{
  "id": 2532249,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harriet Tenen, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tenen",
  "decision_date": "1971-03-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 54854",
  "first_page": "786",
  "last_page": "789",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "132 Ill. App. 2d 786"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "91 N.E. 59",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "244 Ill. 26",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3411170
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/244/0026-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "68 Ill.App.2d 369",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2594645
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/68/0369-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "289 Ill. 184",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        4963875
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/289/0184-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "366 Ill. 149",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2579355
      ],
      "year": 1919,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/366/0149-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 368,
    "char_count": 5989,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.746,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.08185824733411098
    },
    "sha256": "918fabb32eacc8e5ef25cd0589f5103fc88ea98e4940288cb112a20af4c34cce",
    "simhash": "1:77a98ccd2c12d7e5",
    "word_count": 999
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:45:25.950864+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harriet Tenen, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from a conviction for deceptive practice. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 17 \u2014 1(d) (1969) ). After a bench trial defendant was sentenced to one year probation and a fine of $100.00. Defendant appeals from that judgment and among other grounds argues that the complaint was fatally defective because it failed to properly allege the identity of the person injured.\nThe facts, pertinent to the disposition of this appeal, reveal that defendant executed and delivered two checks to pay for the purchase of certain household furniture that was then delivered to her possession. The checks were both returned \"not sufficient funds\u201d and \u201caccount closed.\u201d\nDefendant was then prosecuted upon the following complaint:\n\u201cHarriet Tenen has, on or about 1 Aug 69 and 5 Aug 69 at Sully House Fine Furniture 8820 W. Dempster committed the offense of Deceptive Practice in that he (sic) with intent to obtain control over furniture of Sully House Fine Furniture, issued a check for the payment of money in the amount of $266.70 and $215.00 upon the name of the Bank of America, with the intent to defraud the said Sully House Fine Furniture Store. * * *\u201d\nDefendant contends that the complaint is fatally defective because it does not specify the person or persons who have been defrauded by the defendant, in that the designation \u201cSully House Fine Furniture\u201d does not qualify as \"another\u201d as that term is used in Sec. 17 \u2014 1 (d), supra; and further, that \u201cSully House Fine Furniture\u201d is not a person as that term is defined in the Criminal Code.\n\u201cAnother,\u201d is defined in Ill. Rev. Stat. (1969), ch. 38, par. 2 \u2014 3, as a person or persons defined in the Criminal Code other than the offender. \u201cPerson\u201d is defined in Ill. Rev. Stat. (1969), ch. 38, par. 2 \u2014 15, as an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership or unincorporated association.\nThe prosecution responds to the foregoing and contends that where the essence of an offense is fraud involving the making of an instrument, neither the identity nor the legal capacity of a specific person who is the intended victim of the fraud is a material element of that offense. In support of tins contention, the prosecution argues that there is an analogy between the crime of forgery and deceptive practice in that the essence of both is fraud and that in charging forgery it is not necessary to allege and prove the identity of an intended victim.\nHowever, there is a formidable distinction between the two offenses. In forgery, the mere making of a forged document capable of defrauding another, or the mere possession, with an intent to issue or deliver, the forged document constitutes the crime when done with an intent to defraud. (People v. Church (1937), 366 Ill. 149.) The crime of forgery is complete with the making of a false instrument, the subject of forgery, with intent to defraud; and it is immaterial whether any one was in fact defrauded. People v. Meyer (1919), 289 Ill. 184.\nRecourse to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, however, reveals that section 13.24 provides that in a \u201cbad check\u201d case, the jury is advised that to sustain the charge the prosecution must prove the following propositions:\n\u201cFirst: That the defendant, with intent [to obtain control over property \u2014 to pay for (property \u2014 labor\u2014services)] of \u2014 [issued\u2014delivered] [a check \u2014 an order] upon a [bank \u2014 fictitious bank]; and\nSecond: That the defendant knew that [the check \u2014 order] would not be paid.\u201d\nThe remainder of the instruction relates to the burden of proof. A committee note advises that \u201cthe name of the victim\u201d be inserted in this instruction. Therefore, it follows that the charge must recite the pertinent allegations and one of them is the identity of the victim or injured party.\nHaving found that the name of the victim must be alleged, we direct our attention to whether the complaint properly identified the injured party. The designation at bar is not of a person as defined by statute, nor is it of an individual, corporation, partnership or unincorporated association. It is not an entity capable of owning or possessing property or of being defrauded. In People v. Hill (1966), 68 Ill.App.2d 369, the owner was identified as \u201cCommunity Discount Store\u201d and this court held the complaint fatally defective.\nThe court there held at page 374:\n\u201cIf the Community Discount Store was a corporation, its corporate existence should have been alleged. People v. Brander (1910), 244 Ill. 26, 91 N.E. 59. If the store was not an entity capable of owning property, the ownership should have been alleged in the individual or individuals who owned the property.\u201d\nIn view of the foregoing, we deem it unnecessary to review defendant\u2019s other contentions and reverse the judgment.\nJudgment reversed.\nLEIGHTON, P. J\u201e and McCORMICK, J., concur.\n\u201cA person commits a deceptive practice when, with intent to defraud:\ne # e\n(d) With intent to obtain control over property or to pay for property, labor or sendees of another he issues or delivers a check or other order upon a real or fictitious depository for the payment of money, knowing that it will not be paid by the depository. Failure to have sufficient funds or credit with the depository when the check or other order is issued or delivered is prima facie evidence that the offender knows that it will not be paid by the depository;\"\n(Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 17 \u2014 3a(l) (1969)) states: \u201cA person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly:\n(l) makes or alters any document apparently capable of defrauding another # e \u00bb\"",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STAMOS"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Harvey Melinger, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle, Alan M. Polikoff, and James Sternik, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harriet Tenen, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 54854;\nFirst District\nMarch 30, 1971.\nHarvey Melinger, of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle, Alan M. Polikoff, and James Sternik, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0786-02",
  "first_page_order": 810,
  "last_page_order": 813
}