{ "id": 5174257, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Frank Dee, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dee", "decision_date": "1957-05-29", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 47,054", "first_page": "96", "last_page": "99", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "14 Ill. App. 2d 96" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "313 Ill. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2434981 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/313/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 Ill. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2544687 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/377/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5302951 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/98/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2649565 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/147/0393-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 362, "char_count": 5259, "ocr_confidence": 0.541, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.759015022747891e-08, "percentile": 0.29913674503803117 }, "sha256": "94bef39a7458af078a8835582a65a09f0e1f5cc62c6c3065276160bab28cd564", "simhash": "1:de4a29bde26087db", "word_count": 858 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:11:15.585812+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "FEINBERGr, P. J., concurs.", "LEWE, J., took no part." ], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Frank Dee, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUDGE KILEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nDefendant Dee was convicted by a jury of fraudulently obtaining a heating unit valued at $1,000 by means of false pretenses in violation of the Criminal Code. (Par. 253, Chap. 38, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953.) Writ of error issued to the Municipal Court of Chicago to review the judgment entered on the verdict.\nParagraph 253, Chapter 38, reads as follows:\n\u201cWhoever, with intent to cheat or defraud another, designedly by color of any false token or writing, or by any false pretense, obtains the signature of any person to any written instrument, or obtains from any person any money, personal property or other valuable thing, shall be fined . . . and imprisoned . . . .\u201d\nThe information charges that Dee \u201cdid . . . unlawfully, willfully and fraudulently obtain from . . . Borg, Inc. ... a Heating Unit ... by means of, falsely representing . . . that he . . . was the owner of the building where the heating unit was installed, the said corporation relying and believing in the . . . representation and being deceived thereby, which said false pretenses were . . . made by the defendant with the design and for the purpose of cheating and defrauding.\u201d\nDee argues that the information is fatally defective in failing to allege intent. We disagree. This court in People v. Cohen, 147 Ill. App. 393, decided that an information drawn under the instant statute was void for failure to allege that the false representations were made \u201cwith intent to cheat and defraud.\u201d The abstract in that case discloses that Cohen was merely charged with obtaining goods by false representations, and that Cohen knew their falsity when he made them. There is no doubt of the defect in that information. We presume the Cohen decision was written with knowledge of Gregg v. People, 98 Ill. App. 170, 174, where this court stated that an information sufficiently alleged intent by the words \u201cwith the design and for the purpose.\u201d\nThe Criminal Code provides that an indictment \u201cshall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct\u201d if stated in the language of the statute \u201cor so plainly that the nature of the offense may be easily understood by the jury.\u201d (Par. 716, Chap. 38, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953.) Webster defines intent as: \u201cLaw. The design or purpose to commit any wrongful act . . . .\u201d (Webster\u2019s ISTew International Dictionary, 2d ed.) The information charges Dee made the false representations \u201cwith the design and for the purpose.\u201d We think this allegation was sufficient to inform Dee of the charge against him in language understood by the jury to mean intent.\nThe judgment against Dee must be reversed, however, for prejudicial error in the trial. In the cross-examination of Dee he was asked, \u201cWhat criminal cases do you have pending?\u201d and \u201cAre there any other cases against you?\u201d An objection was sustained but a motion to withdraw a juror was denied, and the jury was not told to disregard the questions nor was the prosecutor admonished. Several witnesses were called by the state in rebuttal to testify to Dee\u2019s \u201cbad reputation\u201d for truth and veracity. Cross-examination of these witnesses disclosed that one had arrested him and was being sued by him for false arrest and that another had had Dee put in jail for six months following a verdict in a damage suit against Dee. On redirect examination this witness told how Dee had hit him \u201con the head,\u201d necessitating eig'hteen stitches. Another witness on cross-examination testified that Dee had been indicted. On redirect the witness told of the circumstances of the indictment, indicating fraud in a building repair contract. A motion to withdraw a juror was again denied though the court told the jury to disregard the question and answer regarding the circumstances.\nThere was no error in producing witnesses to offer evidence of his reputation for truth and veracity, since Dee had \u201cvoluntarily testified.\u201d (People v. Bakutis, 377 Ill. 386, 390.) The prejudice was in the nature of their testimony. The door was opened on cross-examination, but this does not remove the prejudice which was heightened by further questions on redirect. In our opinion, testimony of the reputation witnesses was highly inflammatory.\nThe effect of the prosecutor\u2019s questions about cases pending against Dee, and of the testimony of Dee\u2019s assault upon a reputation witness and of the \u201ccircumstances\u201d of the indictment of Dee, were likely to bring the focus of the jury on extraneous issues, prejudicial to Dee, and to influence the jury away from the issue on which Dee was being tried. (People v. Lewis, 313 Ill. 312, 319.) We think the result was an unfair trial.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nFEINBERGr, P. J., concurs.\nLEWE, J., took no part.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUDGE KILEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Herbert M. Wetzel, of Chicago (Demetri M. Spiro, of Chicago, of counsel) for plaintiff in error.", "Benjamin S. Adamowski, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County (L. Louis Karton, and Rudolph L. Janega, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of Chicago, of counsel) for defendant in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Frank Dee, Plaintiff in Error.\nGen. No. 47,054.\nFirst District, Third Division.\nMay 29, 1957.\nReleased for publication June 20, 1957.\nHerbert M. Wetzel, of Chicago (Demetri M. Spiro, of Chicago, of counsel) for plaintiff in error.\nBenjamin S. Adamowski, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County (L. Louis Karton, and Rudolph L. Janega, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of Chicago, of counsel) for defendant in error." }, "file_name": "0096-01", "first_page_order": 106, "last_page_order": 109 }