{ "id": 2575578, "name": "In the Matter of Robert R. Urbasek, Alleged Delinquent Boy. Robert F. Urbasek, by His Mother and Next Friend, Lorraine Urbasek, Respondent-Appellant, v. People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Urbasek v. People", "decision_date": "1966-10-31", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 51,004", "first_page": "375", "last_page": "388", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "76 Ill. App. 2d 375" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "110 Ill 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5373532 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/110/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4778789 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/265/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 NE2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2886822 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 US 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047531 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 NE2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill2d 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826213 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ill2d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5354819 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/26/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 F Supp 224", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4265198 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/135/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 P2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Neb 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5292778 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/157/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 NYS2d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 App Div2d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3130722 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/20/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 F2d 556", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1956763 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/274/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 US App DC 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "U.S. App. D.C.", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 F2d 666", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3764688, 430346, 3765854, 430223 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/236/0666-02", "/f2d/236/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 US App DC 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "U.S. App. D.C.", "case_ids": [ 3764688, 3765854 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [] }, { "cite": "383 US 541", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172664 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/383/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill App2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5789618 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/30/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 SE2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Va 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2143813 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/185/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 NYS2d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 NYS 765", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 App Div 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.", "case_ids": [ 5013412 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad/233/0012-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1070, "char_count": 21318, "ocr_confidence": 0.587, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.825287257850047e-08, "percentile": 0.45800874877261183 }, "sha256": "86a26051c08261b34734e42af10467cd99cf81062a73329414c7399367b3234e", "simhash": "1:c2f93802b7711fa5", "word_count": 3550 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:40.140758+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In the Matter of Robert R. Urbasek, Alleged Delinquent Boy. Robert F. Urbasek, by His Mother and Next Friend, Lorraine Urbasek, Respondent-Appellant, v. People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nRobert F. Urbasek, an eleven-year-old boy, was found to be a delinquent by the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County on October 1, 1965. The petition alleging delinquency charged that he did \u201cviolate a State law.\u201d At the hearing, evidence was introduced of the murder of an eleven-year-old girl with whom he had been playing approximately four hours prior to the discovery of her body. The finding of delinquency was based on the use of the \u201cpreponderance of the evidence rule.\u201d\nOn appeal, the principal questions are: (1) Where the hearing and determination of delinquency were prior to the effective date of the present Juvenile Court Act, should the proceedings have been governed by the \u201cpreponderance of the evidence rule\u201d or by the \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt rule,\u201d since personal liberty was at stake? (2) Was the delinquent entitled to all the constitutional safeguards possessed by adults exposed to criminal prosecution? (3) May an expert witness on direct examination be questioned about learned treatises on which he is not specifically relying? (4) Was there an illegal search and seizure and, if so, was the right to suppress the fruits thereof waived?\nOn August 26, 1965, between 7:00 and 8:00 p. m., the body of Karen Mitchell was found in the locked Urbasek garage. Karen had been missing since about 3:00 p. m., and her mother had been searching for her. She had questioned Robert several times and finally insisted that Robert and his older sister allow her to look for Karen in their garage. The garage was opened, and the girl\u2019s body, with seven stab wounds, was found in the crawl space at the far end of the garage. A 6-inch knife was found near her head, and on her left wrist was \u201ca strapping with perforated holes and a combination lock and a piece of twinelike substance around her neck.