{ "id": 5257263, "name": "Kropp Forge Company, an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry Jawitz, d/b/a Transformer Company of America, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz", "decision_date": "1962-10-29", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 48,699", "first_page": "475", "last_page": "483", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "37 Ill. App. 2d 475" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "117 NE2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill App2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5116866 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/1/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 NE2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill App2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5228711 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/31/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 NE 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5275380 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/348/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill2d 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2695776 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 NE2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill App2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5261212 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/36/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 F Supp 277", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 432645 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/172/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 F Supp 482", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 436249 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/171/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 NE2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2785531 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/11/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 NE2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill2d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2762895 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/16/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 US 310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157001 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/326/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 US 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6162253 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0235-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 659, "char_count": 12773, "ocr_confidence": 0.527, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.716246680726914e-07, "percentile": 0.962981625569676 }, "sha256": "6faa7e375410f571e5a110343d442ef91017dd29dfc767f500f3a221148df858", "simhash": "1:a15bad3bdaa4a88a", "word_count": 2063 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:35:05.328897+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BUBMAN, P. J. and ENGLISH, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Kropp Forge Company, an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry Jawitz, d/b/a Transformer Company of America, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an action for contract damages. Defendant, Harry Jawitz, a nonresident, appeals from a $2600 judgment entered against him in a nonjury trial in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois.\nTwo principal questions are presented: (1) whether the nonresident defendant transacted \u201cany business\u201d within the State of Illinois sufficient to submit defendant \u201cto the jurisdiction of the courts of this state\u201d; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain plaintiff\u2019s judgment.\n\u2022 Personal service of summons was made on defendant outside of the State of Illinois (\u00a7 16, Civil Practice Act). Defendant filed a special appearance and then moved to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant. The motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth the reasons (\u00a7 20, Civil Practice Act), was overruled. Defendant answered, denying the material allegations of plaintiff\u2019s complaint and the existence of a contract between the parties, and again denied jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant.\n\u25a0 The evidence shows that plaintiff, in Chicago, and defendant, in New York, by correspondence commencing December 6, 1957, conducted negotiations for the purchase by defendant, from plaintiff, of turbines and generators located in plaintiff\u2019s plant at Cicero, Illinois. It is undisputed that defendant, after the exchange of correspondence, visited plaintiff\u2019s premises in Cicero, Illinois, on January 15, 1958, where he conversed with plaintiff\u2019s employees, inspected the powerhouse in which the turbines and generators were located, and took measurements of the equipment and the powerhouse doorway. A witness for plaintiff, A. F. Tydeman, an employee, testified that after the inspection was completed, defendant left with the \u201cparting statement that he was going to have lunch with his riggers at the Palmer House and make final arrangements for the removal of the equipment.\u201d\nDefendant, by deposition, testified that at the time of his visit to plaintiff\u2019s premises on January 15, 1958, he examined the equipment and found that the turbines were of a condensing type and were therefore unacceptable; that he left the premises and later that day, while at the airport, unsuccessfully tried to reach Tydeman by telephone; and that in Tydeman\u2019s absence, he left the message that \u201cI had to leave and there was nothing I could do about the steam turbines.\u201d\nTydeman testified he was never informed of defendant\u2019s telephone call from the airport, and that on January 16, 1958, by letter to defendant in New York (in evidence), he confirmed the meeting and asked for information as to \u201cthe arrangements which have been made for the removal of the equipment.\u201d The foregoing, in substance, is the basis on which the trial court found for plaintiff and that defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Illinois.\nOn the question of jurisdiction, defendant contends that he never transacted business in Illinois within the meaning of Section 17 of the Civil Practice Act. Of the various forms of activity set forth in Section 17(1), by which defendant might be held to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts, only subsection (1) (a) is relevant here. This provides:\n\u201c(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:\n\u201c(a) The transaction of any business within this State.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s affidavit in support of his motion to quash the summons states, and it is not controverted, that: he is a resident of the State of New York; never maintained any office, telephone, situs or location in Illinois, nor employed any help of any kind in the state; and that during the years 1957 and 1958, other than the correspondence in this suit and the trip to Chicago in January, 1958, he was not present in Illinois and transacted no business in Illinois.\nAs pointed out by defendant, tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States in the case of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US 235 (1958), stated:\n\u201cThe unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant\u2019s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.\u201d\nThe landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 US 310 (1945), pronounced the requirement of \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with the forum state as a necessary precondition to the assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. There (p 316), the United States Supreme Court said:\n\u201c. . . due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend \u2018traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 \u201d\nThe International Shoe doctrine of \u201cminimum contacts\u201d is now the gauge of the appropriateness of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.