{ "id": 5189832, "name": "Continental Air Transport Co., Inc., Appellee, v. Charles F. Carpentier, Secretary of State of State of Illinois, Joseph D. Bibb, Director of Public Safety, State of Illinois, and William H. Morris, Superintendent, State Highway Police, State of Illinois, Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Continental Air Transport Co. v. Carpentier", "decision_date": "1958-07-03", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 47,479", "first_page": "340", "last_page": "345", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "19 Ill. App. 2d 340" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "410 Ill. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5311188 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 U. S. 4", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 368146 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14, 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/316/0004-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 431, "char_count": 7432, "ocr_confidence": 0.531, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.7747507953166004e-07, "percentile": 0.8346698977430731 }, "sha256": "6c316418ccf2bc82739b78594128bf59ab5cd1894ac8681ac064a7b83fdb7656", "simhash": "1:5fe5262f23e59fc1", "word_count": 1166 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:16.878292+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LEWE, P. J. and KILEY, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Continental Air Transport Co., Inc., Appellee, v. Charles F. Carpentier, Secretary of State of State of Illinois, Joseph D. Bibb, Director of Public Safety, State of Illinois, and William H. Morris, Superintendent, State Highway Police, State of Illinois, Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying defendants\u2019 motions to dissolve a temporary injunction.\nContinental Air Transport Company, plaintiff, made application for licenses under Section 3 \u2014 801(f) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Chap. 951/2[, \u00a73 \u2014 801(f)]), which is applicable to \u201cbusses in a public system for transporting more than seven passengers, which vehicles are used as common carriers . . . and not devoted to any specialized purpose.\u201d The fee for such a vehicle is $2 per calendar year, and the owner of the vehicle is exempt from paying either a flat weight tax or mileage tax.\nThe Secretary of State, after a hearing, denied the licenses on the ground that plaintiff\u2019s buses, which are used exclusively as conveyances between Chicago\u2019s two airports and the Chicago Loop, Evanston and Oak Park, were operated as airport buses and for a \u201cspecialized purpose,\u201d and were not in the general transportation of passengers. The difference between fees tendered and demanded was $5,000, and plaintiff filed a $5,600 surety bond conditioned upon his defeat.\nThe plaintiff sought judicial relief by proceeding under the Administrative Be view Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Chap. 110, \u00a7\u00a7 264-279) and impleaded, as defendants, Charles P. Carpentier, Secretary of State, Joseph D. Bibb, Director of Public Safety, and William H. Morris, Superintendent, State Highway Police. On the application of plaintiff, the trial court issued an injunction, restraining all three defendants from enforcing the provisions of the Illinois Motor Vehicle law, and otherwise interfering with the operation of plaintiff\u2019s transportation services pending \u201cfull judicial review\u201d of the Secretary of State\u2019s refusal to grant plaintiff\u2019s application for licenses under Section 3 \u2014 801(f).\nThe pleadings consist of the complaint, plaintiff\u2019s motion for temporary injunction, and the motions of defendants to dissolve the injunction. The injunction issued on the pleadings.\nThe principal questions are: (1) whether the trial court properly issued the restraining order against the enforcing officers until judicial review determined the correctness of the license refusal; and (2) the inclusion, as defendants in the Administrative Review proceedings, of State officials who were not parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency.\nThe powers of the trial court in proceeding under the Administrative Review Act are set forth in Section 12 of the Act ([Ill. Rev. Stats. 1957,] Chap. 110, \u00a7 275), and (1) (a) provides that upon notice to the agency, and good cause shown, the trial court has the power \u201cto stay the decision of the administrative agency in whole or in part pending the final disposition of the case.\u201d Defendants have cited no authority to indicate that this does not mean what it says. We believe the trial court had the power to grant a stay in the instant case and to use the conventional powers of a court of chancery to implement the stay until the final disposition of the case, by the issuance of an injunction against proper parties. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U. S. 4, 14, 16 (1942).\nDefendants contend that defendants Bibb and Morris were improperly included in the Administrative Review proceedings and in the injunction order, because they were not parties in the proceedings before the Secretary of State and had no opportunity to be heard there. Section 8 of the Administrative Review Act ([Ill. Rev. Stats. 1957,] Chap. 110, \u00a7 271) provides that \u201cthe administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.\u201d This section indicates the indispensable parties in an action to review the final decision of an administrative agency. Bibb and Morris were not involved in the proceedings before the Secretary of State, but they were necessary parties to give effect to the temporary restraining order, which prevented interference with plaintiff\u2019s transportation service pending review. If they were not restrained, plaintiff would suffer the imposition of penalties and irreparable injury from the attempts of the defendants to perform their duties.\nThe Administrative Review Act, Section 14 ([Ill. Rev. Stats. 1957,] Chap. 110, \u00a7 277), provides that the \u201cCivil Practice Act\u201d shall apply to all proceedings thereunder, except as otherwise provided. Section 24 of the Civil Practice Act [Ill. Rev. Stats. 1957, ch. 110, \u00a7 24] permits joinder of defendants who are necessary for the complete determination or settlement of any question involved in the controversy. Construing these statutory provisions in the light of the directions expressed in the Civil Practice Act (\u00a74) [Ill. Rev. Stats. 1957, ch. 110, \u00a7 4] for liberal construction, \u201cto the end that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties,\u201d we hold that Bibb and Morris were proper and necessary parties to the extent they were included in the Review proceedings.\nWe do not agree with defendants\u2019 contention that plaintiff had an adequate remedy by paying the license fees under protest and suing for recovery under the provisions of the Protest Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Chap. 127, \u00a7 172). That means of securing a judicial review of the license denial in the instant case was supplanted by legislation effective January 1, 1958 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Chap. 951/2, \u00a7 2 \u2014 117), wherein it is provided that the action of ..the Secretary of State in suspending, revoking or denying any registration, license or permit, or certificate of title, shall he subject to judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act. Where the Administrative Review Act has been, by express reference, adopted by the act creating or conferring power on the administrative agency, it has been held under Section 2 of the Administrative Review Act ([Ill. Rev. Stats. 1957,] Chap. 110, \u00a7 265) that the employment of the pre-existing methods of securing judicial review is prohibited. Moline Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue, 410 Ill. 35 (1951).\nDefendants\u2019 contention that the instant proceedings are prohibited by Article IV, \u00a7 26, of the Illinois Constitution, which prohibits suits against the State, is answered by the decision in Moline Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra, wherein it was said, in similar proceedings under the Administrative Review Act (at page 38) that \u201cno encroachment upon the immunity of the sovereign results from making a State agency a party defendant.\u201d\nOur conclusions dispose of other contentions of defendants. Therefore, the order of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLEWE, P. J. and KILEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Latham Castle, Attorney General (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, A. Zola Groves, and Bernard Genis, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel) for defendants-appellants.", "Lee A. Freeman, of Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Continental Air Transport Co., Inc., Appellee, v. Charles F. Carpentier, Secretary of State of State of Illinois, Joseph D. Bibb, Director of Public Safety, State of Illinois, and William H. Morris, Superintendent, State Highway Police, State of Illinois, Appellants.\nGen. No. 47,479.\nFirst District, Second Division.\nJuly 3, 1958.\nReleased for publication September 18, 1958.\nLatham Castle, Attorney General (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, A. Zola Groves, and Bernard Genis, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel) for defendants-appellants.\nLee A. Freeman, of Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0340-01", "first_page_order": 352, "last_page_order": 357 }