{
  "id": 5243373,
  "name": "Summit Township Road District, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., a Corporation, McLean Trucking Company, a Corporation, and Don E. Anderson, Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Summit Township Road District v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.",
  "decision_date": "1963-11-08",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 63-O-27",
  "first_page": "274",
  "last_page": "280",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "44 Ill. App. 2d 274"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "35 So2d 828",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "So. 2d",
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        10090572
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      "cite": "210 La 375",
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      "reporter": "La.",
      "case_ids": [
        10035980,
        5384095
      ],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:55:19.466287+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "CULBERTSON, P. J. and SCHEINEMAN, J., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Summit Township Road District, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., a Corporation, McLean Trucking Company, a Corporation, and Don E. Anderson, Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "HOFFMAN, JUSTICE.\nThis action was brought to recover damages to a bridge owned by plaintiff. The bridge was destroyed when defendant\u2019s truck, by reason of its weight, caused the bridge to collapse.\nOn the evening of December 11, 1961 the defendant Anderson was driving defendant Hayes Freight Lines\u2019 truck and trailer with a load of steel bars proximating 24 tons on a run from Cleveland to St. Louis. The night was dark and foggy. It was raining. After a rest stop, defendant Anderson, while attempting to get on a new interstate road, mistakingly turned down a township road rather than the interstate\u2019s approach. Anderson soon realized he was not on the road he intended and stopped to inquire from a farm resident as to his whereabouts. Though he was advised to turn around, he proceeded along this township road until he arrived at the bridge in question. Seeing the bridge, he stopped, looked at the bridge from the cab of his truck, and decided to proceed across. As his tractor and trailer came upon the main span of the bridge, it gave way.\nThis bridge, under the provisions of the Hlinois Highway Code (Ill Rev Stats 1961, c 121, \u00a7 2-202) was a part of what was called the \u201cOld Shumway Road.\u201d Pursuant to Section 134(c) of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Ill Rev Stats 1961, c 95%, \u00a7 231) this road had been limited to a weight of 3 tons by a proper resolution of the local authority. Pursuant to this resolution the local authority procured a sign which stated \u201cLoad Limit 3 Tons,\u201d and erected it at the entrance to the Old Shumway Road approximately 1,000 feet from the bridge. No other sign, along the road nor on or near the bridge, advised the traveling public of the weight limitation. The Old Shumway Road commenced at a country intersection and ran westerly therefrom. The sign was erected immediately west of this intersection, actually about 50 feet west of the west line of the intersecting road, and anyone using this road, including the defendant, could not get to the bridge without passing this sign.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s principal basis for seeking recovery in this action rests upon the claim that the defendant by virtue of his violation of the weight restriction upon this highway became liable for the damages which ensued.\nThe defendant\u2019s answer is that the plaintiff failed to properly post the bridge and the road with adequate signs to warn the traveling public of the weight limitation imposed.\nThe very able trial judge in an exhaustive opinion determined that the defendant was in fact at fault and \u201cassumed the risk incident to the use he made of the bridge,\u201d but held in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The trial judge stated, \u201cIt was the duty of plaintiff to properly warn the traveling public of the limitations of this highway. It failed to do so by failing to post this highway and bridge as provided by law and . . .. its failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent damage to its own property, precludes it from recovering in this action.\u201d\nThis appeal arises from the judgment entered for defendant.\nInvolved in the decision of this ease are the following sections of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways:\nSection 134(c): \u201cLocal authorities with respect to highways under their jurisdiction may also, by ordinance or resolution, prohibit the operation of trucks or other commercial vehicles, or may impose limitations as to the weight thereof, on designated highways, which prohibitions and limitations shall be designated by appropriate signs placed on such highways.\u201d\nSection 135(a): \u201cAny person driving any vehicle, object, or contrivance upon any highway or highway structure is liable for all damage which the highway or structure may sustain as a result of any illegal operation, driving or moving of such vehicle, . . .\u201d\nSection 26(b): \u201cNo ordinance or regulation . . . shall be effective until signs giving notice of such local traffic regulations are posted upon or at the entrances to the highway or part thereof affected as may be most appropriate.\u201d\nSection 28: \u201cThe Department shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions of this Act for use upon highways within this State.