{
  "id": 2533907,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie Gaston, Jr., Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gaston",
  "decision_date": "1971-06-14",
  "docket_number": "No. 70-212",
  "first_page": "900",
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      "cite": "132 Ill. App. 2d 900"
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "cite": "130 Ill.App.2d 932",
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      "cite": "130 Ill.App.2d 672",
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      "cite": "340 Ill. 250",
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          "page": "265"
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    {
      "cite": "395 U.S. 238",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1930,
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:45:25.950864+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie Gaston, Jr., Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nUpon a negotiated plea of guilty, defendant was sentenced to a term of 1-5 years and appeals on the sole contention that he did not expressly and understandingly waive his right to a trial by jury.\nIn a two count indictment, defendant was charged with robbery and mob action. At the time, he was on probation for having committed a felony. On arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter, he, his counsel and the State, entered into plea bargaining. On August 3, 1970, in open court, he withdrew his plea of not guilty, and the court was informed that the parties had negotiated a plea agreement. The agreement, related by the prosecutor, was that upon a plea of guilty to count II (mob action), the State would dismiss count I (robbery), and agree to a sentence of from 1-5 years. The defendant was asked if he had discussed the plea with his attorney and responded, \u201cYes.\u201d The court further inquired, \u201cIs there anything about it you don\u2019t understand;\u201d and the defendant replied, \u201cNo.\u201d The prosecutor then related the factual basis of the offense and the court entered sentence.\nExcept for a written waiver of jury signed by the defendant, the record is completely silent with respect to the defendant\u2019s right to a jury trial. This, alone, would have been reversible error were it not for the written waiver. (Boykin v. Alabama (June 2, 1969), 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709.) Long prior to Boykin, our Supreme Court, in People v. Fisher (1930), 340 Ill. 250, 265, stated:\n\u201c* \u201c * Upon the trial court is imposed the duty to see that an accused person\u2019s election to forego such a trial is not only expressly but also understandingly made. The performance of that duty involves a responsibility which cannot be perfunctorily discharged.\u201d\nSee also, People v. Brown, 130 Ill.App.2d 672, 267 N.E.2d 16 and People v. Garner, 130 Ill.App.2d 932, 267 N.E.2d 38.\nHowever, there remains the question of whether the signed jury waiver, in and by itself, was sufficient to result in a relinquishment of the defendant\u2019s constitutional right to a jury trial.\nW\u00e9 hold that it was not.\nTo constitute a proper jury waiver, the record must affirmatively show (1) an expression on the part of the defendant that he desires to reject his right to be tried by a jury and (2) that he do so understandingly and voluntarily after interrogation by the court. In the instant case, the written waiver met the first provision. However, the record being totally silent on the issue of waiver of jury, the second essential requirement was not met.\nAs stated in People v. Rambo (1970), 123 Ill.App.2d 299, 303:\n\u201cA written waiver, as well as an oral waiver, may be an express waiver if it is properly and knowingly made; but signing a printed form has become such a routine formality that a perfunctory signing \u2014 without proof that the form was read by the defendant and understood by him \u2014cannot be accepted as a substitute for an express waiver, understandingly made after careful interrogation by the court.\u201d\nSee also, People v. Rosen (1970), 128 Ill.App.2d 82, 85.\nFor the reasons stated, the defendant\u2019s conviction is reversed and remanded with directions to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty and plead anew.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nABRAHAMSON and KRAUSE, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Morton Zwick and E. Roger Horsley, both of Defender Project, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Philip G. Reinhard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford, (K. Craig Peterson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie Gaston, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 70-212;\nSecond District\nJune 14, 1971.\nMorton Zwick and E. Roger Horsley, both of Defender Project, of Chicago, for appellant.\nPhilip G. Reinhard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford, (K. Craig Peterson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0900-01",
  "first_page_order": 924,
  "last_page_order": 926
}
