{ "id": 1580227, "name": "John R. Price, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The Civil Service Board of the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, and Allen S. Lavin, Acting Director of Personnel of the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Price v. Civil Service Board", "decision_date": "1970-03-25", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 53,079", "first_page": "2", "last_page": "11", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "123 Ill. App. 2d 2" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "188 NE2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill App2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5252746 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335-338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/40/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 NE2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill App2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1585450 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/118/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 NE2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill App2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5170635 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347-348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/13/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 NE2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill App2d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 NE2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "396 Ill 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2466420 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/396/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 NE2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill App2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1598860 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/105/0317-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 653, "char_count": 13428, "ocr_confidence": 0.587, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2965671706445128e-07, "percentile": 0.786892787957908 }, "sha256": "e9b7d2e02b9eaca1fed434ac8982fbafa51c1e3a21f66a92ce8d18751bcd5583", "simhash": "1:73a3c5a6ff955477", "word_count": 2174 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:26:20.368977+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "John R. Price, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The Civil Service Board of the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, and Allen S. Lavin, Acting Director of Personnel of the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE ENGLISH\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nDefendants appeal from an order of the Circuit Court reversing the defendant Board\u2019s discharge of plaintiff from his employment with the Sanitary District.\nPlaintiff had held the position of Supervisor of Employee Selection, the examination for which had been advertised by the Board\u2019s announcement which read, in part, as follows:\nQualifications:\nNine years of progressively responsible experience in a technical and supervisory capacity in personnel administration including substantial experience and/or training in examination and selection procedures; and graduation from a four-year accredited college course majoring in personnel administration, industrial psychology or related field. Full-time graduate study in pertinent field may be substituted for experience on the basis of one school year of study for one and one-half years of experience. Any equivalent combination of training and experience will be considered.\nPlaintiff, who had been working for the District on a contract basis for over three months, filed his application for the position on May 25, 1964. The application, which was under oath, contained the following significant portion relating to plaintiff\u2019s education qualifications:\nOne feature of the application form which bears on this case in a rather fundamental way, is the part at the top marked \u201cImportant,\u201d which calls the applicant\u2019s attention to the fact that the information supplied \u201cmay be rated as part of your examination and thus effect your final grade.\u201d\nIn addition to the education data set forth above, the application also contained information as to plaintiff\u2019s previous employment with three different employers covering approximately twelve years. Plaintiff was permitted to take the examination, which he passed, and, being first on the eligible list, he was appointed Supervisor of Employee Selection on August 7,1964.\nThe instant action arose on November 17, 1966, when Allen Lavin, Acting Director of Personnel of the District, filed charges with the Board alleging violation by plaintiff of the following Rules of the District\u2019s Director of Personnel (adopted pursuant to the authority of Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 42, \u00a7 323.5):\n11.041\u2014Causes for Discharge: An employee holding a permanent appointment may be discharged from the service if he is found by the Civil Service Board to:\n(4) Have violated any of the provisions of the Statute governing the classified service of the District, any official regulation of the Board of Trustees, or of the Civil Service Board, or to have failed to obey any proper order or direction made or given by any superior officer of the District.\n(6) Have made a false statement of a material fact in an application for employment, or to have violated any provisions of these rules governing examinations or to have been guilty of any conduct in the course of an examination which tends to bring the District service into disrepute.