{ "id": 2533324, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reginald Williams, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1971-03-23", "docket_number": "Nos. 55029, 55154 cons.", "first_page": "806", "last_page": "809", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "132 Ill. App. 2d 806" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "291 Ill. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2421012 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/291/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ill.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2762462 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4985842 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/293/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ill.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2769065 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2742429 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856566 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0577-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 468, "char_count": 7871, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3235015319991602e-07, "percentile": 0.6272605082381251 }, "sha256": "c7e3325dbddd99c24c76eaabe1aa76c5a25da2afc332beb2eb5a7b255c04eff0", "simhash": "1:41a3545c5c3f43d5", "word_count": 1333 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:45:25.950864+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reginald Williams, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE McCORMICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn March 1, 1970, the defendant, Reginald Williams, and Kenneth Whitted were charged with knowingly carrying two revolvers concealed in a vehicle, in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1 (a) (4), and with possession of two revolvers without possessing a firearm owners identification card, in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 83 \u2014 2 (a).\nOn April 2, 1970, the defendant and Whitted appeared in the Circuit Court to stand trial. On advice of counsel, defendant waived his right to trial by jury and submitted the cause to the court on a plea of not guilty. After hearing all the evidence the court found defendant guilty of both offenses, and sentenced him to serve nine months in the House of Correction for the conviction of carrying two revolvers concealed in a vehicle. For the offense of having possession of two revolvers without also possessing a firearm owners identification card, defendant was sentenced to serve 30 days at the Illinois State Farm at Vandalia [considered served]. Whitted pleaded guilty to the charge of carrying concealed weapons, and the State moved to nolle the second charge.\nAt the trial the only witnesses to testify were Officers Ragula and Witos, of the Cook County Sheriffs Police. The record indicates that on March 1, 1970, at about 4:20 A.M., defendant was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by Whitted. Officer Ragula testified that he and Officer Witos were driving a marked squad car at 151st Street and Dixie Highway when they stopped the vehicle driven by Whited because of an \u201cespecially loud roar\u201d coming from the exhaust. Whitted left the car and walked toward the officers; Officer Witos left the squad car and asked to see Whitted\u2019s driver\u2019s license. At the same time, Officer Ragula walked to the vehicle to close the door which had been left open by Whitted, and taking a \u201cquick glance\u201d into the car he saw the butt of a revolver under the driver\u2019s seat, which later proved to be a .32 caliber Smith and Wesson. He saw the defendant sitting on the passenger side of the front seat, with a young woman sitting next to him. Officer Ragula ordered the two out of the car and searched it, discovering a second revolver under the passenger\u2019s seat. This weapon was identified as a .38 caliber Rossi.\nWhen Officer Ragula questioned the defendant and Whitted about the guns they both denied knowing anything about them, since the car in which they were found belonged to someone else; and neither of the two men possessed a firearm owner\u2019s identification card.\nIn addition to the revolvers, three .32 caliber cartridges were found lodged between the passenger\u2019s side of the front seat and the floor, and in a search at the police station five .38 caliber cartridges were found on Whitted\u2019s person.\nIn prosecuting this appeal defendant has urged that the State failed to prove he had knowledge of the presence of the weapons, and contends that the conviction was based solely on his proximity to them. We disagree with this contention. At the trial there was ample circumstantial evidence presented to warrant the court\u2019s inference of defendant\u2019s knowledge. The State introduced uncontroverted evidence that the arresting officers found a .38 caliber Rossi under the passenger\u2019s seat, and a .32 caliber Smith and Wesson under the driver\u2019s seat of the automobile. The State further proved that the cartridges fitting the Smith and Wesson were found under the seat defendant had occupied, and that cartridges fitting the Rossi were found on Whitted\u2019s person. If the revolver could be seen in a quick glance by the officer, standing outside, the trial judge could certainly infer that the defendant, a passenger in the car, was aware of its presence, as well as that of the second gun.\nIn People v. McKnight, 39 Ill.2d 577, the court had the problem of determining whether the defendant had knowledge of the presence of weapons, and said at page 581: \u201cWhile it is unnecessary to prove defendant\u2019s ownership, we agree that knowledge that the gun was in the car is essential to establish a crime. [Citing case.] However, scienter may and must often be proved by circumstantial evidence.\u201d\nIt is our opinion that in the instant case the defendant was not convicted, as he contends, on the basis of his proximity to the weapons, but because of the reasonable inference of knowledge the court could draw from all of the uncontroverted circumstantial evidence presented at the trial.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention, that his convictions must be reversed since the revolver found under the driver\u2019s seat was not immediately accessible or readily available to him, is based upon the proposition that he would have had to change his position considerably if he wanted to take the gun from under the driver\u2019s seat. Even if this argument were correct, it would not of itself preclude the court\u2019s finding him criminally liable.\nSection 5 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 1] provides: \u201cA person is responsible for conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct is either that of the person himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable for such conduct as provided in Section 5 \u2014 2 or both.\u201d\nSection 5 \u2014 2 (c) provides, in pertinent part, that a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when \u201cEither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d\nThe Supreme Court of Illinois construed the above statute in People v. Washington, 26 Ill. n dealing with the question of what constitutes aiding and abetting, the court said at page 209:\n\u201cWhile it is true that mere presence or negative acquiescence is not enough to constitute a person a principal, one may aid and abet without actively participating in the overt act and if the proof shows that a person was present at the commission of the crime without disapproving or opposing it, it is competent for the trier of fact to consider this conduct in connection with other circumstances and thereby reach a conclusion that such person assented to the commission of the crime, lent to it his countenance and approval and was thereby aiding and abetting the crime. (People v. Torres, 19 Ill.2d 497; People v. Thicksten, 14 Ill.2d 132; People v. Cione, 293 Ill. 321.) Stated differently, circumstances may show there is a common design to do an unlawful act to which all assent, and whatever is done in furtherance of the design is the act of all, making each person guilty of the crime. People v. Rybka, 16 Ill.2d 394; People v. Marx, 291 Ill. 40.\u201d\nIn the case before us there were other circumstances which support the conclusion that defendant was guilty with respect to both revolvers. It was brought out at the trial that the cartridges discovered under the passengers seat were of the same caliber as the revolver found under the drivers seat. Viewing this fact, together with the presence of the Rossi under the passenger\u2019s seat, the Smith and Wesson under the driver\u2019s seat, and the fact that the two men were riding together in the automobile, we are faced with inference of the existence of a common scheme with defendant\u2019s approval and assent.\nOn the evidence presented, the trial court was warranted in finding defendant guilty of both charged offenses. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nLEIGHTON, P. J, and STAMOS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE McCORMICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Leo E. Holt and Maria A. Elden, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Reginald Williams, Defendant-Appellant.\n(Nos. 55029, 55154 cons.;\nFirst District\nMarch 23, 1971.\nLeo E. Holt and Maria A. Elden, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." }, "file_name": "0806-01", "first_page_order": 830, "last_page_order": 833 }