{ "id": 5251650, "name": "The First National Bank of Peoria, Illinois, Administrator de bonis non With Will Annexed of the Estate of William V. Dufner, et al., Plaintiffs, John Wayne Dufner, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Margaret Alice Davis, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Home of the Good Shepherd, an Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "First National Bank v. Home of Good Shepherd", "decision_date": "1963-02-19", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 11,669", "first_page": "31", "last_page": "37", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "40 Ill. App. 2d 31" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "62 NE2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill App 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4942389 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/326/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 NE 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5417323 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/131/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 NE2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "413 Ill 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314245 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 NE2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill2d 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2778436 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0625-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 500, "char_count": 10113, "ocr_confidence": 0.583, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.36530546761606564 }, "sha256": "3fab077f93a204244a59283170e09e796ad80e52bbf22445ce9e93fe9cbf676d", "simhash": "1:a0cfda1ef2882eb5", "word_count": 1680 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:49.038379+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The First National Bank of Peoria, Illinois, Administrator de bonis non With Will Annexed of the Estate of William V. Dufner, et al., Plaintiffs, John Wayne Dufner, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Margaret Alice Davis, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Home of the Good Shepherd, an Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SPIVEY, J.\nWilliam V. Dufner died, leaving a will with a residuary bequest to \u201cThe Home of the Good Shepherd, of the City of Peoria, Illinois.\u201d A suit was brought by the executor of Dufner\u2019s estate and certain heirs to construe the will to determine what disposition to make of the particular bequest, since, the executor claimed there was no such home in existence in Peoria, Hlinois on the date of death of the decedent, on the date the residuary bequest became effective, or at the time of filing of the complaint. Defendant, \u201cHome of the Good Shepherd,\u201d an Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation, answered the complaint and denied that no such home was in existence in Peoria, Illinois, and claimed to be entitled to the bequest. The Circuit Court of Peoria County entered judgment in favor of the defendant on the pleadings and certain of the plaintiffs appealed from that judgment.\nIn the defendant\u2019s answer, it alleged that it was an Hlinois Not-for-Profit Corporation, organized in 1892. Defendant alleged that a Roman Catholic Religious Order called \u201cSisters of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd\u201d established a convent under the name recited above for the purpose of maintaining a school and the convent. Defendant alleged that the name given to the convent was \u201cHome of the Good Shepherd.\u201d According to the defendant\u2019s answer the school and convent were transferred from Peoria to other institutions operated by the religious order in 1953. Defendant alleged that it was currently in good standing as a not-for-profit corporation now, and that the officers and directors now and always were members of \u201cSisters of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd.\u201d The defendant asked the court to decree, that it was the residuary legatee named in the will and entitled to receive the residuary estate. None of the allegations of the answer were denied by the plaintiffs.\nDefendant then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in which it contended that there was no issue of fact to be tried. The court, in its decree, found that the defendant is the same person as \u201cHome of the Good Shepherd, of the City of Peoria, Illinois\u201d and was entitled to receive the bequest. Further, the court found that there was no requirement that the defendant possess, occupy and administer any physical facilities at the date of death of the testator, or at the time the residuary gift became effective, or at the present time. It was further decreed that the will contained no restriction or directions as to the manner or method of expenditure of the funds.\nA motion to vacate was filed by the plaintiffs who contended that the defendant and \u201cHome of the Good Shepherd, of the City of Peoria, Illinois\u201d were not one and the same organization. This motion was denied and this appeal followed.\nPlaintiffs in their brief contend that there was a latent ambiguity in the will of the decedent and therefore, extrinsic evidence should have been admitted to aid in the construction of the will. Plaintiffs contend that there was an issue of fact, that is, is the defendant \u201cHome of the Good Shepherd,\u201d an Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation one and the same as \u201cHome of the Good Shepherd, of the City of Peoria, Illinois.\u201d For these reasons, plaintiffs contend that the court erred in granting the defendant\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings.\nThe plaintiffs contend that the will is latently ambiguous and so must be construed to determine the testator\u2019s intention. The defendant denies that any ambiguity exists and denies that construction is proper. In view of the defendant\u2019s position, it is obvious that if an ambiguity exists, it is a latent ambiguity.\nIn the case of Hays v. Illinois Industrial Home for the Blind, 12 Ill2d 625, 147 NE2d 287, the Supreme Court said, \u201cIn Krog v. Hafka, 413 Ill 290, 109 NE2d 213, a latent ambiguity is defined as one when the language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a necessity for interpretation of a choice among two possible meanings.