{
  "id": 5219196,
  "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. Raymond P. Drymalski (Impleaded), Defendant in Error",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Drymalski",
  "decision_date": "1961-01-23",
  "docket_number": "Gen. Nos. 48,081-84 (Consolidated)",
  "first_page": "479",
  "last_page": "481",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "28 Ill. App. 2d 479"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "170 N.E.2d 171",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1960,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "20 Ill.2d 295",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2738408
      ],
      "year": 1960,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/20/0295-01"
      ]
    }
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    "simhash": "1:44d3f02b94dc82bf",
    "word_count": 608
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:20.019953+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. Raymond P. Drymalski (Impleaded), Defendant in Error."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PER CURIAM.\nThese cases are brought here on writ of error to the Criminal Court of Cook County to review the judgments of that court discharging the defendant. He was indicted with other defendants in three indictments charging conspiracy to obstruct justice and to cheat and defraud the City of Chicago and County of Cook. In a fourth, he was indicted alone for malfeasance in the office of Chief Justice of the Municipal Court of Chicago.\nDefendant filed what he termed, \u201cpleas in bar\u201d alleging that he was a de jure judge of the Municipal Court of Chicago; that the acts complained of were done \u201chonestly and in good faith\u201d in the administration of his judicial duties, and, therefore, he was exempt from indictment thereon. The People\u2019s oral motion to strike the \u201cpleas in bar\u201d was denied and answers to the pleas were filed. After a hearing on the pleas and answers, the \u201cpleas in bar\u201d were sustained and the defendant ordered \u201cdischarged.\u201d\nWe think the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, People v. Ferguson, 20 Ill.2d 295, 170 N.E.2d 171 (1960), controls our decision in this appeal.\nIn that ease the Supreme Court of Illinois held, that the judgment discharging Ferguson was reviewable. On authority of that holding, we hold that the instant judgment is reviewable.\nThe Supreme Court also held, \u201cthat a plea in bar is appropriate in a criminal case only in those instances in which such a plea was permitted at common law.\u201d This holding followed a previous conclusion that \u201cthe common-law pleas involved only matters which had occurred after the events charged in the indictment \u2014 former acquittal, former conviction, or pardon. They did not involve a trial of the matters charged in the indictment.\u201d\nSince the instant pleas did not come within those permitted at common law, we are impelled to hold that the plea was inappropriate and should not have been sustained, and, that the judgment of the trial court is erroneous.\nThe court heard evidence on the question whether the defendant\u2019s unlawful acts were \u201cperformed honestly,\u201d and the judgment was \u201ca discharge.\u201d Defendant argues that this amounted to a bench trial under the indictment. There is no merit in this argument, in view of the Ferguson decision, that these questions of fact should be determined under a plea of \u201cnot guilty.\u201d\nIt is contended that the Ferguson case is distinguished because in the Ferguson plea, as the Supreme Court noted, there was not alleged, \u201cthat the acts charged in the indictment were performed honestly, in good faith, and in the course of defendant\u2019s judicial duties.\u201d We see no merit in this contention. The Supreme Court was considering a \u201cplea in bar,\u201d which it found to be, and treated, as a motion to quash. The court did discuss the lack of the above alleged facts in the Ferguson plea. But, it left no basis for inference that, if those facts had been alleged, the plea would have been a proper \u201cplea in bar.\u201d The Supreme Court\u2019s intention was to limit the scope of a \u201cplea in bar\u201d to the scope at common law.\nBecause of the holding in People v. Ferguson, and for the additional reasons given, the judgment is re-versed and the cause is remanded for further proceeding.\nJudgment reversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PER CURIAM."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Benjamin S. Adamowski, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook county (Francis X. Riley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel) for plaintiff in error.",
      "Harry J. Busch and Jacob Shamberg, of Chicago, for defendant in error."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. Raymond P. Drymalski (Impleaded), Defendant in Error.\nGen. Nos. 48,081-84 (Consolidated).\nFirst District, First Division.\nJanuary 23, 1961.\nBenjamin S. Adamowski, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook county (Francis X. Riley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel) for plaintiff in error.\nHarry J. Busch and Jacob Shamberg, of Chicago, for defendant in error."
  },
  "file_name": "0479-01",
  "first_page_order": 489,
  "last_page_order": 491
}