{
  "id": 2910446,
  "name": "Marjorie H. Fritzen, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Concord Life Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Fritzen v. Concord Life Insurance",
  "decision_date": "1971-03-11",
  "docket_number": "No. 11255",
  "first_page": "941",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
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      "cite": "334 Ill. 510",
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    {
      "cite": "110 Ill.App.2d 1",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:16.150777+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Marjorie H. Fritzen, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Concord Life Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff brought action as beneficiary of an insurance policy to recover for the accidental death of her son. The trial court entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.\nDefendant issued a \u201cmaster policy\" to a retail business and plaintiff was insured as a holder of a credit card furnished by such business. The issues arise as to the construction of the following provision:\n\u201c \u2018Insured Person wherever used herein shall include the Insured and the Insured dependents.\u201d\n\u201cPart VII Individuals Insurance Provisions Eligible Status. Each person registered with the Holder as an approved Credit Card holder and his eligible dependents are eligible for coverage under the policy if their permanent resident address at the time of application for insurance is the United States of America. Eligible dependents means the spouse of such person and the natural bom or adopted children of such person or of the spouse of such person who are between the ages of fourteen days and nineteen years inclusive (to age 23 if attending school on a full time basis).\u201d\nIt is agreed that the deceased son was attending college and that he had passed his twenty-third birthday.\nThe trial court found that the language:\n\u201c* # * t0 age 23 if attending school on a full time basis \u00b0 \u00b0 *\u201d\nprovided coverage on the son only to age twenty-three, and that such coverage did not extend into the twenty-fourth year.\nPlaintiff recognizes that as first phrased, the coverage, \u201cbetween the ages of fourteen days and nineteen years\u201d specifies the respective termini of the period of coverage. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines the word \u201cbetween\u201d with the statement, \u201cIf an act is to be done \u2018between\u2019 two certain days, it must be performed before the commencemnt of the latter date\u201d. As to this policy, it takes the enlarging modification provided by the word \u201cinclusive\u201d to extend the period of coverage beyond the nineteenth birthday, as plaintiff agrees.\nIt seems to be plaintiff\u2019s argument that the word, \u201cinclusive\u201d having been used in the phrase, \u201cbetween * * * and 19 years inclusive\u201d, it must also be inserted in the phrase, \u201cto age 23\u201d. Such is not the plain meaning of the language.\nIn Domke v. McCue, 110 Ill.App.2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 287, the court considered a will wherein the testator expressly referred to \u201carticles first to sixteenth inclusive\u201d and \u201cthree to fifteen inclusive\u201d, together with a subsequent provision which used simply the words, \u201cParagraphs 1 to 13\u201d. It was held that under the last provision, the paragraph designated \u201c13\u201d was excluded. It was said that in forbearing to employ the word \u201cinclusive\u201d a different meaning was intended by the testator, and that the provision meant what was said.\nThe word \u201cto\u201d is a word of \u201cexclusion, unless, by necessary implication, it is manifestly used in a different sense\u201d. (86 C.J.S. 909). In Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, it is said that the word \u201cto\u201d is ordinarily a word of exclusion. In Webster\u2019s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, the word \u201cto\u201d is said to be a \u201cfunction word to indicate the place or point that is the far limit\u201d, and also \u201ca function word to indicate a determined condition or end\u201d. In The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word \u201cto\u201d is discussed as expressing a relation in time and is said to indicate a final limit in time or the end of a period, and as synonymous with \u201ctill\u201d and \u201cuntil\u201d.\nWhere a contract provides that it extends to a certain date, the word \u201cto\u201d means \u201ctill\u201d, and excludes the day following it as a part of the contract. (34 ILP 343, Time, par. 7.) In Taylorville Sanitary Dist. v. Nelson, 334 Ill. 510, p. 515, 166 N.E. 60, the court adopted the language that the words, \u201cto\u201d, \u201ctill\u201d and \u201cuntil\u201d are words of exclusion to a day to, till or until which an act may be performed. The court pointed out the contrast in meaning between the words \u201cto\u201d and \u201cto and including\u201d. In Stearns v. Sweet, 78 Ill. 446, the court said:\n\u201cTaking the word \u2018to\u2019 in its plain, ordinary and popular sense * * * it is clear the interest was paid only until or before the 26th inst. \u2014 that is embracing the time which was completed when the 26th day commenced.\u201d\nPlaintiff urges that her construction is supported by the opinion in Brandenburg v. Buda Co., 299 Ill. 133, 132 N.E. 514. That opinion announces the rule that the word \u201cto\u201d ordinarily means \u201cuntil\u201d and excludes the day following it as part of the contract. There, however, the contract was to take effect from its date and to continue \u201cto July 1, 1916\u201d. The court held that July 1, was to be the last day of the contract, noting that other provisions of the contract stated that \u201c* * * all periods of years end July 1\u201d. Such construction is an example of the common law rule of excluding the first day and including the last day which is said to be applicable where an act is to be performed within a period from or after a specified date. Taylorville Sanitary Dist. v. Nelson. 334 Ill. 510, 166N.E. 60.\nPlaintiff cites no cases which employ her argued construction to include the period of a year. The thesis contended for would seem, at most, to extend the coverage from the day of the twenty-third birthday, The authorities cited do not authorize construing the words \u201cto age 23\u201d to extend coverage to the twenty-fourth birthday.\nPlaintiff assumes as a premise that the policy was obviously designed to provide coverage to the son \u201cas long as he remained in school\u201d or \u201cto provide coverage on the son through college\u201d. Apart from the argument, such is not necessarily apparent. If we were to accept such premises as indicative of intent, it would be unnecessary to insert an upper age limit, but simply to provide coverage of a dependent where in school or college. We are constrained to take plain language for its plain meaning and not employ a unilateral assertion of intent to find an ambiguity not otherwise apparent.\nThe judgment is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSMITH, P. J., and CRAVEN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Summers, Watson & Kimpel, of Champaign, for appellant.",
      "Hayes & Moore and Hatch, Corazza, Baker & Jensen, both of Champaign, (Harold A. Baker and Timothy O. Madigan, of counsel,) for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Marjorie H. Fritzen, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Concord Life Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 11255;\nFourth District\nMarch 11, 1971.\nRehearing denied April 7, 1971.\nSummers, Watson & Kimpel, of Champaign, for appellant.\nHayes & Moore and Hatch, Corazza, Baker & Jensen, both of Champaign, (Harold A. Baker and Timothy O. Madigan, of counsel,) for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0941-01",
  "first_page_order": 961,
  "last_page_order": 964
}