{ "id": 5195499, "name": "Richard L. Hauswald, Appellee, v. Board of Education of Community High School District No. 217, Cook County, Illinois, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Hauswald v. Board of Education of Community High School District No. 217", "decision_date": "1958-12-16", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 47,492", "first_page": "49", "last_page": "57", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "20 Ill. App. 2d 49" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "19 Ill.App.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5189521 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/19/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill.App.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5189930 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/19/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill.App.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5166403 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/12/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5805761 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/356/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ill. App. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4998906 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/340/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ill.App.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5145301 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/7/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 Ill. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2509352 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/390/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ill. App. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4998864 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/340/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313840 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0422-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 707, "char_count": 13859, "ocr_confidence": 0.494, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.977688336193149e-07, "percentile": 0.9049062319849536 }, "sha256": "9f955c178901036b154e0e3657501012a24cf4ba43c571e1f388d49a854c7bc8", "simhash": "1:5b9f400e75afec00", "word_count": 2314 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:34.543090+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LEWE, P. J. and MURPHY, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Richard L. Hauswald, Appellee, v. Board of Education of Community High School District No. 217, Cook County, Illinois, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KILEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an Administrative Be view proceeding to review defendant Board\u2019s order dismissing plaintiff as teacher in the Argo Community High School. The trial court reversed the order and the Board has appealed.\nPlaintiff began to teach in the high school in 1931. On August 6, 1957, the Board served him with notice of his suspension as of September 1, and his dismissal as of November 2, 1957. A copy of the Board\u2019s resolution of dismissal setting forth the charges accompanied the notice. Briefly, the charges were that plaintiff made \u201cextensive and exaggerated\u201d use of \u201cfree reading time\u201d instead of giving adequate instruction in grammar; \u201cobjected to and refused to comply\u201d with an administrative policy of weekly written themes; failed to keep lesson plans available for his substitute teachers; and failed to co-operate with the superintendent \u201cin the above and other matters.\u201d\nPlaintiff qualified for \u201ccontractual continued service\u201d under the Teacher Tenure Law, Ill. Bev. Stat. 1957, ch. 122, \u00a7 24 \u2014 2, and was therefore entitled to the benefits, pertinent here, of \u00a7 24 \u2014 3, \u201c. . . the dismissal . . . shall not become effective until approved by a majority vote of all the members of the board upon specific charges and after a hearing. ...\u201d If he was suspended pending the hearing, where the Board\u2019s opinion was that the interest of the school required it, and was later acquitted, he was not to suffer loss of salary. Before serving him with notice of charges \u201cthat may be deemed to be remediable\u201d he was to be given reasonable warning \u201cin writing,\u201d stating specifically the \u201ccauses\u201d which, if not removed, may result in charges.\nPlaintiff demanded a public hearing, which was given him, and a bill of particulars, which was refused. The hearing was held on September 30 and October 1, 1957, and witnesses for the Board and plaintiff were heard. Before the testimony was taken plaintiff moved unsuccessfully to dismiss the proceeding on the grounds discussed later in this opinion.\nAfter the hearing the Board found from the testimony and exhibits that the charges were proven and were sufficient reason for his dismissal, that the \u201ccauses\u201d were not remediable and that the best interests of the school required the dismissal. On review the Circuit Court decided the Board\u2019s order was \u201cnot supported by substantial evidence and was against the manifest weight of evidence\u201d; and that the findings that the \u201ccauses\u201d were not remediable and that the dismissal was required in the best interests of the school were against the manifest weight of evidence. The order was reversed and the Board was ordered to reinstate plaintiff.\nWe think the nub of this case is the question whether the trial court had the power to decide that the Board\u2019s finding that the \u201ccauses\u201d were not remediable was against the manifest weight of evidence; and if it had the power to make that finding, whether the finding is right. If the \u201ccauses\u201d were remediable, plaintiff was entitled to a notice in writing to remedy them, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 122, \u00a7 24 \u2014 3, and it is conceded no notice for that purpose was given him.