{ "id": 2592405, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul H. Musselman, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Musselman", "decision_date": "1966-04-11", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 50,514", "first_page": "454", "last_page": "459", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "69 Ill. App. 2d 454" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "195 NE2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2829348 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 NE2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360801 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 NE2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2824755 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 NE 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4935051 ], "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/286/0627-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 438, "char_count": 6889, "ocr_confidence": 0.583, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.631750451036227e-07, "percentile": 0.822285584989704 }, "sha256": "329ae91937730fcaa9cfe4f6a89fb30c414eca9c818e38093944356107b678a3", "simhash": "1:228396fb860dff13", "word_count": 1156 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:18.448543+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "KLUCZYNSKI, P. J. and BURMAN, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul H. Musselman, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ME. JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn a complaint defendant was charged with the statutory offense of \u201cunlawful use of weapons.\u201d In a bench trial he was found guilty as charged and was fined $200 and costs. The fine and costs were suspended and his \u201cgun confiscated.\u201d\nThe complaint alleged that on or about November 24, 1964, at Burger King parking lot, 180th and Halsted, Glenwood, Illinois, Cook County, defendant \u201cknowingly carried and possessed a dangerous or deadly weapon (J. C. Higgins 22 cal. rifle), with intent to use the said weapon unlawfully against another,\u201d in violation of Chapter 38, Section 24-1(2), Illinois Revised Statutes. This section provides:\n\u201cUnlawful Use of Weapons.] (a) A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly: ... (2) Carries or possesses with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, a dagger, dirk, billy, dangerous knife, razor, stiletto or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument of like character; . . . .\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant contends that \u201cthe judgment of the court is contrary to the evidence inasmuch as the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the requisite state of mind (intent) to commit the crime charged.\u201d\nA police officer, the only witness for the State, testified that on November 24, 1964, at approximately 10:00 p. m., he saw the defendant \u201cin a kneeling position with a \u201922 rifle with a telescope sight aiming directly at a group of people at the Burger King Restaurant at 185th and Halsted Street. . . . There was a line there and he had the weapon pointed directly at the line\u201d \u2014 people \u201cwaiting to be served.\u201d\nThe officer further testified that the defendant was approximately 50 to 75 feet from the restaurant when he was pointing his rifle, and after he was arrested, defendant told him he was with a lot of people, although the officer saw no one else there at the time.\nOn cross-examination, the officer testified that he did not ascertain \u201cwhether the weapon was loaded at the time it was pointed,\u201d and as far as he knew, \u201cit was not loaded.\u201d No ammunition was found in the weapon after the arrest.\nDefendant testified, \u201cWe were going hunting the next day and they have a shot gun too which isn\u2019t present and I had those over there. I hadn\u2019t fired the 22 in over a year. I was looking at it and looking through the chamber as far as firing. As far as a line, I didn\u2019t see any line. There\u2019s a little thing on top of the building which I was aiming at.\u201d He denied that he was aiming at any people or personnel. He volunteered a statement, \u201cYour honor, he keeps saying I pointed it at a line of people. No one can say I was pointing at a line of people. No one looked down the sight with me. ... I can\u2019t recall whether a line was there. I am there every night. It is just a meeting place.\u201d\nDefendant argues, \u201call that the State has proved directly is that the Defendant pointed an empty rifle at a restaurant seventy-five feet away from him.\u201d Defendant asserts that the statute requires proof of the specific intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another, and intent must be proved in order to obtain a conviction. Cited in support is section 4-4 of the new Criminal Code, which defines \u201cintent\u201d as follows:\n\u201cA person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.\u201d\nCases cited include People v. Fernow, 286 Ill 627, 122 NE 155 (1919), and People v. Murff, 29 Ill2d 303, 194 NE2d 226 (1963).\nDefendant further argues \u201cthat the means employed by defendant would not result in any unlawful use of the weapon against other persons; he could not shoot them, the gun was not loaded, he could not strike them, he was too far away, he did not assault anyone, because there is no testimony demonstrating that he did. Clearly, the State must prove his guilt, he need not prove his innocence. The defendant\u2019s only conscious objective, from the evidence presented, is as Defendant testified \u2014 to re-familiarize himself with his weapon for the next day\u2019s hunt.\u201d\nThe State argues that the defendant\u2019s intent was clearly shown by the circumstances adduced at the trial. Cases cited include People v. Johnson, 28 Ill2d 441, 192 NE2d 864 (1963), a burglary case, where it is said (p 443):\n\u201cIntent must ordinarily be proved circumstantially, by inferences drawn from conduct appraised in its factual environment. . . . Like other inferences, this one is grounded in human experience, which justifies the assumption that the unlawful entry was not purposeless, and, in the absence of other proof, indicates theft as the most likely purpose.\u201d\nThe State further argues that the trial court, as the finder of fact, did not believe the defendant\u2019s story, and the judgment should be affirmed.\nFrom our examination of this record, we think the testimony of the police officer that the defendant, at ten o\u2019clock at night, was kneeling and looking down the telescopic sight of a rifle pointed at a group of people, was sufficient credible evidence of \u201cconduct appraised in its factual environment\u201d from which, \u201cgrounded in human experience,\u201d any reasonable person would be justified in the assumption that defendant\u2019s intent was to unlawfully use the rifle, a dangerous or deadly weapon, against the group of waiting customers at whom the rifle was pointed. As stated in the Committee Comments to article 24, Smith-Hurd Illinois Annotated Statutes, ch 38, art 24, p 364:\n\u201cThe possession and use of weapons inherently dangerous to human life constitutes a sufficient hazard to society to call for prohibition unless there appears appropriate justification created by special circumstances.\u201d\nProof that the rifle was loaded should not be required before an inference can be drawn that defendant intended to use it unlawfully. See People v. Clark, 30 Ill2d 216, 195 NE2d 631 (1964), at p 219:\n\u201cHere, there was credible evidence fully establishing defendant\u2019s guilt of the crime charged and, what is more, the trial court could properly consider the improbabilities in defendant\u2019s explanation and his presence at the scene of the offense.\u201d\nWe hold that the evidence here was sufficient proof of the offense charged in the instant complaint.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nKLUCZYNSKI, P. J. and BURMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ME. JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Arnold and Kadjan, of Chicago (Daniel N. Kadjan, of counsel), for appellant.", "Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and James B. Klein, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul H. Musselman, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 50,514.\nFirst District, First Division.\nApril 11, 1966.\nRehearing denied May 21, 1966.\nArnold and Kadjan, of Chicago (Daniel N. Kadjan, of counsel), for appellant.\nDaniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and James B. Klein, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0454-01", "first_page_order": 466, "last_page_order": 471 }