{
  "id": 5191038,
  "name": "Percy Jones, Appellant, v. Francis Hutchins, Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. Hutchins",
  "decision_date": "1958-12-03",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 47,526",
  "first_page": "484",
  "last_page": "490",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "19 Ill. App. 2d 484"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "117 Utah 390",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Utah",
      "case_ids": [
        8869809
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/utah/117/0390-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "114 Utah 505",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Utah",
      "case_ids": [
        8871105
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/utah/114/0505-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 564,
    "char_count": 9985,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.507,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 8.02114797974916e-08,
      "percentile": 0.4649309670177682
    },
    "sha256": "971d36e2b53b8051a6c58556cfc6a905734e863f9c38294610f73b8e01e7612b",
    "simhash": "1:086958b0fba40c33",
    "word_count": 1696
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:16.878292+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "BRYANT and BURKE, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Percy Jones, Appellant, v. Francis Hutchins, Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FRIEND\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nPlaintiff brought suit against defendant to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him as the driver of one of several southbound automobiles involved in multiple collisions in heavy traffic on the Outer Drive in Chicago about six-thirty in the evening on October 4, 1954. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendant, from which plaintiff appeals.\nIn June 1958 defendant moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that there was no judgment in the record, that the report of trial proceedings was not properly before the reviewing court, and that the record on appeal was not filed in apt time. The point is again urged in defendant\u2019s brief, but since the first division of this court, before assignment of cases, denied the motion, we need not consider it.\nThe essential facts disclose that the traffic flow on the Outer Drive between Randolph Street and Belmont Avenue (3200 north) is changed, commencing at Randolph Street at six o\u2019clock in the evening, from a rush-hour pattern to a normal pattern, with an allowable variation of five minutes in the scheduling; the change-over at North Avenue (1600 north) is scheduled for six-thirty. Then the six-lane northbound flow of the rush hour is decreased to a four-lane flow, while the two-lane southbound rush-hour flow is correspondingly increased to a four-lane flow. The testimony here is at variance as to whether the change-over had been effected at the time of the accident; plaintiff stated that there were two lanes open for southbound traffic; Cross, a disinterested witness, said that the \u201ctraffic was changed after the accident\u201d; defendant, driving south in the second lane from the west curb, spoke of \u201cpreparing to pull out to my left,\u201d of trying to \u201cget into that other lane,\u201d thus suggesting that southbound traffic was no longer confined to a two-lane flow. All the witnesses, however, were agreed that the traffic was heavy, and that cars were lining up in slowly moving or stopped southbound lanes. A Yellow Cab driver came to a sudden stop; behind him Bruce Cross had to stop suddenly from a speed of about forty miles an hour; an unidentified motorist behind Cross swung into another lane of traffic; without stopping, plaintiff\u2019s car, the next in line, abruptly crashed into the rear of Cross\u2019s car at a speed of about twenty-five miles an hour; and almost immediately thereafter there was another crash as defendant\u2019s car struck the rear of plaintiff\u2019s.\nCross, a disinterested witness who is not involved in this litigation, testified that he was driving south at about forty miles an hour; that he had to stop abruptly when the taxi ahead of him stopped or slowed down very suddenly; and that after bringing his car to a stop about two feet behind the cab he looked into his rearview mirror and observed Jones\u2019s car, about a car length away, coming up behind him at approximately twenty-five miles an hour. Within the space of a second, Jones\u2019s car crashed into the rear of Cross\u2019s car and pushed it into the taxicab, and almost immediately after that impact Cross heard a crash as Hutchins\u2019 car struck the rear of Jones\u2019s car.\nJones testified that he called for a friend, Lucille Smith, at 547 Brompton Place at fifteen or twenty minutes past six. Prom there he drove east on Brompton Place to Sheridan Road and followed Sheridan until he reached the Drive. The weather was clear, and at this time of evening it was becoming dark. On the Outer Drive, Jones was driving south in the second lane from the west curb. There was a partition in the roadway immediately to his left, and a lane open to his right; there was no lane open to his left going in a southerly direction. His car was proceeding at the rate of about thirty to forty miles an hour, with automobiles before and behind him. Following approximately forty-five feet behind another car, he saw taillights flashing in front of him, indicating cars were stopping, and he testified that he began to pump his brakes to bring his car to rest and also to signal that he was stopping. The car in front of him then swung out of his lane into the traffic lane to his right. Plaintiff stated that he stopped his car about three or four feet behind the Cross car and was stopped there, with his foot on the brake, for four or five seconds, when his automobile was hit in the rear by defendant\u2019s car and plaintiff sustained the injuries for which he is asking damages.