\n(9) Have been guilty of any conduct which tends to render his continued employment detrimental to the discipline, efficiency, or reputation of the District\u2019s service.\nHearings were held before the Board on November 22, 1966, and other dates at which plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by counsel.\nLavin testified in support of the charges he had filed. He said that on about October 28, 1966, he, a Mr. Forbes McCann and plaintiff were discussing the different job descriptions in the personnel department. Plaintiff was called in because McCann wanted to be sure of the nature of plaintiff\u2019s training. Lavin asked plaintiff how much time he had completed at Northwestern, to which plaintiff replied, \u201cNot what it says on the application.\u201d Lavin referred to plaintiff\u2019s application and asked plaintiff about it. Plaintiff then said that the three years or 75% would have been what he had completed if he had gone through the four-year day school, but that his three years were at night, which was a six-year course.\nLavin testified further that he then asked plaintiff several questions to determine how many hours of college credit he had completed. Plaintiff replied that he had not completed 50% of the curriculum, and narrowed the figure for hours of credit to \u201csomewhere between forty and fifty,\u201d mentioning two or three subjects he had taken. The following workday the witness confronted plaintiff with information he had received from Northwestern, which was that plaintiff had completed only a total of six semester hours\u2014two each in three courses. Lavin stated that there was a discrepancy (which he did not then discuss with plaintiff), since plaintiff had indicated on the application that he had completed 75% of his college curriculum, and had circled the highest year completed as the third. (The Northwestern transcript received in evidence as an exhibit showed completion of the six semester hours and indicated that 120 semester hours were required for graduation.)\nLavin testified that, at the time plaintiff submitted his application to the personnel department, he (Lavin) had no direct capacity with the department, and had not discussed the application with Mr. Kopec, then Director of Personnel. He did not know whether Mr. Kopec had qualified plaintiff to take the examination by virtue of his training and experience, nor did he know what the qualifications were of the other persons who applied for the same position.\nLavin further testified that plaintiff had been given varied assignments while working in the personnel department, including the screening of applicants for civil service examinations and for employment at the District.\nPlaintiff testified that in the first part of May, 1964, he had had a conversation with Mr. Kopec, then the Director of Personnel, during which he discussed his education, explaining that he had gone to night school for three semesters. He also mentioned his employment background, and Kopec advised him to file for the position, stating, \u201cWith your background and your experience, you should have no problem.\u201d He never told Kopec that he had completed or graduated from a four-year college course. It was after this conversation that he applied for the position.\nPlaintiff detailed his college education, which conformed with Lavin\u2019s earlier testimony as taken from the Northwestern transcript. He admitted that in terms of calendar time spent, he had attended Northwestern for only one year and three months. He stated that the notation on his application of three years of college completed referred to three semester years, each semester being one year. He didn\u2019t know what a semester hour meant. Plaintiff also testified that what he though was meant by the percent completed column, which he filled in as \u201c75%,\u201d was that he had taken four courses, three of which he had finished. He had no intention of obtaining credit hours for the purpose of going for a degree. He didn\u2019t know how many credit hours he had; therefore, he didn\u2019t put any down on the application. He further testified as to his duties while in the employ of the District.\nOn October 28, 1966, he had a conversation with Mr. McCann and Mr. Lavin and was asked how far he had gone in school. He told them that he didn\u2019t remember, and Mr. Lavin \u201ckept throwing questions back and forth.\u201d Again, on October 31, 1966, he met with Mr. Lavin, who told him he would be given a chance to resign or charges would be brought against him on account of his having lied on the application as to his academic background. He then cleaned out his desk and told Mr. Lavin to \u201cgo ahead and file charges.\u201d\nAfter the hearings, the Board found that plaintiff had \u201cmade false statements of material facts in his application for employment . . . [which] related to his educational background necessary to meet the minimum requirements set out in the specifications for the position of \u2018Supervisor of Employee Selection.\u2019 \u201d The Board found plaintiff guilty of violating Rules 11.041(4), (6) and (9) as above set out, and ordered him discharged as of December 1,1966.