{
  "id": 1583527,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore V. Panker, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Panker",
  "decision_date": "1970-03-11",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 69-188",
  "first_page": "203",
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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      "cite": "243 NE2d 576",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "year": 1968,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "102 Ill App2d 257",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
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      "reporter": "N.E.",
      "year": 1929,
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    {
      "cite": "334 Ill 516",
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      "reporter": "Ill.",
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      "cite": "137 NE2d 270",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1956,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "9 Ill2d 204",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5320421
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:28:55.675631+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore V. Panker, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe defendant, Theodore V. Panker, was charged with the crime of forgery, tried before a jury and found guilty. The trial court, after denying a new trial and probation, sentenced the defendant for a term of 1 to 4 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.\nOn appeal, it is contended that the following errors occurred: (1) that defendant was denied due process of law in that (a) the court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance had the effect of depriving him of the right to the effective assistance of counsel and (b) the court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance was an abuse of discretion; (2) the prejudicial conduct of the trial court throughout every stage of the proceedings deprived the defendant of a completely fair and impartial trial; (3) the prejudicial conduct of the prosecutor deprived the defendant of a full, fair and impartial trial; and (4) the court erred in denying motion for mistrial when the word \u201cinnocent\u201d was discovered on the inside of the jury box.\nOur first consideration is whether the court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance had the effect of depriving the defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel and was an abuse of judicial discretion.\nThe record discloses that the defendant, along with a codefendant, were charged with forgery in the same indictment. On May 20, 1968, the defendant and his privately retained counsel appeared before the trial court for arraignment where the following transpired:\nMr. Vogel: \u201cWe are making a plea of not guilty at\nthis time, your Honor.\u201d\nThe Court: \u201cAsking for a Jury trial?\u201d\nMr. Vogel: \u201cAsking for a Jury trial. And it is my\nunderstanding that the codefendant is up on the 3rd and intends to present some motions.\n\u201cSo at this time I would ask the Court to make the next date for this matter also June 3rd, at which time I will present any pretrial motions that I will have.\u201d\nThe Court: \u201cJune 3rd.\u201d\nMr. Vogel: \u201c9:30, your Honor?\u201d\nThe Court: \u201c9:30. . . .\u201d\nOn the morning of June 3, 1968, both defendants, the attorney for the codefendant and an assistant State\u2019s Attorney, appeared before the court, but defendant\u2019s counsel was not present. At this time, the following occurred:\nThe Court: \u201cWho did you say you represented?\u201d\nMr. Zak: \u201cDefendant Magro.\u201d\nThe Court: \u201cPanker, who is your lawyer?\u201d\nDefendant Panker: \u201cJohnVogel.\u201d\nMr. Zak: \u201cHe contacted my office. He sent me\na copy of discovery motions and advised \u2014 asked that I advise the Court that he\u2019d not be able to make an appearance here. I have a copy of a motion and order. I don\u2019t have any originals.\u201d\nMr. Dondanville: \u201cIf the Court please, these matters were set today for the filing of motions by defense counsel.\u201d\nThe Court: \u201cYou got a motion?\u201d\nMr. Zak: \u201cI have my own motions, yes, your\nHonor. I served the State\u2019s Attorney with them. . . .\u201d\nThe codefendant\u2019s motions were filed, including a motion of severance, and the State was given 30 days to reply. Subsequently, the motions were allowed. Having concluded the matters before it, pertaining to the codefendant, the court then directed its attention to the defendant and the following transpired:\nThe Court: \u201cAs far as your lawyer is concerned, I am just about ready to revoke your bond.and put you in jail; that is, until he shows up.\n\u201cAnd your bond is revoked and you are committed to the custody of the Sheriff. That is the only way I know how to get a Chicago lawyer to show up.\u201d\nMr. Dondanville: \u201cI will prepare an order.\u201d\nThe Court: \u201cAdvise this man\u2019s lawyer that he is in jail until his lawyer shows up out here and takes care of him. . . .