{
  "id": 2531957,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam Collins et al., Defendants-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Collins",
  "decision_date": "1971-03-19",
  "docket_number": "Nos. 54033, 54177 cons.",
  "first_page": "553",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:45:25.950864+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam Collins et al., Defendants-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DRUCKER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants were found guilty after a bench trial of the offense of armed robbery. Judgment was entered and defendant Collins was sentenced to three to eight years and defendant Washington was sentenced to two to five years. On appeal defendants contend (1) that they did not knowingly and intelligently waive then right to a jury trial and (2) that the prosecutor\u2019s improper cross-examination of defendant Washington violated their constitutional rights.\nDefendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence may be briefly summarized. On January 3, 1966, at 1:00 A.M., the defendants and a Rose Mary Jones, a co-indictee with defendants, entered the apartment of Jesse Powers. After a couple of minutes defendant Collins demanded money. When Mr. Powers told the defendants that he did not have any money Collins hit him in the face and broke his glasses. The defendants then tied Mr. Powers to the bed and Collins hit him with a bayonet blade in the head and arms and threatened to kill him. Washington then fit a cigar, stuck it near Mr. Powers\u2019 eyes and threatened to bum them out if he did not hand over his money. Collins proceeded to gouge Mr. Powers in the groin with a butcher knife. Defendants continuously threatened Mr. Powers throughout the robbery. Def\u00e9ndants ransacked the apartment and took approximately $2,000 worth of cash and merchandise.\nMr. Powers positively identified the defendants as the robbers both at a lineup and at trial. Rose Mary Jones, testifying for the State, also identified the defendants as those involved in the robbery.\nOpinion\nDefendants contend that they did not knowingly and intelligently waive their rights to a jury trial. After defendants\u2019 counsel stated that he was ready for trial, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cMR. FISHMAN [defendants\u2019 counsel]: A bench trial. May we have a jury waiver?\nTHE COURT: You know what a jury trial is?\nDEFENDANT COLLINS: We are having a bench trial, aren\u2019t we? MR. FISHMAN: That\u2019s right.\nTHE COURT: I want to make sure you are waiving a jury trial, you know what a jury trial is. You are waiving it and being tried by the bench rather than by the jury?\nDEFENDANT COLLINS: Yes.\nTHE COURT: All right, let the jury waivers be recorded.\u201d\nDuring the aforesaid colloquy defendant Washington remained silent. However, as shown, his counsel stated that there would be a bench trial and asked for a jury waiver form which Washington signed. In People v. Sailor, 43 Ill.2d 256, the court stated:\n\u201cThe record reveals that defendant\u2019s counsel, in her presence and without objection on her part, expressly advised the court that the plea was hot guilty\u2019 and that a jury was waived. An accused ordinarily speaks and acts through his attorney, who stands in the role of agent, and defendant, by permitting her attorney, in her presence and without objection, to waive her right to a jury trial is deemed to have acquiesced in, and to be bound by, his action.\u201d\nSee also People v. Adorno, 126 Ill.App.2d 98.\nWe find no merit in defendants\u2019 contention that the court fa\u00fced in its duty to see that defendants\u2019 waiver of a jury trial was understandingly and knowingly made.\nWe befieve that the circumstances of this case distinguished it from People v. Baker, 126 Ill.App.2d 1, the principal authority relied upon by defendants.\nDefendants point out that when they signed the jury waiver forms defendant Collins signed his name to the form of defendant Washington and defendant Washington signed his name to defendant Collins\u2019 form. We consider this a technicality of no consequence.\nDefendants also contend that the prosecutor\u2019s improper cross-examination of defendant Washington violated their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them. On cross-examination Washington was asked several questions as to whether he had told \u201csomeone\u201d or an Officer M anion that Collins had committed the robbery. Washington denied that he had made any statement implicating Collins in the robbery. Neither the \u201csomeone\u201d nor Officer Manion referred to by the prosecutor was called in rebuttal by the State. Defendants claim that these questions prejudiced their rights to confront their accusers and cross-examine them.\nDuring the alleged improper cross-examination of Washington defendants\u2019 counsel only once objected to the questions asked Washington. However, defendants\u2019 counsel then informed the court that he was withdrawing his objection. Since no objection was made the alleged error, if any, was waived. People v. Trefonas, 9 Ill.2d 92; People v. Payton, 124 Ill.App.2d 78; and People v. Jenkins, 131 Ill.App.2d 49.\nAt oral argument on appeal defense counsel cited People v. Nuccio, 43 Ill.2d 375, in support of their argument that the prosecutors cross-examination was improper. In Nuccio the defendant aso argued that he was deprived of the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him due to the improper prosecutorial questioning of defendant and his witnesses. This argument was predicated upon \u201ca persistent course of cross-examination by which the State repeatedly insinuated, generally without any supporting testimony, that defendant and his witnesses had engaged in a pattern of reprehensible conduct * * \u00b0 (People v. Nuccio, supra, 381.) The court then catalogued a number of relevant examples of the State\u2019s unsupported insinuations. The State presented no rebuttal testimony to the defense witnesses\u2019 specific denials of misconduct.\nThe court believed that it was apparently the State\u2019s position that the questions were legally improper when asked but that the defendant waived his objection to their prejudicial effect by failing to object at trial. However, as the court at page 394 stated:\n\u201cDefendant urges that he is entitled to assume the prosecution would not ask such patently prejudicial questions unless proof of the threats was available, and, therefore, he is under no obligation to object thereto, particularly where he moves for a mistrial as soon as the inability or unwillingness of the State to produce such proof is manifested. With this we agree.\nWe do not intend this opinion to indicate that no objection should have been made by defendant to any of the testimony herein quoted.\u201d\nIn the instant case there were only a few questions asked by the prosecutor as to whether Washington had ever told anyone that Collins had committed the robbery. Therefore, there was no persistent pattern of conduct as in Nuccio. Furthermore, the defense never redirected the court\u2019s attention to this matter at the close of the evidence, nor did it move for a mistrial.\nIn Nuccio (supra, at page 396) the court also bases its decision to reverse and remand on the fact that the guilt of defendant was \u201cnot manifest\u201d but was dependent upon the degree of credibility accorded the defense witnesses by the trier of fact. In the instant case, however, the guilt of defendants was \u201cmanifest\u201d and no question has been raised in this court as to the sufficiency of proof. The defendants were positively identified and implicated as the robbers both by the victim and by Rose Mary Jones, a co-indictee, who testified for the State.\nThe judgments are affirmed.\nJudgments affirmed.\nENGLISH, P. J., and LORENZ, J., concur.\nRose Mary Jones pleaded guilty and was placed on probation.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DRUCKER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender, of Chicago, (Suzanne M. ICohut, James N. Gramenos, and James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel,) for appellants.",
      "Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Elmer C. Kissane, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney; of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam Collins et al., Defendants-Appellants.\n(Nos. 54033, 54177 cons.;\nFirst District\nMarch 19, 1971.\nGerald W. Getty, Public Defender, of Chicago, (Suzanne M. ICohut, James N. Gramenos, and James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel,) for appellants.\nEdward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Elmer C. Kissane, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney; of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0553-01",
  "first_page_order": 577,
  "last_page_order": 581
}
