{ "id": 5296807, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel Edward Mason, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mason", "decision_date": "1965-10-18", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 49,995", "first_page": "211", "last_page": "219", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "63 Ill. App. 2d 211" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "139 NE2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2724498 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Ill2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5352878 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/25/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 NE2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill2d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5363878 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" }, { "page": "403" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0396-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 667, "char_count": 13574, "ocr_confidence": 0.529, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7817273071113374e-08, "percentile": 0.30018603401202154 }, "sha256": "4db9c6204ffb0f4da4f1be9415d5c0c445ff150f9f941f163ffa0555583d96a2", "simhash": "1:8f31779267729ae9", "word_count": 2272 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:51:04.191964+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BUSMAN, P. J. and KLUCZYNSKI, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel Edward Mason, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ME. JUSTICE MUEPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAfter a jury trial, defendant, Samuel Edward Mason, was found guilty of the illegal sale of narcotics. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of from ten years to life.\nA prior conviction for the same offense was reversed in People v. Mason, 28 Ill2d 396, 403, 192 NE2d 835 (1963), because \u201cthe trial court cut off all inquiry on subjects with respect to which the defense was entitled to a reasonable cross-examination. This was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error.\u201d The cause was remanded for a retrial, and the evidence in both trials was substantially the same.\nDefendant contends in the instant appeal (1) that he was unduly restricted in his right of cross-examination; (2) that statements of the State\u2019s Attorney to the jury were prejudicial and influenced the jury contrary to the weight of the evidence; (3) that the apparent prejudice of the trial court so affected the jury as to cause its verdict to be returned against the defendant; and (4) that the reversal of the judgment of conviction of the defendant in the first trial became the law of the case and requires that the conviction now appealed from be reversed and the defendant discharged.\nThe principal witness for the State was Inspector Carl H. Henry of the Illinois State Division of Narcotic Control. He testified that on December 15, 1959, at about 4:00 p. m., an informer brought the defendant to him while he was seated alone, in civilian clothing, in an unmarked State automobile parked at 39th and Ellis in Chicago. Henry was under the surveillance of Narcotic Inspectors Manson and Patch, who were in another parked automobile. During the presence of the informer, Henry told the defendant he would like to purchase three packages of heroin for $15. Defendant \u201cwas presently awaiting a source of supply,\u201d and they made an agreement to meet later that evening. At 9 o\u2019clock, Henry, alone in the car, returned to the same intersection, again under the surveillance of Inspectors Manson and Patch, and the defendant and the informer reappeared. Henry gave defendant $15 in marked money and received three envelopes from defendant. An agreement was then made for another purchase around 3:30 in the morning. After this, Henry \u201crendezvoused\u201d with the other two inspectors and a field test was made of one of the packages of white powder.\nInspector Henry further testified that at 3:30 on the morning of December 16, he returned to the same place, with Inspectors Patch and Manson in surveillance. After a half hour, defendant reappeared and entered the automobile. Henry told the defendant that he \u201cwanted $20 worth, or four bags,\u201d and gave defendant \u201c$20 of pre-recorded, officially advanced funds.\u201d Defendant said to wait and he would return with the drugs. Defendant then entered a building \u25a0which was adjacent to where Henry was parked. Fifteen minutes later, defendant returned, \u201caccompanied by another negro male. He leaned into the car, handed me the four packages. At that time the male that was with him stuck his head into the vehicle to look at me. As he did, he stated, to the best of my recollection, \u2018oh, my God, man, what have you done?\u2019 \u201d They both backed up very abruptly and went into the building.\nHenry then drove from the intersection and again \u201crendezvoused\u201d with Inspectors Patch and Manson. They all got into one State vehicle and drove back to the vicinity of 39th and Ellis, where they saw the defendant and the other man walking on Ellis. Inspectors Patch and Manson got out of the car and placed the defendant under arrest. About fifteen minutes had elapsed from the time of the second sale until the time defendant was arrested.