{
  "id": 2577952,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas Addison, Jr., Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Addison",
  "decision_date": "1966-10-06",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 10,750",
  "first_page": "358",
  "last_page": "361",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "75 Ill. App. 2d 358"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "212 NE2d 97",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "33 Ill2d 527",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2882681
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/33/0527-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "63 NE2d 759",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "391 Ill 565",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2512004
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/391/0565-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 366,
    "char_count": 5081,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.629,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.445900475173738e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6540753920402309
    },
    "sha256": "c9a9a4a9e4432846d3640c0a3f9a82d34808f06a7c91b5c4d2581c3a6146f5f7",
    "simhash": "1:a92b5e3355e70758",
    "word_count": 873
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:26.646330+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas Addison, Jr., Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "SMITH, J.\nAppeal on dismissal of an indictment for forgery. It is said that there is a fatal variance between the \u201cpurport\u201d and \u201ctenor\u201d clauses. In forgery indictments the instrument or \u201cdocument apparently capable of defrauding another,\u201d for obvious reasons, must somehow be described, and it can be done in two ways, either by its purport or tenor, or for that matter, by both. A \u201cpurport description\u201d is narrative in style and describes generally the instrument in its salient aspects, while a \u201ctenor description\u201d is either an exact copy \u2014 xerox, etc., or typed facsimile in haec verba, as the older cases say. Here, we have examples of both clauses and there\u2019s the rub, we are told, because they are inconsistent.\nThe \u201cpurport description\u201d charges that defendant \u201cknowingly made a check apparently capable of defrauding another, in such a manner that it purported to have been made by Marge Jones.\u201d The \u201ctenor description\u201d follows immediately \u2014 \u201csaid check being in the words and figures following, to-wit:\u201d and is a typed facsimile which discloses a check signed by \u201cRobert A. Packer,\u201d payable to \u201cMarge Jones,\u201d and continues: \u201cand endorsed on the back thereof as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Marge Jones Jim Jones 2236 East Olive,\u2019 \u201d\nIt is true, if we focus one eye on the so-called purport clause and the other on the tenor, a surface disparity does appear \u2014 one eye reads Marge Jones as the maker, the other, Robert A. Packer. But if we rid ourselves of this strabismus and read both descriptions as one, in the context of the forgery statute, the inconsistency vanishes and what we have is simply a check drawn by Packer, payable to Jones and endorsed by her. The action words of the statute are \u201cmakes or alters,\u201d and it would follow necessarily that the verb \u201cmake\u201d has to be given a very broad definition indeed, if the evil the statute is aimed at is to be remedied at all. Thus, \u201cmakes\u201d includes \u201cendorses,\u201d and if so, the text of the purport and tenor clauses in this context is a charge that Jones\u2019 endorsement was forged, which is the making of a \u201cdocument,\u201d as such is defined in \u00a7 17-3 (c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (c 38, Ill Rev Stats 1965).\nIt might seem that we are overruling People v. Nickols, 391 Ill 565, 63 NE2d 759, but we are not, and of course, we shouldn\u2019t. In Nickols, the purport clause described an instrument \u201capparently capable of defrauding,\u201d while the tenor clause disclosed an instrument that wouldn\u2019t defraud anyone. After pointing out the nonnecessity of describing an instrument by both its purport and tenor, Nickols concludes, \u201cyet where it [the indictment] attempts to do so, the two descriptions must be consistent and it must appear from the face of the indictment that they refer to the same instrument.\u201d Here this is so. Not only, as we have pointed out, need we not dissect this indictment, but even if we do, the hypercritical would have to agree that the purport and tenor clauses do refer to the same instrument, which is, as we have said, a check drawn by Packer, payable to Jones, and endorsed by Jones.\nAn indictment performs the office of advising the chargee of the charge, and it is also said that it must be explicit enough to bar a second prosecution for such offense, and while in no way belittling this office, the indictment itself, as proof that such is the case, will hardly carry the day. It is unreal to expect an indictment all by itself to stand as a bar to a second indictment for the same offense. Ordinarily, when such is suspected, evidence is heard de hors the indictment, to use lawyers\u2019 language, and \u00a7 114-1 (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure so provides. The Nickols\u2019 rule is admittedly technical, and we detect a latter-day emphasis, or thrust, to use a much overworked word, that such preciosity in criminal pleading is no longer in vogue. At least we read People v. Blanchett, 33 Ill2d 527, 212 NE2d 97, as saying so, and such emphasis and holding is in accord with one purpose of the Code, to \u201csecure simplicity in procedure.\u201d Section 101-1, ch 38, Ill Rev Stats 1965. This indictment sets \u201cforth the nature and elements of the offense charged,\u201d as provided in \u00a7 111-3 of the Code in sufficient detail and consistency to meet both offices. One could, of course, conjure up, reductio ad absurdum, a great many bizarre possibilities, if purport and tenor are to be considered alone and without regard to the other. But when we read them together in the context of the forgery statute, and in the light of the very purposes for an indictment, we believe that we have here the prerequisities of a good indictment. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the indictment.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nTRAPP, P. J. and CRAVEN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "SMITH, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Basil G. Greanias, State\u2019s Attorney of Macon County, of Decatur, for appellant.",
      "Baird & Latendresse, of Decatur (Donald G. Baird, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas Addison, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.\nGen. No. 10,750.\nFourth District.\nOctober 6, 1966.\nBasil G. Greanias, State\u2019s Attorney of Macon County, of Decatur, for appellant.\nBaird & Latendresse, of Decatur (Donald G. Baird, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0358-01",
  "first_page_order": 364,
  "last_page_order": 367
}