{
  "id": 5190412,
  "name": "Joseph R. Willens, Appellant, v. City of Northlake, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Willens v. City of Northlake",
  "decision_date": "1958-07-03",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 47,371",
  "first_page": "316",
  "last_page": "319",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "19 Ill. App. 2d 316"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "243 Ill. 535",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "337 Ill. App. 183",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        5016195
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/337/0183-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:f1a3d67ac406149b",
    "word_count": 721
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:16.878292+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "LEWE, P. J. and MURPHY, J., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Joseph R. Willens, Appellant, v. City of Northlake, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE KILEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an action to recover $11,000 paid by plaintiff contractor to defendant Village under the mistaken notion that the payments were required by ordinance. The cause was dismissed \u201cwith prejudice\u201d on motion of the Village and plaintiff has appealed.\nThe well pleaded facts are admitted by the Village\u2019s motion.\nOn November 12, 1956, plaintiff paid the money as fees to the Village for \u201csewer and water connection\u201d related to family residences plaintiff was building on eleven lots in the Village. He was told by a Village agent that an ordinance required the fees. There was no such \u201cvalid\u201d ordinance. There was, however, a \u201cprivate agreement\u201d between the Village and School District #87 of the Cook County Board of Education in existence with respect to the sewer and water connections. This was attached to the complaint.\nThis \u201cletter\u201d recites the School District\u2019s understanding that the Village contemplates permitting \u201ca contractor\u201d to install a private sewer and water main running from points in the Village \u201cto the site of the Mark Twain School\u201d and that by the terms \u201cof an agreement\u201d between the Village and contractor the latter will own and operate these facilities until the Village pays him \u201ctherefor\u201d either out of proceeds of a bond issue or \u201cout of fees which the city will charge the other abutting property owners for connecting to the sewer and water main at the rate of $1,000.00 per lot.\u201d The District then \u201cagreed\u201d in consideration of the privilege of connecting and using the utilities to \u201cadvance to the Contractor upon completion of the utilities\u201d the sum of $10,000 upon several \u201calternative conditions.\u201d This document concluded: \u201cIt is further understood that upon acceptance of this letter by the City Council this letter is to serve as a preliminary or definitive agreement subject to the formulation of final contract document.\u201d The Council accepted the \u201cletter\u201d and approved it.\nThe main ground of the Village\u2019s motion was that the mistake alleged was of law and that no claim therefore lies.\nWe think that the mistake was one of fact. Plaintiff was led to believe there was an ordinance. The existence or non-existence of an ordinance, as distinguished from the legality or effect of an existing ordinance, is a fact (70 C. J. S., Payment, section 157b), and if plaintiff had known that no ordinance existed, he would obviously not have made the payment. Thus there was no justification for dismissing the action on the ground that defendant\u2019s payment was upon a mistake of law.\nThis court said in Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of Glen Ellyn v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 337 Ill. App. 183, 194-195: \u201cIt is an elemental principle of law, applied in both law and equity courts, that where one person has received money . . . which belongs to another, under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it, recovery will be allowed.\u201d The recovery at law, the court said (Page 195), was \u201con the basis of a quasi-contract, or contract implied in law.\u201d\nThat principle supports plaintiff\u2019s cause of action and renders erroneous the dismissal of his suit. The question, who was the agent of the Village is a matter of evidence and the question of a change of position to the prejudice of the Village is one of pleading and evidence. The question whether plaintiff should have known there was no such ordinance in existence should be presented in answer so that plaintiff may raise an issue as to whether his failure to know was his fault. The case of Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Tel. Co., 243 Ill. 535, cited by defendant, is not applicable. There the suit was not dismissed bnt a verdict was directed and judgment on the verdict affirmed. And there was no mistake of fact.\nFor the reasons given the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nLEWE, P. J. and MURPHY, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE KILEY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hoellen & Willens, of Chicago (John J. Hoellen, Sherwin Willens, and Floyd B. Manilow, of counsel) for appellant.",
      "Edward B. O\u2019Shea, Jr., of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Joseph R. Willens, Appellant, v. City of Northlake, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee.\nGen. No. 47,371.\nFirst District, Second Division.\nJuly 3, 1958.\nReleased for publication September 18, 1958.\nHoellen & Willens, of Chicago (John J. Hoellen, Sherwin Willens, and Floyd B. Manilow, of counsel) for appellant.\nEdward B. O\u2019Shea, Jr., of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0316-01",
  "first_page_order": 328,
  "last_page_order": 331
}