{
  "id": 2574802,
  "name": "Joseph Svoboda, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. William Blevins, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Svoboda v. Blevins",
  "decision_date": "1966-10-17",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 49,925",
  "first_page": "277",
  "last_page": "281",
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    {
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
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      "cite": "176 NE2d 551",
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      "year": 1961,
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    {
      "cite": "32 Ill App2d 37",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5233283
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      "year": 1961,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:40.140758+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Joseph Svoboda, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. William Blevins, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nPlaintiffs appeal from a not guilty verdict and judgment for defendant in their tort action and seek a new trial. Their principal contention is that they did not receive a fair trial, because of the prejudicial misconduct of defendant\u2019s counsel during the trial.\nThere is no dispute as to the occurrence. On December 15,1960, plaintiffs, who worked together as truck drivers, were on their way home from work in an automobile owned and driven by plaintiff Svoboda. They had stopped and were waiting in a line of traffic for an intersection traffic light change, when their car was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by defendant.\nThe evidence for plaintiffs consists of testimony by plaintiffs and their attending physician, Dr. Gerald J. Rabin, who had been recommended to them by their attorney. Defendant was interrogated as an adverse witness under section 60 of the Civil Practice Act. Both plaintiffs testified as to head and neck pains and loss of time at work. There was no evidence as to lost pay or automobile repairs. Dr. Rabin testified that his charges for Roper were $145 and for Svoboda $344, and both bills were unpaid. He also testified that Svoboda had a hospital bill of $129.40. Defendant presented no evidence.\nDefendant\u2019s attorney commenced his cross-examination of plaintiff Roper, by questioning him about a finger injury which occurred two years prior to the trial and, after ascertaining that the doctor who treated Roper for his finger was not his present physician, asked, \u201cAnd, you didn\u2019t call up your attorney, Mr. Hutul, and ask him to get the name of a doctor?\u201d An objection was sustained. In chambers and out of the presence of the jury, the court said, \u201cThe only issues in this case, who was responsible for this accident and was this man hurt ? Those are the issues.\u201d The cross-examination was resumed with a series of questions about Mrs. Roper working for a medical center and whether Roper had consulted a doctor at the medical center or gone to the clinic \u201cfor anything as a result of this accident.\u201d Objections were overruled, and Roper\u2019s answer \u201cNo\u201d was permitted to stand.\nDefendant\u2019s attorney, over repeated objections and in the presence of the jury, continued his questioning as to how Roper happened to go to Dr. Rabin and how he made contact with his attorney of record. At one point the attorney remarked to the court, \u201cI think your Honor, this man was sent to a doctor by a lawyer.\u201d His questions to Roper included, \u201cThe attorney told you to take a couple [weeks] off work, didn\u2019t he? . . . Did you tell the attorney your wife worked for a medical center ? . . . Did she [Mrs. Svoboda] tell you that they had heard that you could get good results from a lawsuit by Dr. Rabin?\u201d When Roper said, \u201cI had an examination and several X-rays . . . ,\u201d the next question was, \u201cDid Doctor Rabin tell you that or did the attorney tell you that?\u201d\nAt one point the court, in sustaining an objection, said, \u201cCounsel, I am going to admonish you to discontinue asking the witness questions in regard to the alleged conversations between the witness and with the witness and the lawyers. ... I am giving you my admonition, let\u2019s get on with it.\u201d\nThe cross-examination of plaintiff Svoboda followed the same line of questions \u2014 as to how he made contact with his attorney and Dr. Rabin. The record is replete with the sustaining of objections made to/these questions and with the court striking the remarks of defendant\u2019s counsel. When the court asked the relevancy of the question, \u201cWho was the lawyer that was recommended to you?\u201d, the attorney for the defendant responded, \u201cI believe the issues in the case are the injuries of this man and that this is not a bona fide claim. I think I have the right to try and show this.\u201d In final argument, counsel referred to plaintiffs as \u201cthose other two palookas.\u201d\nWe conclude that this record sustains plaintiffs\u2019 contention that defendant\u2019s counsel \u201cengaged in improper conduct, made improper remarks, conducted his interrogation of the witnesses along improper lines of questioning, and improperly interjected his opinions into the case during the trial and during his final argument.\u201d This court, in Jacobson v. National Dairy Products Corp., 32 Ill App2d 37, 176 NE2d 551 (1961), said (p 43):\n\u201cSuch conduct has been recognized as cause for reversal in this State, regardless of whether the court has ordered the remarks stricken or not.\u201d\nA trial should be conducted with dignity and without prejudicial conduct of counsel. Obviously defendant\u2019s counsel was endeavoring to use the trial as an inquiry into the assumed unethical conduct of plaintiffs\u2019 attorney and physician. This was an inquiry that should have been presented to the proper professional associations and not used as a vehicle \u201cto inflame the passions or arouse the prejudices of the jury\u201d in order to defeat plaintiffs\u2019 action. As the court noted, the only issues were plaintiffs\u2019 damages and the responsibility of defendant, if any. We believe this record comes within the remarks made by our Supreme Court in Coal Creek Drain, and Levee Dist. v. Sanitary Dist., 336 Ill 11, 167 NE 807 (1929), atp 45:\n\u201cArgument of counsel is for the purpose of assisting the jury fairly, deliberately and impartially to arrive at the truth of the facts submitted to them for their decision, and it is highly improper for an attorney to do or say anything in argument the only effect of which will be to inflame the passions or arouse the prejudices of the jury against one of the parties without throwing any light upon the question for decision. (People v. Bimbo, 314 Ill 449.) Litigants are entitled to a fair, dispassionate and impartial trial, and counsel who overstep the bounds of propriety in argument and so prevent such trial have no ground for complaint when courts of review correct their misconduct by granting new trials.\u201d\nWe conclude that plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a mistrial should have been allowed and a new trial granted. For the reasons given, the judgment in favor of defendant is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nKLUCZYNSKI, P. J. and BURMAN, J\u201e concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the court."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "H. P. Hutul, of Chicago, for appellants.",
      "Hubbard, Hubbard, O\u2019Brien & Hall, of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Joseph Svoboda, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. William Blevins, Defendant-Appellee.\nGen. No. 49,925.\nFirst District, First Division.\nOctober 17, 1966.\nH. P. Hutul, of Chicago, for appellants.\nHubbard, Hubbard, O\u2019Brien & Hall, of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0277-01",
  "first_page_order": 283,
  "last_page_order": 287
}