\nThe Illinois courts have recognized that the above authorities are controlling. In Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., Inc., 16 Ill2d 426, 158 NE2d 73 (1959), the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed at length the major pertinent decisions with respect to jurisdiction over nonresidents (including Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill2d 378, 143 NE2d 673 (1957)) in the context of a case involving the construction of Section 17(1) (a) of the Civil Practice Act, here involved.\nDefendant asserts that he \u201cdid nothing more than send a letter and a telegram to the plaintiff, and spend one morning in Illinois examining the equipment.\u201d He argues, from the Grobark case, that \u201ca visit alone even coupled with other activities does not necessarily vest the court with jurisdiction.\u201d Also cited to support the contention that a single isolated transaction in the forum state does not satisfy the \u201cminimum contact\u201d requirements are Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F Supp 482 (ED Ill 1959), and E. Film Corp. v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 172 F Supp 277 (ND Ill 1958). We are not persuaded that these authorities apply here.\nIn the Morgan case, the defendant never entered Illinois in connection with the transaction. In the E. Film Corp. case, the court stated, \u201cThe contract on which plaintiff bases its actions was not entered into in Illinois.\u201d In the Grobark case, the terms of. the contract were contained in a letter from defendant in New York City to plaintiffs in Chicago, and the performance consisted of shipping goods into Illinois. The Grobark holding is that contracting from outside Illinois and shipping goods into Illinois via an independent carrier was not transacting business in Illinois, so as to constitute an act subjecting a New York corporation to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court, when the nonresident defendant had no agents or offices in Illinois, even though, as the opinion indicates, negotiations preliminary to the contract were carried on in Illinois.\nIt is our conclusion, from the reasoning in the Grobark case (p 437), that the performance of jurisdictional acts by a nonresident or his agent, while physically present in Illinois, is essential for submission to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under Section 17(1) (a). Saletko v. Willys Motors, Inc., 36 Ill App2d 7, 12, 183 NE2d 569 (1962).\nWe believe that the ultimate test is the substance of the act rather than the quantity. The criteria \u201ccannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. . . . Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.\u201d International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 US 310, 319.\nWe conclude that the \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with Illinois, required by due process to subject defendant to in personam jurisdiction of the courts of this state, are evidenced by this record. Either the making of the alleged contract itself, or the activity in furtherance of it, while defendant was physically present in Illinois, is the business shown to have been transacted by defendant within Illinois, and distinguish this case on the facts from those in the Urobar k case. Defendant, by his acts done in Illinois, purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business activities within this state, \u201cthus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.\u201d Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US 235, 253.\nThe second principal contention of defendant is that the essential elements of a contract, i. e., an offer and an acceptance, are not shown by plaintiff\u2019s evidence.\nPlaintiff\u2019s contractual theory is in the alternative; either the contract was made by defendant\u2019s telegram of December 22,1957, the offer, and plaintiff\u2019s responsive Tetter of January 8, 1958, the acceptance, or the contract was made by plaintiff\u2019s letter of January 8, 1958, a counteroffer, and defendant\u2019s acts in plaintiff\u2019s plant in Cicero, Illinois, on January 15, 1958, the acceptance of the counteroffer. Under either theory, plaintiff argues a binding contract of sale was entered into by the parties.\nDefendant\u2019s telegram of December 22, 1957, sent to plaintiff at Chicago, said:\n\u201cBoth turbines with generators worth $2600 as is where is, or $3600 loaded on cars. Please wire whether they are condensing or non condensing. Our man can arrive January fourth with payment and take care of shipping.\u201d\nPlaintiff\u2019s letter of January 8, 1958, to defendant in New York, stated:\n\u201c. . . we hereby accept your offer of $2,600.00 for both turbines and generators, as-is, where-is to be removed by your agent without damage or dislocation of our premises and you to furnish certificates of insurance.\n\u201cPlease advise when your representative will arrive with payment to make shipping arrangements.\u201d\nPlaintiff contends this letter was an \u201cacceptance\u201d of defendant\u2019s telegraphed \u201coffer\u201d of December 22, 1957. Defendant contends that plaintiff\u2019s letter of January 8 cannot be considered an acceptance, because the Illinois courts have uniformly held that the acceptance must conform exactly to the offer (Whitelaw v. Brady, 3 Ill2d 583, 589 (1954)) and must be unconditional, unequivocal, and unqualified. Worley v. Holding Corp., 348 Ill 420, 181 NE 307 (1932).\nPlaintiff argues its letter was not a counteroffer, and that the expression, \u201cto be removed by your agent without damage or dislocation of our premises and you to furnish certificates of insurance,\u201d was a \u201ccustom and usage\u201d trade expression. This is denied by defendant. We make no determination of this contention because we have concluded that defendant\u2019s acts at plaintiff\u2019s plant in Illinois, on January 15, 1958, which climaxed the previous negotiations, constituted an acceptance of the alleged counteroffer, and made a binding contract of sale between the parties.\nTwo witnesses testified for plaintiff as to the transaction at the Kropp plant. Defendant did not directly contradict their testimony, and he was silent as to the taking of measurements. Generally, he disclaimed any agreement to purchase the equipment at any time.\nWhere the trial court has seen and heard the witnesses and the testimony is contradictory, this court will not substitute its judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for that of the trial court unless we can say that the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Ezydorski v. Krozka, 31 Ill App2d 79, 175 NE2d 668 (1961).) We cannot say, as we must in order to reverse, that on the record before us an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Olin Industries, Inc. v. Wuellner, 1 Ill App2d 267, 117 NE2d 565 (1954).\nFor the reasons stated, the order and judgment appealed from are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBUBMAN, P. J. and ENGLISH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Cohen, Cohen & Fiffer, of Chicago (Nathan M. Cohen, Robert S. Fiffer, Allan N. Lasky and Howard L. Korengold, of counsel), for appellant.", "Norville, Walsh & Case, of Chicago (Richard J. Walsh, Robert O. Case and Alan S. G-anz, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Kropp Forge Company, an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry Jawitz, d/b/a Transformer Company of America, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 48,699.\nFirst District, First Division.\nOctober 29, 1962.\nCohen, Cohen & Fiffer, of Chicago (Nathan M. Cohen, Robert S. Fiffer, Allan N. Lasky and Howard L. Korengold, of counsel), for appellant.\nNorville, Walsh & Case, of Chicago (Richard J. Walsh, Robert O. Case and Alan S. G-anz, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0475-01", "first_page_order": 485, "last_page_order": 493 }