{ "id": 5271484, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. Louis Panozzo, Defendant in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Panozzo", "decision_date": "1964-04-27", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 49,489", "first_page": "385", "last_page": "391", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "48 Ill. App. 2d 385" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "170 NE2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 NE2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2778681 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 US 452", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1175385 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/285/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 L Ed2d 1982", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 US 217", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163406 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 US 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 362582 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/339/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ill2d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5315299 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 Ill 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2684599 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2738563 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 NE2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill2d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2730270 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 US 344", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6932148 ], "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/282/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 NE2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2737324 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 NE2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5361096 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 US 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157337 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/331/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 F 818", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 6741095 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/270/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 US 581", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 365313 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/332/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 NE 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5295803 ], "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/352/0248-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 606, "char_count": 10449, "ocr_confidence": 0.56, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.3770007440588235 }, "sha256": "45904fbe58fa5e38f6001f83721aeaae4126725321e45a3ade623a3e3a24a761", "simhash": "1:e7ee1c10eaabb3ad", "word_count": 1740 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:28:25.209130+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BURMAN, J., concurs.", "KLUCZYNSKI, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. Louis Panozzo, Defendant in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an appeal by the People from an order sustaining defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The question presented is the reasonableness of a search and seizure made in defendant\u2019s home, incident to a valid arrest, hut without a search warrant.\nThe controlling facts are not disputed. Defendant and two associates were indicted for the robbery of Richard Tebodo on February 15, 1963. The second count charged the defendants with theft, in that they knowingly obtained unauthorized control of stolen property, to-wit: $50 in United States currency, 25 watches and 60 rings, all the property of Richard Tebodo.\nPrior to trial, a written motion to suppress was filed by the instant defendant. The only witness heard was a police officer, who testified that oh February 27,1963, at 2:30 p. m., an arrest warrant was served upon defendant. The arrest' warrant, issued two or three days earlier, charged that defendant unlawfully received three vacuum cleaners and a typewriter or appliances stolen on December 24, 1962, more than two months before the arrest. Defendant was arrested in the kitchen of his five-room one-story residence. The police officers then searched the kitch-, en, found nothing, and after walking through two rooms, the dining room and living room, searched a front hall closet, where they found diamond rings taken in a recent robbery, the subject of the instant motion to suppress.\nDefendant contends that \u201calthough the defendant was lawfully arrested, the search of his home that followed far exceeded the limitations on the right of search prescribed by the constitutions of the. United States of America and the State of Illinois. The right of the police to make a search incident to a lawful arrest does exist, but in this case the search- wbnt beyond the requirements of reasonableness and the reasons for the existence of the right.\u201d Defendant makes no claim that the property found in his home cannot be admitted because it was not the property sought. \u201cThat is not our point. The police had no right to delve into [defendant\u2019s] closet. An unlawful search cannot be justified by what is found. A search that is lawful [sic] when it begins is not made lawful by the discovery. People v. Scaramuzzo, 352 Ill 248, 185 NE 578 (1934); United States v. DiRe, 332 US 581 (1948). After all, \u2018It was against such prying, on the chance of discovery, that the constitutional amendment was intended to protect the people.\u2019 United States v. Slusser, 270 F 818, 819 (1921).\u201d\nThe People primarily rely on Harris v. United States, 331 US 145, 154 (1947); People v. Harvey, 27 Ill2d 282, 285, 189 NE2d 320 (1963); People v. High-tower, 20 Ill2d 361, 368, 169 NE2d 787 (1960).\nThe question here presented, \u201cthe reasonableness of a search without a search warrant, incident to a valid arrest,\u201d has been so thoroughly discussed in the foregoing authorities and others, we do not believe it necessary to dwell upon the two competing philosophies, each of the highest and most obvious importance \u2014 \u201cthose involving the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ,\u201d and \u201con the other hand, the interest of the community in effective enforcement of the criminal law . . . .\u201d Allen, the Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 Ill Law Review 1, 3 (1950).\nIn the light of the competing values, the cases have not necessarily been consistent, and each case must be decided upon its own facts and circumstances. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 US 344, 357 (1931); and as stated in People v. Harvey, 27 Ill2d 282, at page 285, 189 NE2d 320:\n\u201cThe critical issue in each case must be whether the situation that confronted the officer justified the search. That question can not be determined by an indiscriminate application of legal concepts that were evolved to meet quite different problems.