{ "id": 5280650, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Aaron C. Warren, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Warren", "decision_date": "1964-10-19", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 49,678", "first_page": "374", "last_page": "384", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "52 Ill. App. 2d 374" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "163 NE2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5328848 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/18/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 NE2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2478857 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/382/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 NE2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "406 Ill 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2633790 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 NE2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 Ill 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5309413 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/409/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 NE2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5332878 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 NE2d 936", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "375 Ill 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2536705 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/375/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 NE2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 Ill 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2664266 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 NE 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 Ill 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2419301 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/290/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 NE 975", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 Ill 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4689531 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/254/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 NE2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2702245 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/4/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 NE2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2824872 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 NE2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5361740 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 NE 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Ill 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4880621 ], "year": 1917, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/279/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 NE2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "401 Ill 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307102 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/401/0068-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 867, "char_count": 15989, "ocr_confidence": 0.56, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.08020373404817e-08, "percentile": 0.5054308185535141 }, "sha256": "d4cb64ae665eda45ed524cfaa4961c4ebc7bd613c58dc8e11041da83c9992824", "simhash": "1:9623687696be86db", "word_count": 2783 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:22:06.292848+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MURPHY, P. J. and BURMAN, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Aaron C. Warren, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nDefendant was found guilty of murder in a jury trial and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 16 to 25 years. The Supreme Court transferred his appeal to this Court. Defendant seeks reversal on the grounds that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt \u201cin that the State failed to sustain the burden of proving the killing was not in self defense\u201d; and (2) that the court erred in refusing certain instructions tendered by the defendant.\nTo pass upon these contentions, an analysis of the evidence is required. Frank Slavik, bartender at the Golden Lantern Tavern, 4519 S. Harlem Avenue, testified that on May 27, 1962 the defendant and the deceased, Alexander Hardie, Jr., entered the tavern at about 9 p. m. After about a half hour, during which time they consumed two glasses of beer, Hardie left and defendant followed five minutes later.\nMatthew Padgen, owner of the Hickory Gardens, a tavern located next door to the Golden Lantern, testified that the defendant and deceased entered his tavern at about 9:30 p. m., had two glasses of beer each and stayed about a half hour. They left together and entered a brown Nash Rambler station wagon that was parked in front of the tavern.- He jotted down the license number of the car. At about 11:45 p. m. defendant returned alone and asked if his partner had come back. Upon being told that he had not, defendant turned and walked out.\nRobert H. Brownell, and his partner Burton Stieg, police officers of the Village of Lyons, shortly after midnight, while patroling in their police vehicle, came upon the body of the deceased, still warm, lying in Hass Avenue between Oakwood and 40th. This area is sparsely inhabited. There is a forest preserve on the west side of the street and on the east side a tavern, catering \u201chouse\u201d and further \u201cup\u201d north there are a few new apartment houses. A Stickney police ambulance was called and the body was taken to a hospital where deceased - was pronounced dead. There were two bullet holes in the chest. In the deceased\u2019s clothes the police found a key ring with some car keys and a veteran\u2019s license identity tag. There were also found some small pills. These, upon examination, consisted of two pills containing a barbiturate acid commonly referred to as a hypnotic drug and six scored tablets found to be an amphetamine, which is commonly referred to as a stimulant drug. The pills were nonnarcotic.