{ "id": 5248172, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, ex rel. the Village of Melrose Park, Illinois, Appellee, v. Frank J. Scheck, Jr., Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Village of Melrose Park v. Scheck", "decision_date": "1963-07-01", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 49,068", "first_page": "117", "last_page": "122", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "42 Ill. App. 2d 117" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "116 NE2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12122141 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 NE 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill App2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5788091 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/30/0264-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 429, "char_count": 7052, "ocr_confidence": 0.578, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.269421779029986e-08, "percentile": 0.38680826565564247 }, "sha256": "7305aef4447a3d6eb3eb62cc730586c63d8e240c16a0cf4390bb9328399145a8", "simhash": "1:7a6cd46575a13acb", "word_count": 1216 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:26.410241+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "ENGLISH, PJ and BURMAN, J, concur." ], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, ex rel. the Village of Melrose Park, Illinois, Appellee, v. Frank J. Scheck, Jr., Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn a trial before a justice of the peace in the Village of Melrose Park, defendant was found guilty of disorderly conduct and reckless driving. An appeal of both charges was taken to the Criminal Court of Cook County. In the nonjury trial de novo, the charges were heard on a consolidated record. Defendant was found to be guilty of disorderly conduct and not guilty of reckless driving. He was fined $50 and costs. Defendant\u2019s motion in arrest of judgment and a motion to \u201copen up, vacate and set aside the judgment\u201d were both denied. Defendant appeals.\nThe complaint, in evidence, shows \u201cCarmen F. Vece, Melrose Park Police Dept.\u201d as the complainant, and the offense charged as that of \u201cdisorderly conduct.\u201d Specifically, the complaint alleges \u201cthat he [Frank J. Scheck] did conduct himself in a manner as to cause a breach of the peace by using loud and profane language in a public place to a police officer in the line of duty and did then and there leave scene and cause more disturbance contrary to State Statutes.\u201d\nThe complaining witness testified that on January 13, 1962, he was a Village of Melrose Park police officer. He was in uniform and on motorcycle patrol in the Winston Park Shopping Plaza in the Township of Melrose Park, Cook County. He was operating a 3-wheel motorcycle, which carried the word \u201cPolice\u201d on the windshield and \u201cWinston Park Police\u201d on the back. He was not assigned to the shopping plaza but, with the permission of his police superior, was on traffic patrol in the shopping plaza, under the employ and direction of the shopping center.\nDefendant was parked at the curb, in front of a \u201cNo Parking\u201d sign. After requesting defendant three times to move, the officer finally ordered him to leave. Defendant refused and got out of his car and told the officer that he had no right to tell him to move. The complaining witness testified that defendant swore at him, saying that he could \u201cgo to hell\u201d and that defendant \u201cwas damned if he was going to move his car.\u201d This attracted a erowd of \u201c30 or 40 people.\u201d The officer stated: \u201cI informed Mr. Scheck he was under arrest for disorderly conduct. He got back in his car and drove away. I followed him, told him to pull over and he kept driving.\u201d In attempting to stop defendant, the officer lost control of his motorcycle and later, when he had stopped defendant, defendant \u201ctook off, causing the door to hit me and knocked me back against my motorcycle.\u201d After an unsuccessful search in the area for defendant, the police officer secured a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest on a sworn complaint, charging defendant with the offense of disorderly conduct.\nDefendant testified as follows in his own behalf. He had pulled up to the curb to pick up his wife and, when ordered to move, said, \u201cPm not parking, I want to pick up my wife.\u201d He denied that there was any disturbance or that he threatened the police officer or used loud or abusive language. The police officer did not represent himself to be a Melrose Park policeman or ever tell defendant that he was under arrest. Defendant drove away because he didn\u2019t want to create any disturbance; \u201cI just don\u2019t like fights of any kind.\u201d He was aware that the officer was following him, but saw no reason to \u201cfind out what it was about.\u201d His intention in leaving was to make a complete circle and to come back to the shopping center and pick up his wife.\nDefendant has cited numerous authorities to support his contentions that (1) his motion in arrest of judgment was denied erroneously; (2) he was convicted erroneously of a crime other than that alleged in the complaint; (3) all elements of the crime were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the judgment is contrary to the law, in that: (a) the trial court erred in finding that the complainant was a police officer in the line of duty; (b) addressing appropriate words to a police officer does not constitute disorderly conduct; (c) refusal to obey an order of a police officer of itself does not constitute disorderly conduct; and (5) defendant was denied due process of law.\nWe have considered these contentions and the authorities cited. An extended discussion of them is unnecessary, because we believe the determinative question is whether the evidence in this record supports a finding of guilty of the statutory offense of disorderly conduct under the Illinois Criminal Code (Ill Rev Stats 1961, c 38, \u00a7 26-1).\nThe complaint is sufficient to charge an offense and plainly and concisely sets forth sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the offense charged against him, so that he could adequately prepare his defense, and, without securing further details or making any objections, he went to trial. We see no error here. (People v. King, 30 Ill App2d 264, 267, 174 NE 2d 213 (1961).) The language of the complaint contains the essential elements of the offense of disorderly conduct and is sufficient to charge that defendant knowingly acted in an unreasonable manner, so as to alarm or disturb another, and to provoke a breach of the peace.\nAlthough defendant denied using profanity, he argues that even had he so spoken and acted, his actions were not unreasonable at the time. We do not agree. We consider the testimony of the complaining witness sufficient to support the statutory offense of disorderly conduct under the Illinois Criminal Code (Ill Rev Stats 1961, c 38, \u00a7 26-1).\nThe testimony of one witness alone, if positive and the witness is credible, is sufficient to convict, even though the testimony is contradicted by the accused. People v. Arnold, 2 Ill2d 92, 95, 116 NE2d 882 (1954).\nDefendant repeatedly refused to remove his car from in front of a \u201cNo Parking\u201d sign when so requested and ordered to do so by a police officer in uniform, operating a motorcycle plainly marked \u201cPolice\u201d on front and back. This conduct, coupled with defendant\u2019s getting out of his car and using abusive language to the officer, which attracted a crowd of 30 or 40 people, is acting in an unreasonable manner, so as to provoke a breach of peace, and is sufficient evidence of the offense of disorderly conduct.\nAlthough defendant was tried before an able and experienced judge, he complains that he was denied a fair trial, in that his counsel was not permitted to complete the presentation of his defense. We have scrutinized the transcript of the testimony and find nothing in the record to indicate that defendant informed the court at the trial that he had other witnesses to offer, or that his examination of either witness was unduly restricted.\nFor the reasons given, we conclude that defendant had a fair trial, and the judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nENGLISH, PJ and BURMAN, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "James C. Hardman, of Chicago (Robert GL Jorgensen, of counsel), for appellant. No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, ex rel. the Village of Melrose Park, Illinois, Appellee, v. Frank J. Scheck, Jr., Appellant.\nGen. No. 49,068.\nFirst District, First Division.\nJuly 1, 1963.\nJames C. Hardman, of Chicago (Robert GL Jorgensen, of counsel), for appellant. No brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0117-01", "first_page_order": 125, "last_page_order": 130 }