\nOn cross-examination, Henry testified that he was then residing in California and was a salesman for a brewing company. He was interrogated at length as to his various places of employment since leaving the Narcotic Division. He said that he had resigned for \u201cpersonal reasons.\u201d He denied that he had been discharged because he had been \u201ccharged with the commission of rape\u201d or because of his personal conduct. He admitted the charge of rape had some connection with his resignation.\nThe State\u2019s other witness was Inspector Thomas E. Manson. At the time of the trial, he was \u201ca customs agent for the United States Treasury Department, Customs Service\u201d and had been so employed for two years. He testified that on each of the three occasions described by Henry, he was parked with Inspector Patch near Henry\u2019s car, and that they could see Henry\u2019s car at all times. At the afternoon meeting, they were parked on the street about 25 or 30 yards away, and on the other two occasions they were parked in a vacant lot ahont 40 yards away. Manson identified the defendant as the person who approached the car on all three occasions, and said that he and Henry had \u201cmutually\u201d identified the defendant walking down the street on the morning after the third meeting.\nOn cross-examination, Manson stated that he had maintained \u201csurveillance\u201d from the inside of his parked vehicle, and \u201cI saw a motion of hands. I can\u2019t say it was money or whatever it was, I couldn\u2019t see that closely. I saw people in conversation and I saw a movement of hands. ... I couldn\u2019t physically see what it was that was transferred.\u201d He saw defendant \u201cfrom thirty feet, on one occasion, thirty yards on one occasion, and forty yards on two occasions.\u201d\nNeither the informer nor Inspector Patch testified, although Manson identified a man in the court room as \u201cSamuel Patch,\u201d his \u201cfellow officer on surveillance that night.\u201d No narcotics and none of the marked money were found in a search of the defendant and his apartment. A stipulation was entered into \u201cthat the material contained in the People\u2019s Exhibit was in fact a narcotic drug commonly known as heroin.\u201d\nDefendant Mason testified that he was 40 years of age and lived and worked in the Pershing Hotel at the corner of 39th and Ellis, and that he was arrested by Inspectors Manson and Patch on Ellis Avenue in the middle of the 3800 block. \u201cThey jumped out of the car and approached me with their pistols.\u201d He was going north on Ellis and was headed for a bar at 36th and Ellis to get a drink. He denied that he ever sold narcotics pr that he was involved in any of the transactions described by Henry and Manson. He had never seen either of them before he was placed under arrest. He testified that he had never been arrested, had no record and never had anything to do with narcotics.\nInitially, we consider defendant\u2019s contention that he \u201cwas unduly restricted in his right of cross-examination,\u201d and \u201cthat the widest latitude should he allowed the defendant in cross-examination for the purpose of establishing bias.\u201d He further asserts that the cross-examination of the State\u2019s witness Henry \u201cwas unduly restricted in that it prevented the defendant from impeaching the witness, discrediting his testimony and pointing out the contradictions existing between his testimony and that of his partner.\u201d\nIn defendant\u2019s previous trial, the trial court had sustained objections to questions directed to Henry and Patch to show that they had both been suspended by the State Narcotics Bureau. In reversing defendant\u2019s conviction, the Supreme Court (People v. Mason, 28 Ill2d 396, 403, 192 NE2d 835) said:\n\u201cThe scope of cross-examination is generally within the trial court\u2019s discretion. However, the widest latitude should generally he allowed the defendant in cross-examination for the purpose of establishing bias. (People v. Naujokas, 25 Ill2d 32.) In the present case the trial court cut' off all inquiry on subjects with respect to which the defense was entitled to a reasonable cross-examination. This was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error.\u201d\nWhile defendant has not pointed out any specific instance to show that he was unduly restricted in the cross-examination of Inspectors Henry or Manson, we have carefully examined the cross-examination of both of these witnesses in the light of the above pronouncements. In the cross-examination of Henry, wide latitude was allowed as to his reason for leaving the Narcotics Division and as to the details of the narcotics sales. The cross-examination of Manson shows the same latitude.\nAt one point, the trial court refused to permit the court reporter, at defendant\u2019s request, to look over the previous testimony of Inspector Henry to find an allegedly inconsistent statement. At another point, the court refused to let the witness Manson draw a diagram of his position in relation to Henry\u2019s car, and also later sustained an objection to the remarks of counsel and a repetitious question. \"We conclude the instant record does not demonstrate that the defendant was unduly restricted in his right of cross-examination.