\u201d The immediate cause of death was stab wounds of the lungs and liver. Karen\u2019s mother testified as to what happened when she found the body: \u201cI saw Karen\u2019s knees. I looked, and I said, \u2018There she is, Bobby. . . . Why did you do it?\u2019 He said, T don\u2019t know.\u2019 \u201d\nLater that evening, Robert was questioned both at home and at the Village of LaGrange police headquarters. The record indicates that Edward F. Vyzral, an attorney, was present during part of the questioning at the police station, and that he represented Robert at the court hearing. Robert cooperated with the police and answered all questions. He denied seeing Karen after 3:20 p. m., when \u201cshe went around the side of the house\u201d while he was filling a lawn mower with gasoline.\nA State\u2019s witness, a Chicago Police Department micro-analyst, testified that he made an examination of a sample of the decedent\u2019s blood, which he received from the morgue, and determined that \u201cit was human blood, Group A.\u201d He also examined reddish brown stains on the knife and on Robert\u2019s T-shirt and found they were \u201chuman blood of Group A.\u201d One strand of hair found in the hand of the decedent was compared with hair strands submitted from the head of Robert, and a comparison determined that both hairs were similar. On the one strand was found a reddish brown flake, which was found to be blood. He also testified, \u201cI found nothing on the boy\u2019s socks, nothing on his undershirt. I found nothing on his undershorts, they were clean. The fingernail scrapings were negative. There were no fingerprints on the knife, there were no fingerprints on the strap iron, there were no fingerprints on the lock, there were no fingerprints on the tape or the rope.\u201d\nRobert testified and was cross-examined extensively at the hearing. His testimony was substantially the same as related by the various police officers who had questioned him on the day of the occurrence. He denied killing Karen and was steadfast in his statement that he did not see her after she left him at 3:20 in the afternoon.\nThe trial court, in announcing its findings, remarked: \u201cI was and am convinced that the youngster committed the act. I believe that the State met their burden of establishing the preponderance of evidence. I don\u2019t know that they met, if it is a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I don\u2019t think that was met. . . . Since I have entered the finding of delinquency, and since I was convinced he was and I am convinced the youngster committed the act, I have felt that long term placement was in need.\u201d\nInitially, we consider whether at the hearing on the delinquency petition, the court should have required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert murdered Karen, which was the basis of the charge and finding of his delinquency.\nThe authorities submitted by respondent include In re Madik, 233 App Div 12, 251 NYS 765, where the charge of delinquency was based on arson, and the court said (p 767):\n\u201cIn the case of an adult, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would be required. The district attorney concedes and we think that such proof is required here.\n\u201cUndoubtedly suspicion points to the boy\u2019s guilt, but suspicion is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and we think that the boy\u2019s guilt has not been sufficiently shown under the rule.\u201d\nIn In re James Rich, 86 NYS2d 308, the charge of delinquency was that the minor was responsible for the death of another person. There the court said (p 311):\n\u201cThe rule of law is that a charge of crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. If there is a reasonable doubt as to the perpetration of the crime, that reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with having committed the act.\nIt is no less applicable to a child than it is to an adult.\u201d\nIn Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va 335, 38 SE2d 444, the court said (p 447):\n\u201cGuilt should be proven by evidence which leaves no reasonable doubt. Inferences must give way when in conflict with facts established by positive proof.\u201d\nAlso cited is an article entitled \u201cConstitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts,\u201d 46 Cornell Law Quarterly 387, where it is said (p 412):\n\u201cDue process of law demands that the particular misbehavior alleged to constitute juvenile delinquency be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Some courts have settled for the quantum of proof used in civil litigation, that is, proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Not only must the offense be clearly proved, but it must be proved, according to the weight of authority, by good and competent evidence with true probative value ....\n\u201cA child before a juvenile court, alleged to have committed particular wrongs, is entitled to the presumption of innocence accorded by the law to inveterate adult wrongdoers . . . .\u201d\nThe State argues, \u201cThe standard of proof for delinquency hearings after December 31, 1965 has been and remains \u2018. . . a preponderance of the evidence . . . .\u2019 Ill Rev Stats 1965, ch 37, par 701-4. That provision of the Juvenile Court Act merely codified the earlier procedural gauge, said to be \u2018. . . the manifest weight of the evidence . . .\u2019 in In re Johnson v. Johnson, 30 Ill App2d 439, 444 (4th District).\u201d\nThe State concedes \u201coccasional suggestions of a reasonable doubt standard are discoverable in New York . . . , but the established standard throughout New York is a preponderance.\u2019\u2019\nOther authorities examined by this court include \u201cStandards for Juvenile and Family Courts,\u201d issued by the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Children\u2019s Bureau Publication Number 437-1966, where it is said (p 72) :\n\u201cSince delinquency proceedings are noncriminal in nature, the majority position holds they should be governed by the preponderance of the evidence rule. The minority position holds that beyond a reasonable doubt should apply since personal liberty is at stake and the imposition of criminal sanctions may be the ultimate result. A recommendation, which represents a middle of the road position, namely, the requirement of \u2018clear and convincing\u2019 proof appears to be a reasonable compromise and is endorsed. . . . Only evidence which is competent material and relevant under the rules applicable to civil cases should be admitted.