\n\u201cThe Teacher Tenure Law was enacted primarily for the protection of Illinois teachers who, prior to its enactment in 1941, served at the pleasure of the boards of . . . education. Its object was to improve the Illinois school system by assuring teachers of experience and ability a continuous service and a rehiring based upon merit rather than failure to rehire upon reasons that are political, partisan or capricious.\u201d Donahoo v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 303, 413 Ill. 422, 425. This court in Biehn v. Tess, 340 Ill. App. 140 at page 148 states, on authority of Anderson v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 91, 390 Ill. 412, that the Tenure Law creates a new liability on the part of school boards and as such it ought to be construed strictly in favor of the Board. This was said in deciding that a principal did not come within the protection of the Tenure Law. In the Anderson case the Supreme Court stated that the Tenure Law makes a contract of \u201ccontractual continued\u201d service following the probationary period, where none would otherwise exist and therefore created a new liability. It cited the general rule of statutory construction (59 C. J. 1129) that such a law should not \u201cextend or enlarge the liability\u201d and construed the Tenure Law against a teacher claiming benefits of the Act. The court construed the Act strictly and precluded plaintiff from protection of the Tenure Law. These cases involved persons trying to qualify under the Law.\nNeither the Biehn nor Anderson cases are authority for a strict construction of the Tenure Law with regard to persons who qualify for its protection, as plaintiff here has by his admittedly \u201ccontractual continued\u201d service. He is entitled to a construction which is consistent with the prime purpose of protecting teachers.\nIt is true that the courts have held that the Boards had discretion in the first instance to determine whether the \u201ccauses\u201d for which plaintiff was dismissed were remediable, Meridith v. Board of Education of Community Unit School Dist. No. 7, Christian County, Illinois, 7 Ill.App.2d 477, Eveland v. Board of Education of Paris Union School Dist., 340 Ill. App. 308. This is not to say that a court does not have the power on review to test the exercise of the Board\u2019s discretion and determine whether there has been an abuse. The Supreme Court in Hartmann v. Board of Education, Westville Tp. High School Dist. No. 220, 356 Ill. 577, 580, stated that the Board was not free \u201cto arbitrarily or without cause\u201d dismiss teachers. The Tenure Law would have no value as a protection to teachers if Boards were free to dismiss teachers for \u201ccause\u201d deemed by them to be irremediable and the decisions were insulated from judicial review. In the Meridith case and in Pearson v. Board of Education, Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, Macoupin County, 12 Ill.App.2d 44, cited by the Board, the courts passed on the question whether the findings that the \u201ccause\u201d was irremediable were against the manifest weight of evidence. And in Smith v. Board of Education of Community Unit School Dist. No. 1 of Coles and Cumberland Counties, Illinois, 19 Ill.App.2d 224, the Third District held that the Appellate Court has the duty to determine whether the finding of irremediability is against the manifest weight of evidence. We think the trial court had the power to pass on the question.\nWe disagree with the Board that \u201cto make the question of irremediability a question of fact would necessarily involve the taking of testimony from .qualified witnesses as to their opinion.\u201d It is our view that there is ample basis in the record before us upon which to infer that the \u201ccauses\u201d were or were not remediable. Expert psychological testimony as to plaintiff\u2019s probable future conduct is not necessary.\nThe Board decided that the best interest of the school required plaintiff\u2019s dismissal because of the several charges made. There is no evidence that plaintiff was given a \u201cdirective\u201d to change his method of teaching English. A resolution of the Illinois Association of English Teachers \u2014 to which plaintiff did not belong although he once belonged to the National Council of Teachers of English \u2014 was deposited in his mail box, by the assistant principal, with the recommendation by the Association of weekly written themes underlined in red. The principal told plaintiff his English program \u201cshould be weighted strongly\u201d with theme writing. The assistant principal had \u201cnumerous discussions\u201d with plaintiff about English instruction, expressing \u201cdisapproval\u201d of \u201cfree reading\u201d once a week and \u201curged\u201d more emphasis on composition and grammar.\nPlaintiff was always \u201cvery argumentative\u201d during the conversations and thought the written work was not \u201cso important,\u201d but from all that appears his superiors had no firm policy which plaintiff was required to adopt, and either because his superiors did not wish to upset him, because of an earlier nervous sickness or out of respect for academic freedom, the point was left flexible and arguable. Plaintiff called for written themes not weekly, but semimonthly, in one class, and slightly less than that in the other class. This shows plainly that the \u201ccause\u201d was not completely irremediable even though no \u201cdirective\u201d was given.