{ "id": 5240573, "name": "Roman J. Binder, President and Local Liquor Control Commissioner of the Village of Hillside, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission of the State of Illinois, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Binder v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission", "decision_date": "1963-12-31", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 48,874", "first_page": "354", "last_page": "361", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "45 Ill. App. 2d 354" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "145 NE2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2780450 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 NE2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 Ill 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2665959 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 NE 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5115455 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/311/0445-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 555, "char_count": 11157, "ocr_confidence": 0.568, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4975956836136062e-07, "percentile": 0.6646528426946899 }, "sha256": "51da51034bbbdc79ac0b858b9d01d832d569aa791885ef9476e84909c1239d28", "simhash": "1:5dd99d8e9628de3c", "word_count": 1835 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:25.622271+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MURPHY and BURMAN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "Roman J. Binder, President and Local Liquor Control Commissioner of the Village of Hillside, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission of the State of Illinois, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE ENGLISH\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis appeal is taken by the President of the Village of Hillside from an order of the Circuit Court affirming a decision of the Illinois Liquor Control Commission. Plaintiff, as Local Liquor Control Commissioner, had revoked the retail liquor license of Carmela Marino d/b/a Fitz\u2019s Hideout, but on review the Commission\u2019s order provided instead for a ten-day suspension of the license.\nOn April 11, 1961, the bartender of Fitz\u2019s Hideout was arrested for selling liquor to a minor. He was convicted of that offense on April 29, and no appeal was taken. On that same day, an order of revocation was issued by plaintiff, and served upon the licensee, for the unlawful sale of liquor to a minor in violation of Ill Rev Stats 1959, c 43, \u00a7 131, and pursuant to Ill Rev Stats 1959, c 43, \u00a7 187, by reason of the conviction of the bartender.\nThe license period expired by its terms on April 30, 1961. On May 5, the Board of Trustees of the Village passed an ordinance reducing the number of retail liquor licenses from 16 to 15. (Section 110.)\nOn May 18, the licensee filed an appeal to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission to review by a trial de novo the action of the plaintiff in revoking her license.\nOn May 19, the son of the licensee attempted to present a cheek for $250 for a retail liquor license on behalf of his mother. He was refused an application, apparently on the ground that no license was available at that time due to the reduction in number of licenses by the ordinance of May 5.\nThe Illinois Liquor Control Commission heard the appeal on July 6, and on July 18 entered an order finding:\nThat the evidence adduced at the hearings before the Commission showed the sale of alcoholic liquor to a minor of the age of 19 years but this evidence was not sufficient of itself, this being a solitary instance of a sale to a minor, to warrant a severe penalty of revocation of the appellant\u2019s local retail liquor license.\nThe Commission, thereupon, modified the order of revocation to provide for a suspension of the license for ten days.\nAfter denial of his petition for rehearing, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for administrative review. On February 8, that Court affirmed the order of the Commission, and this appeal followed.\nPlaintiff advances four contentions: (1) that when the employee on licensee\u2019s premises was convicted of selling liquor to a minor, it became mandatory under Section 187 for the Local Liquor Control Commissioner to revoke the license; (2) that the Illinois Liquor Control Commission had no authority to alter or modify the order of revocation, but could only pass upon the propriety of the act of the Local Liquor Control Commissioner, under section 153; (3) that no administrative review had been obtained because the Circuit Court failed to consider the record before the administrative agency; and (4) that the appeal of the licensee to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission had become moot, there having been no license then available for issuance under the ordinance of May 5 which reduced the number of retail liquor licenses in the village.\nTo support his first contention that revocation was mandatory, plaintiff cites Section 187 which reads as follows:\nRevocation of license when employee convicted\u2014 Forfeiture \u00f3f bond and license fees.\nWhenever any officer, director, manager or other employe (sic) in a position of authority of any licensee under this Act shall be convicted of any violation of this Act while engaged in the course of his employment or while upon the premises described by said license, said license shall be revoked and the fees paid thereon forfeited both as to the holder of said license and as to said premises, and said bond given by said licensee to secure the faithful compliance with the terms of this Act shall be forfeited in like manner as if said licensee had himself been convicted.\nPlaintiff reads this statute as though the sentence should be stopped after the words, \u201cshall be revoked,\u201d thus disregarding the last phrase, \u201cin like manner as if said licensee had himself been convicted.\u201d We read the section as a whole to mean that when an employee in a position of authority is convicted of a violation of the Liquor Control Act for an act done while engaged in the course of his employment, the local commissioner is empowered to revoke the license, as though the licensee himself had been convicted. The immediately preceding section of the statute (section 186) clearly states that upon conviction of the licensee, revocation is discretionary:\nRevocation of license after conviction\u2014Forfeiture of bond and license fees\u2014Effect of revocation.\nWhenever any licensee shall be convicted of any violation of this Act, the licenses of said licensee may, in the discretion of the State commission or of the local commissioner, (whichever has jurisdiction) be revoked and forfeited and all fees paid thereon shall be forfeited, and the bond given by said licensee to secure such licensee\u2019s faithful compliance with the terms of this Act shall be forfeited, and it shall thereafter be unlawful and shall constitute a further violation of this Act for said licensee to continue to operate under said license.