{
  "id": 5280058,
  "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Emmit Suddoth, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Suddoth",
  "decision_date": "1964-10-19",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 49,532",
  "first_page": "355",
  "last_page": "359",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "52 Ill. App. 2d 355"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:06.292848+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "BURMAN and KLUCZYNSKI, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Emmit Suddoth, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ME. PEESIDING JUSTICE MUEPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the conrt.\nDefendant, Emmit Snddoth, in a bench trial, was found guilty of driving an automobile while his operator\u2019s license was revoked, in violation of section 6-303 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law (Ill Rev Stats 1961, c 95%). He was sentenced to the House of Correction for 7 days. He prosecutes this appeal, contending he was not guilty of the offense charged, because at the time of his arrest he was eligible to apply for an operator\u2019s license.\nThe record includes an agreed statement of facts. It stands admitted that defendant did not have a valid operator\u2019s or chauffeur\u2019s license when arrested in Chicago on April 19, 1963. In 1958, defendant was convicted of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and, as directed by statute, the Secretary of State on August 8, 1958, revoked defendant\u2019s license to operate a motor vehicle. Approximately one year from the date of revocation, defendant was informed by the office of the Secretary of State that he was eligible to apply for a new license by following certain procedures outlined in that communication. There is nothing in the record to show that defendant applied for a new license.\nThe pertinent part of section 6-303, under which defendant was charged and convicted, is:\n\u201c(a) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when his operator\u2019s or chauffeur\u2019s license or permit or privilege so to do or his privilege to obtain a license or permit under this Act is revoked or suspended as provided by this Act or any other Act, except as may be allowed by a restricted driving permit issued under this Act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 7 days nor more than 1 year and there may be imposed in addition thereto a fine of not more than $1,000.\u201d\nDefendant contends that since he had the right, pursuant to section 6-208, to make application for a license \u201cafter the expiration of 1 year from the date of revocation\u201d at any time \u201con or after August 8, 1959, he was not in violation of the statute with which he was charged on April 19,1963, because his privilege to obtain a license or permit was not revoked at that time. Defendant was not in violation of the statute with which he was charged.\u201d\nThe People contend that since the defendant was charged and convicted of the crime of driving while his operator\u2019s license was revoked and was not charged or convicted of the separate offense of driving while the privilege to obtain a license was revoked, it is immaterial, under the terms of section 6-303, whether at the time of his arrest defendant had the privilege of obtaining a license on a proper application. The People argue that under section 6-208 (b), once a driver\u2019s license has been revoked, he is not entitled, as a matter of right, to have it renewed. The People also argue that the Secretary of State is not required to restore the license because of the expiration of one year. To the contrary it must first be determined, by investigation, whether the granting of a new license will endanger the public safety or welfare.\nIn order to ascertain the intent of the legislature, sections 1-157, 6-208 (b) and 6-210 must be read together with section 6-303. Section 1-157, which defines \u201cRevocation of operator\u2019s or chauffeur\u2019s license,\u201d states that the termination \u201cof a person\u2019s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, . . . shall not be subject to renewal or restoration except that an application for a new license may be presented and acted upon by the Secretary after the expiration of at least one year after the date of revocation.\u201d Section 6-208 (b) states in part that \u201cany person whose license or permit or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the highways has been revoked shall not be entitled to have snch license or permit or privilege renewed or restored. However, such person may make application for a license . . . (2) . . . after the expiration of 1 year from the date of revocation.\u201d Section 6-210 reads, in part, that any resident \u201cwhose operator\u2019s or chauffeur\u2019s license or permit or privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State has been suspended or revoked as provided in this Act shall not operate a motor vehicle in this State ... (2) After such revocation until a license is obtained when and as permitted under this Act . . . .\u201d\nThe foregoing provisions, when read together with section 6-303, mean that before a person who has had his license revoked can be allowed to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, he must obtain a new license. Defendant\u2019s revoked license was terminated from the date of its revocation. His right to apply for a new license, of itself, does not restore any driving privileges. There is no automatic restoration of driving privileges after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in section 6-208. A person who has had his driver\u2019s license revoked must reapply, qualify for, and have issued to him, a new operator\u2019s license before he is properly licensed to drive.\n\"We believe, also, that section 6-303 must be read in the disjunctive. It applies to any person who drives a motor vehicle \u201cat a time when his operator\u2019s or chauffeur\u2019s license or permit or privilege so to do or his privilege to obtain a license or permit under this Act is revoked or suspended . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Section 6-303 is intended to cover a driver whose driving status may have been within any one of the disjunctive categories set forth, and a charge based on any one of these categories is sufficient to bring the offense within the terms of section 6-303. We hold the agreed facts are sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction of the offense of which defendant stood charged.\nIn view of our holding that section 6-303 applies to the instant factual situation, we find no merit in defendant\u2019s further contention that a 1963 amendment to the penalty provision of section 6-401 (c), increasing the penalty for \u201cunlicensed driving\u201d by a person who drives \u201cafter the expiration of a period of suspension or revocation,\u201d is significant, in that it indicates that the legislature believed that section 6\u2014 303 did not apply to the instant situation. Defendant, in arguing that section 6-401 (c) applies because the period of revocation here has expired, fails to properly distinguish the concepts of suspension and revocation. Suspension allows the temporarily inoperative privilege to drive to he reinstated. Revocation is the formal termination of a person\u2019s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle and requires the procurement of a new license or permit or privilege before one can lawfully operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this State. This was not done here.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBURMAN and KLUCZYNSKI, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ME. PEESIDING JUSTICE MUEPHY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Washington and Durham, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Matthew J. Moran, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Emmit Suddoth, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 49,532.\nFirst District, First Division.\nOctober 19, 1964.\nRehearing denied November 9, 1964.\nWashington and Durham, of Chicago, for appellant.\nDaniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Matthew J. Moran, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0355-01",
  "first_page_order": 367,
  "last_page_order": 371
}