\nOfficer Raymond Dus of the Stickney police, who responded to the call for an ambulance, and who removed the body to the hospital, testified that he looked for and found deceased\u2019s car in front of the Hickory Gardens Tavern. He spoke to some of the \u201ccitizens,\u201d then called the Lyons police and with them proceeded to defendant\u2019s home. Officer Dus knew the defendant prior to the date of the occurrence. Defendant\u2019s \u201cyellow and brown\u201d Nash Rambler was found parked in front of his home. He was requested to accompany the officers, after the police had searched the car with his permission. An expended bullet shell was found immediately behind the front seat on the floor of the car and there were blood stains on the back seat. When confronted with Padgen and Slavik at the tavern sites, defendant denied being in the taverns that night or having seen them. Later, at the Lyons police station, defendant denied knowing the deceased. Upon being told that the card of Alexander Hardie was found in his wallet, he stated that it was a reference to a girl who was married and that he used the name so as to avoid getting her into trouble. He told a story of his activities for the day and evening and said he got home at 1:30 a. m. This story eliminated any presence in the taverns or being in the company of the deceased. He explained the presence of blood in the car as coming from a cut finger he got helping his father that day with some concrete work. The cartridge shell, he said, was the result of \u201cshooting with it, with a friend in the boondocks.\u201d During the questioning he asked and was allowed to talk to officer Dus alone and shortly thereafter defendant made a statement which was reduced to writing.\nIn this statement the defendant said that he was to meet the deceased Hardie by appointment at the tavern on Harlem Avenue. When he got there Hardie had not arrived. He went to the adjoining tavern still seeking him. As he came out of the second tavern Hardie arrived. Hardie asked about \u201cthe tires\u201d and he said he didn\u2019t have them with him. At Hardie\u2019s request they re-entered the Hickory Gardens and \u201cthen got into my car and drove for a short way\u201d into the forest preserve. \u201cHe already had the gun which I gave him in Summit, Illinois.\u201d Hardie then told defendant to drive some distance and stop. Hardie then said \u201cYou lied to me, you haven\u2019t got the tires, the money, you haven\u2019t got \u2018s\u2014t.\u2019 \u201d Hardie told him to get out of the car and started to open the door on his side. Pointing the gun at him Hardie said \u201cNo tires, no money, no car, no you.\u201d \u201cThen I struggled for the gun and the gun went off twice. I put the car in reverse and he was leaning against the door and he fell out.\u201d Defendant then drove off. The police officers went to defendant\u2019s home and found the gun between the mattress and box spring of his bed.\nAt 10:50 a. m. defendant made another written statement under interrogation by an assistant state\u2019s attorney. In this statement he said he met the deceased about three and a half months previously in a tavern on Harlem Avenue. They became chums and he disclosed to the deceased that he had recently been released from the penitentiary. The deceased thereafter began to blackmail him by threatening to expose his penal record to his employer. Defendant, over the period, had given the deceased about 40 tires costing approximately $1000 purchased through his father\u2019s credit card. He had also given Hardie about $200 in currency which he had saved up from his earnings. On May 27, 1962 he met Hardie in front of the tavern \u201cin Summit.\u201d Hardie asked for the gun and after receiving it asked where the tires were. He told Hardie he had them but could not give them to him. He said he lied. Just before they left the tavern Hardie showed him two pills and asked if he was willing to sell \u201cthese.\u201d When defendant refused the deceased got \u201csalty,\u201d cursed him and said they were going for a ride.\nThey drove off in defendant\u2019s car leaving Hardie\u2019s car at the tavern. After driving into the forest preserve, \u201call he did was bitch and moan and gripe and told me what I was and told me what his wife was.\u201d Defendant then took the wheel and drove around within the Lyons vicinity. Hardie was arguing and trying to talk defendant into selling the pills. After some period of driving, Hardie told defendant to stop the car. He pointed the gun at him and told him to get out. The deceased screamed and stuck it in defendant\u2019s face. \u201cHis door was open when he stuck the gun in my face. I grabbed for it.\u201d He thought he got the gun. \u201cI was sitting on top of him. My weight was on his body. When I pushed up on the gun, I put my weight on his body and then I remember hearing two shots.\u201d Defendant then drove off causing the deceased to fall out. He put the gun between the mattress and bed spring of his bed when he got home.\nDefendant did not take the stand in his defense.\nIn contending that his guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant argues that under the Illinois Criminal Code, c 38, \u00a7 3-2(a), (b), and \u00a7 7-14 (Ill Rev Stats 1961), the State must assume the burden of proving not only that defendant committed homicide but the additional burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self defense. Defendant\u2019s argument comes down to but one proposition, namely, \u201cthat no one can tell which of the two was the aggressor,\u201d and consequently, that the People\u2019s case which was one of \u201cmere circumstantial evidence,\u201d failed to establish defendant\u2019s guilt \u201cso thoroughly as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis,\u201d including the one that he killed in self defense. People v. Willson, 401 Ill 68, 81 NE2d 485 (1948); People v. Ahrling, 279 Ill 70, 116 NE 764 (1917).\nThe statutory provisions relied upon by the defendant read as follows (c 38, \u00a7 3-2(a, (b), and \u00a7 7-14, Ill Rev Stats (1961)):\n\u00a7 3-2. Affirmative Defense\n(a) \u201cAffirmative defense\u201d means that unless the State\u2019s evidence raised the issue involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, must present some evidence thereon.\n(b) If the issue involved in an affirmative defense is raised then the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all the other elements of the offense.\n\u00a7 7-14. Affirmative Defense A defense of justifiable use of force, or of exoneration, based on the provisions of this Article is an affirmative defense.\nIt is apparent from the above, as well as the Committee Comments to the Criminal Code of 1961 thereunder, that once the issue of self defense is raised by some minimum amount of evidence which is sufficient to warrant submission of that issue to the jury, the affirmative defense becomes another element of the offense and the State has the burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue as well.