\u201d\nThe instant record indicates the trial court relied on People v. Alexander, 21 Ill2d 347, 172 NE2d 785 (1961), in which defendant was arrested by narcotics agents without a search warrant, and the two agents proceeded to completely search the defendant\u2019s apartment. Every portion of every room was searched. Linoleum and boards in the floor were ripped up, and narcotics were found. The search was held to be unreasonable because it \u201cwas far more extensive than the limited search which is permissible as an incident to a lawful arrest.\u201d However, in People v. Harvey, for reasons significant in the present case also, the Alexander case was distinguished (p 286):\n\u201cIn the Alexander case the arrest was made for an offense committed two months previously, and the search was not for the fruits of the crime, but for incriminating evidence. In the present case the arrest and search were made on the premises where the crime had been committed and which were under the immediate control of the person arrested, minutes after the crime had been committed, and for the sole purpose of discovering the fruits of the crime.\u201d\nAnd, again on page 287:\n\u201cDecisions, both in this court and in the Supreme Court of the United States, have firmly established the proposition that a search of the premises where the arrest is made and which is under the control of the accused, immediately subsequent to and incidental to a lawful arrest, in order to find and seize the fruits' of the crime, is not a violation of constitutional rights. People v. Van Scoyk, 20 Ill2d 232; People v. McGowan, 415 Ill 375; People v. Tillman, 1 Ill2d 525; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56; Abel v. United States, 362 US 217; Anno 4 L Ed2d 1982.\u201d\nWe believe all of the foregoing remarks are substantially in point here. Although the arrest of the defendant was based on an offense committed two months previously, the search was incident to a lawful arrest \u201cand for the sole purpose of discovering the fruits of the crime,\u201d and not \u201cfor incriminating evidence,\u201d which characterizes People v. Alexander and similar cases, where the arrest was termed \u201ca pretext to search for evidence.\u201d (United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 US 452, 467 (1932).) The warrant of arrest, issued two days prior to defendant\u2019s arrest, identified \u201cthe fruits of the crime\u201d to be household appliances of such a nature as would be found in a household closet. The record indicates it was a visual search, made in a five-room apartment in the exclusive possession of defendant. We think it is irrelevant that the search was made in the front closet after the arrest had been made in the kitchen. In Harris v. United States, 331 US at page 152, the court said:\n\u201cNor can support be found for the suggestion that the search could not validly extend beyond the room in which petitioner was arrested. Petitioner was in exclusive possession of a four-room apartment. . . . But the area which reasonably may be subjected to search is not to be determined by the fortuitous circumstances that the arrest took place in the living room as contrasted to some other room of the apartment.\u201d\nFinally, defendant contends that \u201cno urgency of time existed in the case at bar. The officers held the arrest warrant for two or three days. . . . there was no showing of any kind that the police officers could reasonably believe the appliances were or ever had been on [defendant\u2019s] premises. If there were such a belief, and if it were based on evidence, there was more than sufficient time to present it to a judicial officer.\u201d Cited are cases in which the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the right of incidental search (People v. Boozer, 12 Ill2d 184, 145 NE2d 619 (1957); People v. Van Scoyk, 20 Ill2d 232, 170 NE2d 151 (1960); People v. Hightower, 20 Ill2d 361, 169 NE2d 787 (1960)) only where \u201cthe search coincided closely in time with the commission of the crime,\u201d and to show when urgency presents itself and a lawful arrest is made, \u201cif the situation demands, he may search for the fruits of the crime just committed. But, absent this urgency, he may not search one\u2019s home without a search warrant issued by an impartial judicial officer after hearing evidence.\u201d\nWe believe this contention is answered in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56 (1950), where the court discussed at length the reasonableness of a search without a search warrant, incident to a valid arrest. The court there said (pp 65-66):\n\u201cA rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that this requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search. It is fallacious to judge events retrospectively and thus to determine, considering the time element alone, that there was time to procure a search warrant. . . , Some flexibility will be accorded law officers engaged in daily battle with criminals for whose restraint criminal laws are essential. . . . The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances \u2014 the total atmosphere of the case. It is a sufficient precaution that law officers must justify their conduct before courts which have always been, and must be, jealous of the individual\u2019s right of privacy within the broad sweep of the Fourth Amendment.\u201d\nApplying what we conclude to be the relevant test\u2014 \u201cwhether the search was reasonable\u201d \u2014 to the \u201cfacts and circumstances \u2014 the total atmosphere of the case,\u201d it is our opinion that the instant search was reasonable.\nWe conclude the trial court was in error in sustaining defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The order of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed herein.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nBURMAN, J., concurs.\nKLUCZYNSKI, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "\u25a0William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield (Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, Elmer C. Kissane and Matthew J. Moran, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.", "Warren D. Wolf son and Dean S. Wolf son, of Chicago, for defendant in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. Louis Panozzo, Defendant in Error.\nGen. No. 49,489.\nFirst District, First Division.\nApril 27, 1964.\nRehearing denied May 27, 1964.\n\u25a0William G. Clark, Attorney General, of Springfield (Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorneys General, Elmer C. Kissane and Matthew J. Moran, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.\nWarren D. Wolf son and Dean S. Wolf son, of Chicago, for defendant in error." }, "file_name": "0385-01", "first_page_order": 397, "last_page_order": 403 }