\nThus, reading these two sections together, plaintiff\u2019s theory cannot stand. Plaintiff has demonstrated no reason why the penalty\u2014i. e., mandatory, rather than discretionary revocation\u2014should he more severe when an employee is convicted than when the licensee himself violates the Act. We believe that what section 187 does is put responsibility for the offenses of an employee on the shoulders of the licensee. It also relates back to section 186 so that the last clause thereof prohibiting further operation under a revoked license will be applicable to the circumstances of Section 187.\nOur reading is consonant with section 185, which provides that a licensee is punishable for his employee\u2019s violation of the Act, \u201cin the same manner as if said act or omission had been done or omitted by him personally.\u201d It is also consistent with section 149 which establishes the basic general and revocation authority of the local commissioner, and provides for notice, hearing and appeal. That section provides that the \u201clocal liquor control commissioner may revolee or suspend any license issued by him,\u201d etc. (Emphasis supplied.)\nThus, the local commissioner was not compelled to revoke the license but was only empowered to do so in the exercise of his discretion.\nThe second contention\u2014that the State commission cannot modify an order of the local commissioner \u2014is no longer supported by statute. The 1955 Liquor Control Act, section 153, had provided for an appeal from a local commissioner\u2019s order to the State commission, \u201cin which event the matter of the propriety of such order or action of such local liquor control commissioner shall be tried de novo as expeditiously as the circumstances permit.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) This provision was interpreted to limit the power of the State commission to a \u201cdetermination of the propriety of the order\u201d rather than a complete trial do novo. (Attorney General\u2019s Reports and Opinions, 1956, p 44.)\nThereafter, in 1957, a statutory amendment expressly deleted the words \u201cof the propriety\u201d but retained this limitation in the case of municipalities of over 200,000 inhabitants. From this revision it appears that in a municipality the size of Hillside, containing fewer than 200,000 inhabitants, it is the legislature\u2019s express intent that the State commission, on appeal, shall conduct a full trial de novo, with a view to deciding (in part pertinent to this case) whether the license in question has been properly revoked or suspended, and shall then \u201center an order in conformity with such findings.\u201d (Section 153.) We believe that the legislature thus contemplated that the scope of such an order might include, as it did in the case at bar, modification of the decision of the local liquor control commissioner. We believe further that in ascertaining this intent we should consider the entire act (Blattner v. Dietz, 311 Ill 445, 449, 143 NE 92) and in so doing we find confirmation of this conclusion in section 149 which refers to a decision of the State commission as \u201csustaining, reversing or modifying\u201d the order of the local commissioner.\nPlaintiff next contends that the Circuit Court failed to consider the record before the administrative agency and thus afforded no administrative review, as provided in section 154a. The case cited for this proposition, Hornstein v. Liquor Control Commission, 412 Ill 365, 106 NE2d 354, is distinguishable in that the Circuit Court there had specifically refused to consider the evidence to sustain the State commission, on the court\u2019s theory that the original revocation was invalid since no formal hearing had been conducted by the local commissioner. The Supreme Court held that such a hearing was unnecessary and sent the cause back for a trial, saying that there had been no administrative review where the court had given no consideration to the evidence tending to show certain gambling operations in connection with a tavern.\nPlaintiff\u2019s claim of no review in the case at bar is not supported by the record which discloses nothing to warrant a conclusion that the facts had not been presented to the court. \"We shall assume that the court considered them.\nPlaintiff\u2019s final point is that the appeal should be dismissed as being moot. Defendants concede that the Village has the power to reduce the number of licenses (section 110; Schreiber v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission, 12 Ill2d 118, 145 NE2d 50) so that the particular license could not be reinstated by this court. Defendant licensee, nevertheless, has an important interest in this appeal because she could never obtain another liquor license in the State of Illinois if the license in question here were to stand revoked. (Section 120(7).) We, therefore, consider that this appeal is not moot.\nWe hold that revocation by the local commissioner was not mandatory; that the State commission had power to modify the order of the local commissioner; and that its decision had been given proper administrative review by the court. The judgment of the Circuit Court, sustaining the decision of the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMURPHY and BURMAN, JJ., concur.\nSection citations throughout the opinion are to Ill Rev Stats, c 43.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE ENGLISH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patrick A. Barton and John J. Dillon, of Chicago, for appellant.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Chicago (William C. Wines, Edward A. Berman and A. Zola Groves, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for defendant-appellee, Illinois Liquor Control Commission. Halfpenny, Hahn & Ryan, of Chicago (James F. Flanagan and Mary M. Shaw, of counsel), for defendant, Marino." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Roman J. Binder, President and Local Liquor Control Commissioner of the Village of Hillside, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission of the State of Illinois, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nGen. No. 48,874.\nFirst District, First Division.\nDecember 31,1963.\nPatrick A. Barton and John J. Dillon, of Chicago, for appellant.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General, of Chicago (William C. Wines, Edward A. Berman and A. Zola Groves, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for defendant-appellee, Illinois Liquor Control Commission. Halfpenny, Hahn & Ryan, of Chicago (James F. Flanagan and Mary M. Shaw, of counsel), for defendant, Marino." }, "file_name": "0354-01", "first_page_order": 364, "last_page_order": 371 }