\u201d In the instant case, the testator named \u201cHome of the Good Shepherd, of the City of Peoria, Illinois\u201d as the residuary legatee. There appears no organization or association with this precise name. In the absence of an organization, corporation, or association with this precise name, we cannot state, without resort to extrinsic evidence that the words \u201cof the City of Peoria, Hlinois\u201d were descriptive, or part of the proper name of the intended beneficiary. Defendant in paragraph 10A of its Answer contends that the testator\u2019s intention was that the \u201cSisters of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd\u201d was the legatee. Obviously then, there is a latent ambiguity which must be construed by resort to extrinsic evidence.\nA similar problem was present in the case of Woman\u2019s Union Missionary Society v. Mead, 131 Ill 338, 23 NE 603. In that case there was a gift to \u201cThe Hahnemann Hospital at Chicago, Illinois.\u201d But there was no such entity. There was, however, a corporation known as \u201cBoard of Trustees of the Hahnemann Medical College\u201d which was generally known as \u201cHahnemann Hospital.\u201d\nThe court said \u201cit was unquestionably competent for these various claimants to prove their corporate existence, and the objects and purposes for which they were organized, the knowledge, if any, which testatrix had of them, and her feeling toward and relations with them, the name or names by which she or others were accustomed to designate, them, that no other corporations, associations or societies corresponding to the name or description given in the will existed at the time it was executed; her family, Church and social relations, in short, every fact and circumstance surrounding her and these claimants, which would aid the court in reaching a conclusion as to her motives and purposes in using the names or descriptions in question.\u201d\nIn the same opinion, the court further stated, \u201cAn almost infinite number of cases involving the validity of bequests where the legatee or devisee was inaccurately named or described in the will, can be found. They have generally arisen out of conflicting claims to the same bequest by two or more individuals or corporations; but we also find many cases in which, as here, there is but one claimant. These cases cannot be wholly reconciled, so as to obtain from them a general rule by which it can be determined just when such bequests are to be sustained. Each case must be determined on its own peculiar facts, \u2014 the object in every case being, if possible, consistent with the rules of evidence, to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the testator, and an examination of the authorities will clearly show that the tendency of all the decisions is in the direction of liberality in permitting the introduction of extrinsic evidence for that purpose.\u201d\nFrom the foregoing it would seem that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to introcluce evidence in opposition to the claim of the defendants. In Mason v. Willis, 326 Ill App 481, 62 NE2d 135, we said, \u201cwhen a charitable organization is designated in a will by an erroneous name, extrinsic evidence is always admissible to identify the charitable organization intended.\u201d Plaintiffs should have been given the opportunity to identify the legatee by extrinsic evidence.\nBecause of the error of the trial court in granting judgment on the pleadings, we must reverse the decree, of the Circuit Court of Peoria County and remand the cause for a hearing to determine the intention of the testator. In conformity with the permissible scope of inquiry, as herein stated, it is further ordered that the defendant answer the interrogatories submitted to it, in accordance with the applicable Rule of the Supreme Court.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "SPIVEY, J." }, { "text": "WRIGHT, P. J. and CROW, J.,\nconcur.\nAdditional Opinion on Rehearing\nOn petition for rehearing, the defendant contends that this court has misapprehended the true issue in the case. Defendant now says that the issue is \u201cwhether the gift should lapse because no such home was being operated at the time of testator\u2019s death.\u201d It is suggested that the trial court would be at a loss to understand the mandate of this court and decide the issue now said to be involved.\nBriefly, the complaint asked that the trial court find that the gift lapsed and the residuary estate was intestate property. Defendant, after voluminous affirmative allegations in its answer prayed that the court find that it was the residuary legatee and the person entitled to receive the residuary estate. The court in its order found that the defendant was the residuary legatee.\nIn its brief in this court the defendant stated that the issue before the court below was \u201cIs the defendant, The Home of the Good Shepherd, an Illinois Not for Profit Corporation, whose registered office is located in Peoria, Illinois, the same as The Home of the Good Shepherd of Peoria, Illinois?\u201d\nWe have decided that the trial court erred in failing to consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the issue the defendant formerly contended was involved in this case. This was the issue presented under the pleadings, determined in the trial court and argued in this court.\nWe are of the opinion that the trial court will understand this opinion so that on remandment the issues as made by the pleadings and as urged by the defendant originally, will be properly resolved.\nDefendant\u2019s petition for rehearing is denied.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "WRIGHT, P. J. and CROW, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Samuel Saxon, of Plainfield, for appellant, John Wayne Dufner.", "McConnell, Kennedy, McConnell & Morris, of Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The First National Bank of Peoria, Illinois, Administrator de bonis non With Will Annexed of the Estate of William V. Dufner, et al., Plaintiffs, John Wayne Dufner, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Margaret Alice Davis, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Home of the Good Shepherd, an Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.\nGen. No. 11,669.\nSecond District, Second Division.\nFebruary 19, 1963.\nAdditional Opinion April 15, 1963.\nRehearing denied April 15, 1963.\nSamuel Saxon, of Plainfield, for appellant, John Wayne Dufner.\nMcConnell, Kennedy, McConnell & Morris, of Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0031-01", "first_page_order": 41, "last_page_order": 47 }