{ "id": 5246135, "name": "Oscar T. Houchins, Appellant, v. Shirley Cocci, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Houchins v. Cocci", "decision_date": "1963-10-28", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 49,027", "first_page": "433", "last_page": "439", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "43 Ill. App. 2d 433" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "185 NE2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill App2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5257374 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/37/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 NE2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill App2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5205319 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/23/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 NE2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill App2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5234707 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/33/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 NE2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill App2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5208211 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/24/0239-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 577, "char_count": 10715, "ocr_confidence": 0.548, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9842472258560544e-07, "percentile": 0.7409675235892131 }, "sha256": "75e5b3cbaa2dae4d2a9864d566e8b1ecbfe92e32f857651016ae0dbfd36ca54a", "simhash": "1:cc86c5055e7c69d7", "word_count": 1852 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:38.694985+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "ENGLISH, P. J. and BURMAN, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "Oscar T. Houchins, Appellant, v. Shirley Cocci, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is a personal injury action, arising out of a collision when plaintiff\u2019s standing automobile was struck in the rear by defendant\u2019s automobile. Plaintiff appeals from a not guilty verdict and judgment for defendant, entered after an extended and hotly contested trial, primarily devoted to the issue of the cause and extent of plaintiff\u2019s laminectomy and spinal fusion.\nPlaintiff\u2019s principal contentions are that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to direct a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability; and (2) in committing numerous trial errors, which included erroneous instructions, errors in the admission and nonadmission of exhibits, prejudicial evidence and comments regarding plaintiff\u2019s prior injuries, and prejudicial conduct and remarks of the trial judge. We believe the decisive question is whether the court should have directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability.\nOn motion by plaintiff to direct a verdict against defendant, the trial court must view all of the evidence in its aspects most favorable to defendant, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. (34 ILP Trial \u00a7 132.) \u201cIt is proper for a court to direct a verdict for a plaintiff on the issue of liability at the close of all the evidence when the plaintiff has made out a case and there is no evidence contradicting or tending to contradict the plaintiff\u2019s evidence on that issue.\u201d Ryan v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 24 Ill App2d 239, 242, 164 NE2d 280 (1960).\nOn Sunday afternoon, December 6, 1959, plaintiff, Oscar T. Houchins, was driving his automobile northbound on Chicago Eoad in South Chicago Heights. He was on his way to purchase a Christmas tree at a lot on the west side of Chicago Eoad immediately north of the intersection at 30th Street. He had passed the intersection and was stopped in the left lane of the two northbound lanes, about 50 to 100 feet north of the intersection, waiting to make a left-hand turn into the Christmas tree lot (a closed Kiddyland), when his automobile was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by defendant, Shirley Cocci, who was also driving north on Chicago Road in the same lane. Both cars were damaged. Defendant testified her car was a total wreck, and it had to be towed away.\nOn January 27, 1960, surgery was performed on plaintiff to remove a spinal disc. This operation included removal of a small portion of the spinal column and the removal of a 6-inch piece of bone out of plaintiff\u2019s leg, which was grafted into the spine \u2014 a laminectomy and a spinal fusion. At the time of the occurrence, plaintiff was 27 years of age. It was admitted he had previously injured his back on June 11, 1959, and again on September 29, 1959.\nAs to the facts of the occurrence, plaintiff testified that he put on his left directional light and slowed down as he got in the vicinity of the intersection of 30th Street and Chicago Road. He saw no cars to the rear of his car and began slowing down and came to a stop 50 to 100 feet north of the intersection. He remained at a standstill for approximately 25 or 30 seconds, during which time his directional signal was on. He looked into the rear view mirror immediately before the impact and saw a car about one foot away, and then felt the impact. After the collision he spoke to the driver of the other car, the defendant, who was hysterical and kept repeating, \u201cI\u2019m sorry. I didn\u2019t see you.\u201d Plaintiff further testified that his car was in good mechanical condition; that the weather was cold and clear, and there was no moisture on the pavement.\nDefendant testified that she was traveling northbound on Chicago Road, with her four and one-half month old daughter in a bassinet on the seat beside her. At 30th and Chicago Road \u201c[I] hit the rear end of an automobile operated by Mr. Houchins.\u201d Prior to reaching 30th Street, she was driving approximately 25 miles an hour, and \u201cI slowed down a bit at the intersection.\u201d She further testified she saw no left-turn signal on plaintiff\u2019s car and no light indicating that plaintiff\u2019s car was stopping prior to the collision. On cross-examination she stated: \u201cI believe at my deposition I said that I was going at the same speed when I crossed the intersection \u2014 about 25 miles. When I first saw the plaintiff\u2019s car, it was stopped. I most emphatically did not see a left-turn signal indicator. I believe upon my deposition I said I didn\u2019t remember whether he had his turn signal on. ... It was a clear day. The pavement was dry. I could see all right. The windshields were clear. Nothing interfered with my vision. My brakes were in good condition. . . . Plaintiff\u2019s car was about 20 feet in front of me when I first saw him.