\nHowever, in the instant case it is undisputed that defendant shot the deceased. Under such circumstances, it has been held that the burden to prove circumstances justifying, mitigating or excusing his action is on the defendant, unless it was sufficiently manifest from the proof of the State that he was justified or exonerated in committing the homicide. People v. Washington, 27 Ill2d 104, 187 NE2d 739 (1963); People v. Kelley, 29 Ill2d 53, 193 NE2d 21 (1964). The issue of self defense was raised by defendant\u2019s exculpatory statements, and was submitted to the jury. It was for them to determine where the truth lay and to ascertain the facts of this case. Upon full review of the evidence we cannot say the jury was unwarranted in rejecting defendant\u2019s claim of self defense, nor was the evidence palpably contrary to the verdict, or so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt as to the issue of self defense or defendant\u2019s guilt.\nDefendant\u2019s contention is without merit for the reason that it is based upon the false premise that the jury was bound to accept and believe his exculpatory statements. Where the defendant is the only person who supplies direct evidence as to the actual facts of the homicide, and for the purpose of establishing self defense, the authorities indicate the jury is not compelled to accept his statements. As stated in People v. Jordan, 4 Ill2d 155, 122 NE2d 209 (1954), at page 163, \u201c(T)he jury may reject defendant\u2019s story if, in itself, it is so remarkable as to almost seem incredible if there were no contradictory evidence, (People v. Morris, 254 Ill 559, 573, 98 NE 975), or if the story of defendant was so improbable as to justify it in being disregarded by them, or if it was contradicted by the facts and circumstances shown in the record, (People v. Strause, 290 Ill 259, 278, 125 NE 339), or if defendant\u2019s story was so unreasonable as to be judged improbable. (People v. Meyers, 412 Ill 136, 145, 105 NE2d 746; People v. Uher, 375 Ill 499, 502, 31 NE2d 936.)\u201d\nThe uncontradicted evidence indicates that the deceased was killed with defendant\u2019s gun; that after the killing, defendant left the deceased in the street, in an isolated area late at night, without attempting to secure medical assistance; that he threw deceased\u2019s wallet away, and returned to Hickory Gardens Tavern in an attempt to establish that he had not been with the deceased; that he then hid his gun, and lied to the police regarding \u25a0 his part in the entire episode, and that when he finally gave his statements they were inconsistent. In his first statement, defendant said that Hardie\u2019s belligerent attitude was due to the fact that there was \u201cno money, no tires, no car,\u201d while the second statement, for the first time, referred to Hardie becoming \u201csalty\u201d because defendant would not sell the \u201cpills.\u201d\nWe believe the facts and circumstances are such that defendant\u2019s weak explanation of the deceased\u2019s possession of his gun; his flight from the scene of the killing; the inconsistencies in his own explanations, as well as his possible motive for the shooting raised serious doubts as to the probability of the truthfulness of his exculpatory statements. We cannot say that the jury wilfully and capriciously disregarded defendant\u2019s statement as to the start of the affray between himself and his victim. The requirement that defendant\u2019s guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that the jury must disregard the inferences that flow normally from the evidence before it. The jury was not required to search out a series of potential explanations compatible with innocence, and elevate them to the status of reasonable doubt. People v. Russell, 17 Ill2d 328, 161 NE2d 309 (1959).\nA case similar to the one at bar is that of People v. Skelly, 409 Ill 613, 100 NE2d 915. There, as here, defendant pleaded self defense, and contended upon review that the only evidence as to the affray between him and the deceased \u201cwhen they met on the street, was his uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony that deceased attacked him in the mouth with a pistol, that a scuffle ensued in which both fell to the pavement, that deceased had a pistol in his hand and that he, the defendant, shot deceased in fear of his life or of suffering great bodily harm; that there being no other direct evidence as to how the fight started, the court and jury were bound by his testimony and his plea of self defense was established.\u201d The Supreme Court affirmed the verdict of the jury, and sustained its findings that defendant\u2019s plea of self defense was unworthy of belief. And we so hold in this case. We find no basis for defendant\u2019s reliance on People v. Jordan, 4 Ill2d 155, 122 NE2d 209, since here, the People\u2019s case was sustained on evidence other than the mere rejection of defendant\u2019s exculpatory statements.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that to establish defendant\u2019s guilt there must be \u201cno reasonable theory upon which he can be innocent\u201d and that guilt cannot be predicated it there is \u201cany reasonable theory consistent with the innocence of the defendant.\u201d Without commenting on the People\u2019s argument that the alleged error in refusing the instructions was not preserved, since the written motion for new trial was solely confined to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is only necessary to note that the trial court allowed one prosecution instruction and four defense instructions which recited the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Three defense instructions on self defense were also given. The jury was thoroughly and correctly instructed on the law applicable to the issues presented. Defendant\u2019s attempt to further define or elaborate upon the meaning of \u201creasonable doubt\u201d was improper (People v. Davis, 406 Ill 215, 220, 92 NE2d 649 (1950)), and as the instructions were also repetitious and superfluous (People v. Rife, 382 Ill 588, 48 NE2d 367 (1943); People v. Weaver, 18 Ill2d 108, 163 NE2d 483 (1959)), the trial'court did not commit error in denying them.\nFor the foregoing reasons the conviction of defendant is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMURPHY, P. J. and BURMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI" } ], "attorneys": [ "John A. Pigott, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.", "Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and William J. Nellis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for defendant in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Aaron C. Warren, Plaintiff in Error.\nGen. No. 49,678.\nFirst District, First Division.\nOctober 19, 1964.\nRehearing denied November 9, 1964.\nJohn A. Pigott, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.\nDaniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and William J. Nellis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for defendant in error." }, "file_name": "0374-01", "first_page_order": 386, "last_page_order": 396 }