{ "id": 5131794, "name": "Sophie Cwik, Appellant, v. Irvin D. Condre, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Cwik v. Condre", "decision_date": "1954-12-13", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 46,344", "first_page": "380", "last_page": "385", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "4 Ill. App. 2d 380" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2429025 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/344/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5804432 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/356/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4915021 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/284/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2659648 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/146/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 Ill. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3196498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/180/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5003030 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/338/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5646886 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/315/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 Ill. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2509634 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/390/0610-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 409, "char_count": 6125, "ocr_confidence": 0.548, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1555839742008125 }, "sha256": "ad00d9235377666222267f94a48aebc822f29771748aa822695746cc39e959b7", "simhash": "1:1eb5e062ca2622ca", "word_count": 1041 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:48.789316+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "FRIEND and N3EMEYER, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Sophie Cwik, Appellant, v. Irvin D. Condre, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn an action filed in the superior court of Cook county by Sophie Cwik, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, against Irvin D. Condre for damages for wrongful death, judgment was entered by agreement on March 5,1948, for $7,300. On .the day of its entry the judgment was satisfied in open court and a release was signed, sealed and delivered by the widow as \u201cAdministratrix of the Estate\u201d and again as \u201cWidow of Albert J. Cwik.\u201d It recites that the payment of $7,300 was \u201cthe sole consideration therefor.\u201d Thereafter Sophie Cwik, as an individual, sued Condre and sought damages for personal Injuries alleged to have been sustained by her in the collision that resulted in the death of her husband. The court disposed of the case on the pleadings and entered judgment against plaintiff, to reverse which she appeals.\nPlaintiff maintains that she intended to release only the cause of action for wrongful death; that if the release is viewed in its aspect most favorable to the defendant it presents an ambiguity; that where an ambiguity exists evidence is admissible to determine the intent; and that the intent should be determined as a question of fact by a jury. We are satisfied that plaintiff intended to discharge her individual claim as well as her claim as administratrix. She signed and sealed the release twice. This indicates an intent to bind her in her capacity as administratrix and in her individual capacity. That she intended to act in a plurality of capacities appears from the testimonium clause stating, \u201cIn Witness Whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this 5th day of March, 1948.\u201d It is obvious that the parties to the release are the administratrix and the plaintiff.\nWe are of the opinion that the release is not ambiguous. Consequently parol evidence is inadmissible to vary its terms. The \u201cinjuries\u201d to \u201cperson or property\u201d covered by the release were those which \u201chave resulted or may in the future develop\u201d from the accident. No injuries could \u201cin the future develop\u201d from the death of Albert J. Cwik. The subject to which the release relates is not declared to be exclusively the death of Albert J. Cwik, for it says \u201cincluding pecuniary loss by reason of the death of Albert J. Cwik.\u201d The subject of the release was not confined to the death of Albert J. Cwik but to the \u201caccident which occurred on or about the 13th day of April 1946\u201d at or near the intersection. The claims from the accident were released and plaintiff\u2019s individual claim is a claim arising from the accident. Plaintiff also indicated that she intended to release all claims of any kind when she said she was executing the release \u201cfor the purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of any and all claims, disputed or otherwise, on account of the injuries and damages above mentioned.\u201d We find that the parties intended to and did settle all claims arising out of the accident.\nPlaintiff asserts that the release was without consideration and is a nullity. There was a judgment by consent iq. favor of the administratrix, a satisfaction thereof and a release by the administratrix and also by the widow of her individual claims arising from the accident. These were contemporaneous transactions. A judgment entered by consent, although valid, derives its validity from the consent of the parties, not from adjudication, and is treated as a contract. Sims v. Powell, 390 Ill. 610; People ex rel. Nelson v. Joliet Trust & Savings Bank, 315 Ill. App. 11; Lefor v. Jones, 338 Ill. App. 173. A promise based upon consideration of a benefit to a third person constitutes a valuable consideration. Cobb v. Heron, 180 Ill. 49; Ruppert v. Frauenknecht, 146 Ill. App. 397. Payment to a stranger at her request would be a valid consideration as to her. Payment to the estate in which she was a beneficiary to a part of the proceeds constitutes a valid consideration. A release under seal carries with it the presumption that it was executed for a valuable consideration, \u25a0 and in the absence of fraud no evidence can be introduced for the purpose of showing that there was no consideration for the giving of the instrument. Woodbury v. United States Casualty Co., 284 Ill. 227, 234; Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 547; Brinker v. Chicago Transit Authority, 344 Ill. App. 479. The release when given was valid and no subsequent action by the legislature or judiciary can impair its obligation. Havemeyer v. Iowa, 3 Wallace, 294, 303. Plaintiff says that whatever the law may have been, the legislature has enacted a statute which places a sealed and unsealed document upon the same legal footing. See par. 153b, ch. 30, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1953 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 28.07]. Section 4 of the Act on construction of statutes (ch. 131, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1953 [Jones Ill. Stats. Ann. 27.16]) provides that no new law shall be construed to affect any right accrued or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceeding. A release embodies a substantial right. We do not think that the legislature intended to pass an act which would impair the obligation of a contract. Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States provides that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. See also section 14, Article II of the Ulinois Constitution.' We find that the 1953 Act abolishing the effect of a seal was not intended to affect contracts made prior to its enactment.\nFor the reasons stated the judgment of the superior court of Cook county is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nFRIEND and N3EMEYER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roman E. Posanski, of Chicago, for appellant; Charles D. Snewind, of counsel.", "Beverly & Pause, of Chicago, for appellee; Frank J. Pause, and William C. Wines, both of Chicago, of counsel." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Sophie Cwik, Appellant, v. Irvin D. Condre, Appellee.\nGen. No. 46,344.\nFirst District, First Division.\nDecember 13, 1954.\nReleased for publication March 7, 1955.\nRoman E. Posanski, of Chicago, for appellant; Charles D. Snewind, of counsel.\nBeverly & Pause, of Chicago, for appellee; Frank J. Pause, and William C. Wines, both of Chicago, of counsel." }, "file_name": "0380-02", "first_page_order": 392, "last_page_order": 397 }