\nBecause \u201cJohnny\u201d could not read or write the University of Illinois decided in 1956 to impress upon high school teachers the importance of teaching English properly. Pamphlets containing the University\u2019s standards of freshman English were ordered by the Argo High School principal. Ninety pamphlets were given plaintiff with \u201cinstructions\u201d to give one to each of his \u201ccollege bound\u201d 1956 senior English students for use in his class, and that the balance be kept for the 1957 seniors who were \u201ccollege bound.\u201d No reason is given why the superintendent did not keep them. Fifty-eight copies of the pamphlets were found in plaintiff\u2019s classroom desk during the following summer. It is argued that he had two \u201ccollege bound\u201d classes in each of two years, each one having 25 to 30 students and that he was clearly delinquent in not following the \u201cinstructions.\u201d If he gave out 25 in each class he should have had 40 pamphlets in his desk instead of 58. There is nothing in the record to indicate that if there was a firm policy or follow-up that plaintiff would not have distributed the other 18 pamphlets, but if he did he would not have enough for the 50 students in the 1958 class. So much for the charges with respect to the teaching of grammar.\nWe cannot see how we could infer from plaintiff\u2019s absence from his class from five to ten times a week that he had a \u201cpenchant for roaming.\u201d It is admitted, as we should expect, that \u201csome\u201d absences were for \u201cjustifiable reasons.\u201d His superiors \u201cmentioned\u201d this to him on eight occasions during the school years of 1955-1956 and 1956-1957, and the assistant principal \u201cstrongly reprimanded\u201d him in April 1957, as follows : \u201cYou have been out of your class quite a bit lately. I see you out in the hall and you are talking to a teacher and keeping her away from class.\u201d There is no testimony about why other teachers were in the hall nor about who was \u201ckeeping\u201d whom away from class. There is no evidence of any severe consequences to the students or school from plaintiff\u2019s absence from class and nothing to suggest that a stronger reprimand in a written notice would not have corrected anything that was wrong in this respect.\nWhat we have said with respect to absence from class applies to his claimed delinquency in carrying out his duties as counsellor.\nFinally we come to the Plan Book, which is a device for teachers outlining in advance their semester\u2019s work for their own good and for continuity should a substitute be needed, and for good school administration. In 1953 plaintiff had been absent for an extended period and had left no plan for the substitute. A superior \u201cdiscussed\u201d this with him then. The proof against plaintiff at the public hearing was that his superiors had found an unused Plan Book in his desk. Plaintiff introduced in evidence a Plan Book bearing date \u201c1956, 1957.\u201d This exhibit is not \u201cfalling apart\u201d although it is \u201cworn\u201d and we cannot tell whether it is \u201cold,\u201d as the Board claims, but it is used. It is likely, as the Board\u2019s brief argues, that the book was not a new one which plaintiff said he obtained in January of 1957. It is probably one he got in the fall of 1956. But there was no cross-examination of plaintiff about the condition of the book and no indication that his \u201cintegrity\u201d was suspected or that he could not have explained several discrepancies. The Plan Book appears to have a change of seating arrangement for the second semester, and changes, through erasures and writing over the erasures, of class work over that of the first semester. The class records for the first semester indicate plaintiff was lax in filling out the space for \u201cOutline of Work Required of Class.\u201d But again there is no reason infer-able from the record why plaintiff would not have improved if his superiors started in 1953 to complain and demand in writing that he give these details more attention. Plaintiff\u2019s \u201ccauses\u201d were not like those of the plaintiff in Jepsen v. Board of Education of Community High School Dist. No. 307, Kankakee County, Illinois, 19 Ill.App.2d 204, where the plaintiff accused the principal of knowingly permitting an ineligible player to participate on the school football team. Once this accusation had been made the damage was done and could not be remedied. Nor are plaintiff\u2019s \u201ccauses\u201d like the \u201cuncontrollable temper cause\u201d in Pearson v. Board of Education, Community Unit High School Dist. No. 5, Macoupin County, 12 Ill.App.2d 44.\nWe conclude that the trial court was justified in deciding that the Board\u2019s order was \u201cnot supported by substantial evidence and was against the manifest weight of evidence,\u201d and that the finding that the \u201ccauses\u201d were not remediable is against the manifest weight of evidence. Therefore, plaintiff under the Teacher Tenure Law was entitled to \u201creasonable warnings in writing\u201d and since this was not done, he was illegally discharged. It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider other points raised by the Board.\nAffirmed.\nLEWE, P. J. and MURPHY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KILEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dale, Haffner & Grow, of Chicago (John M. Wejman, and Mitchell J. Overgaard, of counsel) for appellant.", "Bugen, Ligtenberg & Goebel, of Chicago (John Ligtenberg, of counsel) for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Richard L. Hauswald, Appellee, v. Board of Education of Community High School District No. 217, Cook County, Illinois, Appellant.\nGen. No. 47,492.\nFirst District, Second Division.\nDecember 16, 1958.\nReleased for publication February 4, 1959.\nDale, Haffner & Grow, of Chicago (John M. Wejman, and Mitchell J. Overgaard, of counsel) for appellant.\nBugen, Ligtenberg & Goebel, of Chicago (John Ligtenberg, of counsel) for appellee." }, "file_name": "0049-01", "first_page_order": 65, "last_page_order": 73 }