\nIt is first argued that the verdict of the jury was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Plaintiff stresses defendant\u2019s testimony that as he was preparing to pull over to his left he glanced back momentarily, and that as he did so he heard \u201ca screeching of brakes\u201d and immediately applied his own, but it was too late to avoid crashing into plaintiff\u2019s car. Hutchins testified that some time prior to the collision he \u201cwas preparing to pull out to\u201d his \u201cleft.\u201d He saw no signal from the car ahead and, because \u201cthere was a blind spot\u201d in his rearview mirror, he glanced back momentarily to assure himself that he could safely make the transition to another lane. The accident occurred in the lane of traffic in which he was driving. The sequence of sudden stoppings already detailed \u2014 -first the Yellow Cab, then Cross\u2019s car, followed by the car of the unidentified motorist who swung into an adjacent lane, next Jones\u2019s car striking Cross\u2019s car \u2014 \u25a0 abruptly interrupted the flow of cars on the express drive and was the cause of Hutchins\u2019 car crashing into Jones\u2019s car. Hutchins testified that he heard the screech of brakes and applied his own fully, after which his car moved about the width of the courtroom before coming in contact with Jones\u2019s car. No evidence was adduced to show the distance between the Jones\u2019s car and the Hutchins\u2019 car when Hutchins momentarily looked back. The evidence is not necessarily persuasive that any sign of danger could be perceived by Hutchins before he glanced to the rear; he stated that he never saw any flashing of lights on the back of Jones\u2019s car or any other signal that Jones was going to stop; and even during the time that Hutchins\u2019 brakes were applied and Jones\u2019s car was in his vision he could not tell if the Jones car was moving or standing still. In applying his brakes Hutchins did not react to a visual warning \u2014 a car giving a stop signal\u2014 but to an auditory warning \u2014 the screeching of brakes; he was then, according to his testimony, approximately thirty-three to forty-four feet behind Jones. There is no inherent vice in glancing back momentarily to supplement a rearview mirror blind spot; rather, such a check may well be an additional precaution. \u201cThe duty to look has inherent in it the duty to see what is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it.\u201d Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495. And in a later case, Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390, 216 P.2d 640, the Utah court said: \u201c. . . keeping a lookout ahead does not mean that the gaze must be glued incessantly on every object ahead. Such intenseness, aside from the strain, might actually detract from the necessity of over-all observation. The content of the duty to drive with reasonable care varies with the condition and circumstances. . . . Unless all reasonable minds must say that a party did not use due care under a particular set of circumstances, it is a question for the jury.\u201d (Emphasis that of the Utah court.) Under the circumstances here set out, whether or not Hutch-ins\u2019 momentary glance backward constituted negligence was a question of fact for the jury to determine. In denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for a new trial, the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, found that \u201cunder the evidence of record the jury could reasonably have found or concluded: (1) That the defendant\u2019s act in merely glancing back momentarily did not constitute negligence, or (2) That the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in not giving a proper signal to the defendant that he was about to stop; or (3) That in view of the emergency, neither was guilty of negligence.\u201d The judge continued: \u201cUpon careful examination of the record, the Court finds that the verdict of the jury has a substantial evidentiary basis in the evidence . . .\u201d We find the reasoning of the trial judge persuasive; under the circumstances we would not be justified in holding that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAlthough the instructions given to the jury do not appear in the abstract, plaintiff places considerable reliance in his appeal on the giving of two instructions, one of which concerns contributory negligence. He contends this was not an issue; however, the record discloses that plaintiff himself tendered an instruction on due care and, having intrpduced this issue, he is not now in a position to complain of a corresponding instruction. Plaintiff also argues that an instruction with reference to an emergency situation should not have been given. There is no doubt that such a situation resulted from the chain of events hereinbefore related, and accordingly we think that an instruction on that phase of the case was proper.\nOther grounds urged for reversal have not been preserved for review. Plaintiff\u2019s motion for a new trial nowhere mentions misconduct on the part of defendant\u2019s counsel or prejudicial rulings by the trial judge.\nWe find no convincing reason for reversal, and therefore the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nBRYANT and BURKE, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FRIEND"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jack L. Sachs and John L. Wallace, of Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Wyatt Jacobs, Jacobs, Miller, Rooney & Lederleitner, of Chicago (Joseph B. Lederleitner, William L. Eifrig, of counsel) for defendant-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Percy Jones, Appellant, v. Francis Hutchins, Appellee.\nGen. No. 47,526.\nFirst District, Third Division.\nDecember 3, 1958.\nRehearing denied December 29, 1958.\nReleased for publication December 29, 1958.\nJack L. Sachs and John L. Wallace, of Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWyatt Jacobs, Jacobs, Miller, Rooney & Lederleitner, of Chicago (Joseph B. Lederleitner, William L. Eifrig, of counsel) for defendant-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0484-01",
  "first_page_order": 496,
  "last_page_order": 502
}