\nThe Board\u2019s order of discharge was reversed by the Circuit Court and it is from that judgment that this appeal has been taken. Defendant Board contends that: (1) the false statements in plaintiff\u2019s application are repugnant to basic morality as well as violative of the rules of the Director of Personnel; and (2) the Board\u2019s decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, since the record shows cause for plaintiff\u2019s discharge. Plaintiff, in his brief, argues chiefly that defendant\u2019s first contention is irrelevant, since plaintiff made full disclosure of his educational background to the Director of Personnel prior to taking the examination, and qualified for the position under the \u201cequivalency provision\u201d as stated in the announcement quoted above (citing McCann v. Civil Service Board of Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago, 105 Ill App2d 317, 245 NE2d 783). Plaintiff also asserts that the Board\u2019s finding does not state precisely what the \u201cfalse statement of material facts\u201d was, and that the evidence did not establish that the \u201calleged misstatement was material and necessary to meet the minimum educational requirements.\u201d\nIt can be seen that plaintiff\u2019s responses do not make a clear issue of the points raised by defendant, and, in our opinion, plaintiff\u2019s primary contention is largely irrelevant.\nWe have no doubt that Rule 11.041(6), providing for discharge of an employee who has made a false statement of material fact in his application, is a reasonable rule and within the rule-making authority of the Director. Ill Rev Stats 1967, c 42, \u00a7 323.5; People ex rel. Jendrick v. Allman, 396 Ill 35, 40, 71 NE2d 44; People ex rel. Krich v. Hurley, 16 Ill App2d 505, 506, 149 NE2d 109; People ex rel. Heffernan v. Smykal, 13 Ill App2d 342, 347-348, 142 NE2d 133. We are also of the opinion that this rule has extraordinary significance in the instant case inasmuch as the position applied for\u2014 that of Supervisor of Employee Selection\u2014involves recruitment and selection for positions in the District\u2019s Classified Service.\nPlaintiff seeks to give great weight to his own testimony concerning a conversation with Mr. Kopec prior to making the application. (Mr. Kopec did not testify.) This argument is wide of the mark. Assuming, as we do, that the conversation took place, plaintiff told him either that he had completed his third year at Northwestern or he told him the truth about having completed only six semester hours of the 120 required for graduation. Under the first hypothesis, Mr. Kopec\u2019s telling plaintiff to apply for the position could avail plaintiff nothing at this time except to show that he had made false statements concerning his education both orally to the Director,, and in writing under oath, thus compounding rather than justifying the untruths in his application. If, on the other hand, he had, as he testified, explained to Mr. Kopec the true extent of his Northwestern education, the advice to proceed with the application could in no wise be considered an authorization to make a gross misstatement under oath as to his education qualifications.\nWe view plaintiff\u2019s argument about the \u201cequivalency provision\u201d in much the same light. The question, as we understand it, is not whether it can now be seen that defendant\u2019s experience, together with his actual education, would have been enough to satisfy requirements (we do not decide this \u201cequivalency\u201d issue), but whether the proof before the Board showed that plaintiff had made a false statement of material fact. We believe that the documentary evidence (the application itself and the Northwestern transcript) did establish this fact conclusively, and that the Circuit Court\u2019s conclusion to the contrary is not supported by the record. We refer, also, to Lavin\u2019s testimony that when he asked plaintiff what his education at Northwestern had been, the latter replied, \u201cNot what it says on the application,\u201d but that he did have \u201csomewhere between forty and fifty\u201d hours of credit. While this testimony was inferentially denied by plaintiff, it is not the functian of the Circuit Court to weigh the evidence in a proceeding under the Administrative Review Act. Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 110, \u00a7 274. A reversal of the Board\u2019s conclusion is permissible only when contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Daley v. Jack\u2019s Tivoli Liquor Lounge, 118 Ill App2d 264, 254 NE2d 814, 820; and Nechi v. Daley, 40 Ill App2d 326, 335-338, 188 NE2d 243.\nWhile not necessary to our conclusion, we also believe that plaintiff\u2019s violation of Paragraph (6) of Rule 11.-041 constituted, in turn, violations of Paragraphs (4) and (9), all of which are quoted above at the beginning of this opinion.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause is remanded with direction to affirm the order of the Board.\nReversed and remanded with direction.\nSTAMOS, P. J. and DRUCKER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE ENGLISH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Allen S. Lavin and Dolphy T. McLaughlin, of Chicago (Fred F. Herzog, of counsel), for appellants.", "Richard F. McPartlin, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "John R. Price, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The Civil Service Board of the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, and Allen S. Lavin, Acting Director of Personnel of the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, Defendants-Appellants.\nGen. No. 53,079.\nFirst District, Fourth Division.\nMarch 25, 1970.\nAllen S. Lavin and Dolphy T. McLaughlin, of Chicago (Fred F. Herzog, of counsel), for appellants.\nRichard F. McPartlin, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0002-01", "first_page_order": 8, "last_page_order": 17 }