\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s attorney appeared later that morning and the following took place:\nMr. Vogel: \u201cYour Honor, at this time I move that the bond forfeited this morning be reinstated and the prisoner be released from the custody of the Kane County Sheriff.\u201d\nThe Court: \u201cAll right; we will vacate the order that we entered this morning, set the case for trial at 1:00 o\u2019clock this afternoon and pick a Jury at that time.\n\u201cDraw the order so the Sheriff can release him. . . .\u201d\nThe record reveals that on the afternoon of June 3, 1968, the voir dire proceedings were commenced and that during these proceedings, the defendant\u2019s attorney stated that he would like the record to show that the defendant was reporting not ready. After the jury had been selected, the defendant\u2019s attorney requested a continuance in order to determine how long one of his witnesses was going to be in the hospital. The court responded that it wanted counsel to make his opening statement and that he could work out what he was going to do during the evening recess.\nOn June 4, 1968, counsel for defendant, presented to the court an affidavit for continuance. The affidavit was subsequently file-stamped on June 6, 1968. The affidavit stated that counsel for defendant did not appear in the early morning of June 3, 1968, because of his being engaged in a jury trial in another county, but that said trial did not proceed for failure of defendant to appear. The affidavit further stated that the affiant was unprepared to try this matter and had had only 14 days from arraignment to trial date and was under the impression that on June 3, 1968, a date would be set for trial which would be some date reasonably convenient to his prior commitment in court. The record also indicates that defendant and his counsel had met for the first time on May 17,1968, and had seen each other 2 or 3 times prior to June 3,1968.\nThe general rule is that the granting of a continuance in a criminal case, on the ground of inade-\nquote time for necessary preparation, is within the province of the trial court\u2019s discretion. The People v. Kenzik, 9 Ill2d 204, 212, 137 NE2d 270 (1956). It is also the rule, as expressed in The People v. Dunham, 334 Ill 516, 166 NE 97 (1929) at page 521:\n\u201cNo person accused of a serious crime should be forced to trial without a reasonable opportunity to employ counsel and properly prepare his defense. . . . Upon a proper showing that for want of time counsel has not been able to properly prepare the case, ... or that the cause is not ready for trial for want of opportunity for preparation owing to no fault of the accused, the court, in the exercise of a wise discretion, should postpone the trial to a later day in the term or continue the cause, if necessary.\u201d (Citations omitted.)\nThe court, in People v. McNeil, 102 Ill App2d 257, 261, 243 NE2d 576 (1968), in quoting from The People v. Hambleton, 399 Ill 388, 393, 78 NE2d 293 (1948), stated:\n\u201cA defendant in every criminal case is entitled, under the law, to a reasonable time and full opportunity to prepare for his trial, and that right is one guaranteed to him by the constitution. Innocent or guilty, or whatever his position might be, he is entitled to sufficient time to prepare his defense. . . . There is not one law for an innocent man and another for a guilty man.\u201d\nIn the instant case, the record shows that only 14 days had passed since the defendant\u2019s arraignment and no previous continuances had been requested. There is no showing that defendant or his attorney had any notice whatever that the matter was going to proceed to trial on June 3, 1968. On the contrary, as can be seen from the quoted portion of the record taken at the time of the arraignment, together with the prosecutor\u2019s statement on the day of trial, June 3, 1968 was set for pretrial motions and not as the date of trial on the merits.\nWhile we cannot condone the fact that defendant\u2019s counsel was not personally present in court on the particular morning set for the filing of pretrial motions, this omission on the part of defendant\u2019s counsel should not work to the detriment of the defendant\u2019s rights.\nWe conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that the trial court should have allowed defendant\u2019s counsel ample opportunity to prepare for trial and failure to do so constituted reversible error. Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to rule upon the other issues raised by the defendant in this appeal.\nThe judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nDAVIS, P. J. and ABRAHAMSON, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Glaeser, Burstein and Horsky, of Dundee, for appellant.",
      "William R. Ketcham, State\u2019s Attorney of Kane County, of Geneva, and W. Ben Morgan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Elgin, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore V. Panker, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 69-188.\nSecond District.\nMarch 11, 1970.\nGlaeser, Burstein and Horsky, of Dundee, for appellant.\nWilliam R. Ketcham, State\u2019s Attorney of Kane County, of Geneva, and W. Ben Morgan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Elgin, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0203-01",
  "first_page_order": 209,
  "last_page_order": 215
}