\u201d\nSection 30: \u201cLocal authorities in their respective maintenance jurisdiction shall place and maintain such traffic-control devices upon highways under their maintenance jurisdiction as may be required to indicate and carry out the provisions of this Act, and local traffic ordinances or to regulate, warn or guide traffic. All such traffic-control devices hereafter erected shall conform to the State Manual and Specifications. . . .\u201d\nUnder Section 135, plaintiff filed this action. Under this section it is clear to us that absolute statutory liability may be imposed against any person who damages a highway structure as the result of an illegal operation upon said highway. The only question in this case, therefore, is whether or not defendant was operating illegally upon the Old Shumway Road at the time of this accident.\nUnder Section 134(c) local authorities, to impose a valid weight limitation upon vehicles using a highway need only do two things: (1) impose the weight limitation by ordinance or resolution, and (2) designate said limitation \u201cby appropriate signs placed on such highways.\u201d\nCounsel have agreed that the necessary resolution was appropriately enacted in the instant case. The only question, therefore, is whether or not such enactment was properly \u201cdesignated by appropriate signs.\u201d\nThere is no case law in Illinois bearing upon the interpretation necessary to this statute. However, the able trial judge searched out other jurisdictions and found two Louisiana eases wherein the doctrine was announced that the highway authority must take reasonable precautions to warn the traveling public of a dangerous situation. (Department of Highways v. Fogelman, 210 La 375, 27 So2d 155; Department of Highways v. Jones, 35 So2d 828.) The trial judge found that the one sign involved in the instant case did not conform to the Manual of Uniform Traffic-Control Devices adopted by the Department of Public Works and Buildings; that it was not placed where it might accomplish the purpose for which it was intended; that plaintiff failed to post this highway and bridge as provided by law; and concluded, that the plaintiff failed in its duty \u201cto properly warn the traveling public of the limitations of this highway.\u201d\nWe do not believe the above Louisiana cases to be persuasive in this instance, for they do not involve statutes which have any similarity to those in force in this state.\nRegarding the notice which Section 134(c) requires, we need only look to the other statutes cited. Section 26 provides that the notice shall he posted \u201cat the entrance to the highway.\u201d The Manual, which was adopted by the Department in accordance with Section 28 and which is binding under Section 30, provides that the signs \u201care to be erected at each end of a limited bridge or section of highway,\u201d and that \u201calong the highway section they shall also be erected at not less than one mile intervals.\u201d There is no question but what, in this case, plaintiff properly posted the sign at the place. There is no requirement that it be \u201cplaced where it might accomplish the purpose for which it was intended,\u201d nor is there any requirement that the bridge itself be posted when the entire highway (of which the bridge is a part) is posted. There is no justification for going beyond the statutory rule and invoking a rule of \u201creasonable notice.\u201d The local authority, to recover, need only comply with the statute.\nBut there is one more aspect. The sign did not conform to the size specified in the Manual. The Manual directs the sign to be 15 x 30,\" whereas its dimensions were 12 x 18.\" Does this alone require a denial of plaintiff\u2019s claim? We believe that the mere size of this sign should not work a defeat of plaintiff\u2019s claim unless its size proximately contributed to the occurrence.\nAn examination of a photo in evidence showing the sign as it stood along the roadway on the evening in question indicates to us that it would have been seen by anyone who was using reasonable care. Although the night was dark and stormy, defendant Anderson knew he had mistakingly taken the wrong road. And, of course, lie was well aware of his tremendous load. In such a situation Anderson and anyone else traveling under such circumstances should be doubly vigilant to any warnings of danger. In such a situation such persons could not overlook this sign, if they would only take the care which would be expected of them. The trier of fact did not find that the mere size of this sign contributed proximately to the occurrence, and we agree.\nIn our view of this case, the plaintiff local authority did all that was required to impose liability for damages to its bridge through overweight. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand this cause for assessment of the damages sustained.\nReversed and remanded.\nCULBERTSON, P. J. and SCHEINEMAN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "HOFFMAN, JUSTICE."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Frank H. Schniederjon, of Effingham, for appellant.",
      "Willis P. Ryan, Harlan Heller and Ryan & Heller, all of Mattoon, for appellees. \u2022"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Summit Township Road District, a Public Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., a Corporation, McLean Trucking Company, a Corporation, and Don E. Anderson, Defendants-Appellees.\nGen. No. 63-O-27.\nFourth District.\nNovember 8, 1963.\nRehearing denied December 30, 1963.\nFrank H. Schniederjon, of Effingham, for appellant.\nWillis P. Ryan, Harlan Heller and Ryan & Heller, all of Mattoon, for appellees. \u2022"
  },
  "file_name": "0274-01",
  "first_page_order": 298,
  "last_page_order": 304
}