nRobert J. Bourell, of Wheaton, for appellant.\nWilliam V. Hopf, State\u2019s Attorney of Wheaton, and A. E. Botti, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0197-01",
  "first_page_order": 203,
  "last_page_order": 208
}