\nDefendant also contends that the remarks of the State\u2019s Attorney to the jury were prejudicial. The record shows that the State\u2019s Attorney told the jury that sales of narcotics are \u201cconsidered in the eyes of the law, . . . after a murder, probably one of the worst, one of the most dastardly crimes to be committed.\u201d He also told the jury that \u201cpeople who sell narcotics . . . what they are selling to the poor soul who buys it is a package of living death.\u201d In People v. Lopez, 10 Ill2d 237, 139 NE2d 724 (1957), the State\u2019s Attorney in his closing argument condemned the defendant as a \u201cvicious, contemptible man ... a destroyer of lives. . . . You see a man who destroys, who tears apart, who tears the living soul out of human beings.\u201d There, the Supreme Court said (p 240):\n\u201cBut we must be mindful of the considerable latitude permitted in closing argument. For example, there was evidence that the defendant sold a narcotic drug in violation of law, and it is common knowledge that the illegal drug traffic is a serious menace to society. It was proper to argue on the evil results of such a crime and urge fearless administration of the law. . . . Moreover, reversal is not warranted unless it appears that the acts complained of influenced the jury in a manner that resulted in substantial prejudice to the accused. . . . Here the jury returned a just verdict; indeed, it was the only reasonable conclusion to reach upon the basis of the evidence adduced.\u201d\nThe remarks complained of in the' instant appeal come within the above pronouncements. There is no prejudicial error here.\nDefendant further complains of the prejudice of the trial court and asserts this is demonstrated \u201cby the commendatory remarks of the trial court to the jury, upon the return of its guilty verdict, his comments to the defendant, and . . . the refusal of the Court to give the defendant\u2019s instructions 2 and 3.\u201d We have examined the remarks of the court, all of which were made after the return of a guilty verdict, and we find no error there.\nThe instructions refused were so-called \u201ccautionary\u201d instructions having to do with the testimony and credibility of witnesses and in an area amply covered by the given instructions. The instructions given to the jury were adequate.\nDefendant further argues, \u201cThe fact that the jury returned its verdict after fifteen minutes from its departure from the court room is persuasive that there was no opportunity for them to do other than elect their foreman and literally put a rubber stamp of guilty upon this defendant, ignoring the lack of sufficient identification and discrepancy in the identification and description of the defendant by Henry and Manson, the only two State witnesses, and that they could not possibly have read the instructions of the Court in that short time. Any verdict which is the result of prejudice such as here occurred, coupled with the prejudice of the State\u2019s Attorney and trial judge, requires a reversal.\u201d\nConsidering this record, we fail to find any justification for the claim that the verdict or its prompt return were the result of prejudice of either the court or the State\u2019s Attorney. The positive testimony of Henry was corroborated by Inspector Manson. If Henry were biased or prejudiced against defendant, the trial court allowed a reasonable cross-examination to show it in order that the jury could consider it. It is true that neither the informer nor Patch testified. The State was not required to call the informer as a witness (People v. Mason, 28 Ill2d 396, 399, 192 NE2d 835), and Patch was in the courtroom, apparently available for use by either the court or the defendant and for whatever significance the jury might place upon the failure of the State to call Patch on its behalf.\nWe agree with defendant\u2019s final contention that the pronouncements of the Supreme Court upon the first appeal (People v. Mason, 28 H12d 396, 192 NE2d 835) were binding upon the trial court. The record shows the trial court did follow the opinion of the Supreme Court during the second trial, and that defendant received a fair and impartial trial, free from prejudicial error, and that defendant was accorded wide latitude in the cross-examination of the State\u2019s witnesses.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBUSMAN, P. J. and KLUCZYNSKI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ME. JUSTICE MUEPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Emilie N. Wanderer, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Stuart P. Shapiro, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Samuel Edward Mason, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 49,995.\nFirst District, First Division;\nOctober 18, 1965.\nEmilie N. Wanderer, of Chicago, for appellant.\nDaniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Stuart P. Shapiro, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0211-01", "first_page_order": 223, "last_page_order": 231 }