\u201d\nA witness for defendant, an investigating officer of the South Chicago Heights police force, testified that when he arrived at the scene of the collision, the two cars were in the inner lane of the northbound traffic. He spoke to defendant, and she told him she did not know exactly how the collision happened \u2014 she glanced over at the baby for a second and saw the car stopped in the road where the other driver was making a left-hand turn, and she tried to stop before striking plaintiff\u2019s car.\nA witness for plaintiff testified that he lived in and operated a locksmith shop on the southeast corner of 30th Street and Chicago Road and witnessed the occurrence. He first noticed a car pull up and stop and turn on the blinker indicating a left turn, while facing north on Chicago Road. That car was about 115 or 120 feet from the witness and 5 to 15 feet south of the entrance to the tree lot. The car was facing north on Chicago Road, next to the center line, waiting for southbound traffic to pass, with its blinker on for a minute or a minute and a half. He saw another car going north, in the center lane, which did not appear to slow up and collided with the stopped car.\nIn summary, defendant basically contends that \u201cplaintiff was clearly negligent in stopping in the middle of the road without warning and without reason,\u201d and \u201cdefendant was not negligent since she did not expect someone to stop in the middle of the road where there was no reason. She took her eyes off the road only momentarily to look at her baby. Plaintiff stopped abruptly in her lane of travel. She was unable to stop completely before bumping him.\u201d\nOn the issue of liability, in considering \u201call of the evidence in its aspect most favorable to the defendant,\u201d we fail to find \u201cany evidence standing alone and considered to be true, together with the inferences that may legitimately be drawn therefrom which fairly tends to support the defendant\u2019s defense,\u201d that plaintiff stopped \u201csuddenly in the middle of the road without warning and without reason.\u201d (Johnson v. Skau, 33 Ill App2d 280, 179 NE2d 40 (1962).) Defendant\u2019s evidence, standing alone, shows only that she was driving 25 miles an hour, on a clear day, on a dry pavement, with nothing interfering with her vision, and saw plaintiff\u2019s stopped car \u2014 20 feet in front of her. She did not see any left-turn or stop lights on plaintiff\u2019s car. This evidence contains nothing from which it can be inferred that plaintiff was negligent or stopped abruptly, or that defendant was justified in having failed to see plaintiff\u2019s car until she was within 20 feet of it. Defendant had a duty to see other cars traveling ahead of her in her traffic lane and to be sufficiently alert to have had her car under proper control so that she could have stopped it without running into other traffic lawfully on the highway and lawfully stopped waiting to make a left turn. Kocour v. Mills, 23 Ill App2d 305, 162 NE2d 497 (1959).\nThere is no evidence in the record to contradict or tend to contradict plaintiff\u2019s evidence that he was stopped for a period of time, in his proper lane, waiting to make a left turn, with nothing to obstruct the view of any car coming from plaintiff\u2019s rear in the same lane. We hold there was a total failure by defendant to prove due care on her part.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict for plaintiff on the issue of liability, because the plaintiff failed to prove any damages whatever. Defendant argues that a necessary element of plaintiff\u2019s case was proof of actual loss or damages. We have examined Jeffrey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 37 Ill App2d 327, 185 NE2d 384 (1962), cited as authority for this contention. That case arose from a rear end automobile collision. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs but awarded them no damages. In its opinion, this court said (p 336):\n\u201cWe believe the rule that there must be at least nominal damages in negligence cases is unrealistic. The damage awarded should be for the harm suffered not for the unintentional tort committed. We hold if a defendant\u2019s liability is established, a plaintiff must prove actual damage before he can recover,\u201d\nIn the instant case, plaintiff offered no evidence of the amount of the damage to his car, and defendant argues that the evidence shows that plaintiff\u2019s injuries were caused by prior happenings. Here, it is not known what issue, liability or damages, the jury considered decisive. Also, the instant case differs from the Jeffrey case in that the question is not whether plaintiff suffered any injuries, but whether plaintiff\u2019s injuries were caused by tbe instant occurrence or prior happenings \u2014 an issue for the jury. Therefore, we hold that the court should have allowed plaintiff\u2019s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability and submitted to the jury only the issue of damages.\nThe record indicates that the question of the cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries is a very close question, which required a trial free from prejudicial trial errors. Collectively, the alleged trial errors might have been prejudicial to plaintiff. However, in view of our conclusion, no such determination is required in this appeal, because we believe that in a new trial these alleged trial errors should not recur.\nOn remandment, the only question which need be submitted to the jury is that of damages. There are no issues upon the elements of plaintiff\u2019s due care and defendant\u2019s negligence. The jury should be directed accordingly and instructed only as to damages.\nReversed and remanded.\nENGLISH, P. J. and BURMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Samuel E. Bublick and Robert A. Sprecber, both of Chicago (Nat P. Ozmon, of counsel), for appellant.", "Hubbard, Hubbard, O\u2019Brien & Hall, all of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Oscar T. Houchins, Appellant, v. Shirley Cocci, Appellee.\nGen. No. 49,027.\nFirst District, First Division.\nOctober 28, 1963.\nRehearing denied November 15, 1963.\nSamuel E. Bublick and Robert A. Sprecber, both of Chicago (Nat P. Ozmon, of counsel), for appellant.\nHubbard, Hubbard, O\u2019Brien & Hall, all of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0433-01", "first_page_order": 443, "last_page_order": 449 }