\u201d\nIn a recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Kent v. United States, 383 US 541, 544 (1966), where the court was concerned with whether the Juvenile Court judge properly waived jurisdiction of the petitioner and directed that he be \u201cheld for trial for [the alleged] offenses under the regular procedure of the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia,\u201d Mr. Justice Fortas discussed the purpose of Juvenile Courts and the theory that their proceedings are designated as civil rather than criminal, and said:\n\u201c1. . . . The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the .needs of the child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. The State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge. But the admonition to function in a \u2018parental\u2019 relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.\n\u201c2. Because the State is supposed to proceed in respect of the child proceeding as parens patriae and not as adversary, courts have relied on the premise that the proceedings are \u2018civil\u2019 in nature and not criminal, and have asserted that the child cannot complain of the deprivation of important rights available in criminal cases. It has been asserted that he can claim only the fundamental due process right to fair treatment. For example, it has been held that he is not entitled to bail; to indictment by grand jury; to a speedy and public trial; to trial by jury; to immunity against self-incrimination; to confrontation of his accusers; and in some jurisdictions (but not in the District of Columbia, see Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 98 US App DC 371, 236 F2d 666 (1956), and Black v. United States, supra) that he is not entitled to counsel.\n\u201cWhile there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.\n\u201cThis concern, however, does not induce us in this case to accept the invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be applicable to adults charged with serious offenses for which Kent was tried must be applied in juvenile court proceedings concerned with allegations of law violation. The Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia provide an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we go no further.\n\u201c3. . . .\n\u201cWe do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Pee v. United States, 107 US App DC 47, 50, 274 F2d 556, 559 (1959).\u201d\nThe foregoing authorities indicate that there are well grounded reasons for the application of either standard of proof where the charge of delinquency is based on a single criminal act, such as murder.\nAfter much consideration, we conclude that the trial court was correct in basing its finding of delinquency on the \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d standard. As we find the hearing measures up \u201cto the essentials of due process and fair treatment,\u201d we do not believe that the interests of justice require that the delinquency proceedings should have been governed by the \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt rule.\u201d\nWe consider next respondent\u2019s contention that \u201cconstitutional rights are not lost by minors in Juvenile or Family Court proceedings.\u201d The basis of this contention is that the court overruled objections and admitted into evidence strands of hair cut from Robert\u2019s head while he was in custody and asleep and a T-shirt taken from his home by police without a warrant. Authorities cited include In re Dennis, 20 App Div2d 86, 244 NYS2d 798, where it is said (p 801):\n\u201cIt requires no citation of authority to support the principle that even the worst malefactor under our system of jurisprudence must be given a fair trial in accordance with the Constitution and the statutes. Surely, no less consideration should be given to this cardinal principle because the person charged is under the age of sixteen.\u201d\nIn re Mantell, 157 Neb 900, 62 NW2d 308:\n\u201cCan it be that the Legislature ,By the quoted statement appearing in section 43-206, RES 1943, intended to destroy the traditional and constitutional safeguards of a trial? Can it be that it intended that trials should be had without the benefit of testimony of witnesses given under the sanction of oath or affirmation? Can it be said that the Legislature intended that the liberty of a child had less sanctity than that of an adult? Even if it did so intend, could that intention be sustained? We think not.\u201d\nIn re Contreras (Cal App), 241 P2d 631 (1952):\n\u201cTrue, the design of the Juvenile Court Act is intended to be salutary, and every effort should be made to further its legitimate purpose, but never should it be made an instrument for the denial to a minor of a constitutional right or of a guarantee afforded by law to an adult.\u201d\nIn re Poff, 135 F Supp 224, at p 226:\n\u201cThe question boils down simply to whether the legislature could deprive, had it so intended, a youth of these constitutional rights. This Court believes it could not, for in so doing it would be contrary to all principles that only by amendment may the Congress depart from the Federal Constitution. If this deprivation were extended to cover certain crimes committed by adults, it would be condemned by the Courts. Yet by some sort of rationalization, under the guise of protective measures, we have reached a point where rights once held by a juvenile are no longer his. . . . This Court stands steadfast in the belief that the Federal Constitution, insofar as it is applicable \u2018cannot be nullified by a mere nomenclature, the evil or the thing itself remaining the same.\u2019 \u201d\nThe State concedes \u201csince some criminal aspects are discoverable in a delinquency proceeding, although the risk of criminal prosecution of Robert Urbasek is entirely absent, we assume arguendo that the constitutional protection could have been invoked.\u201d However, the State argues that since no pretrial motion to suppress \u201cwas voiced, the claim of an illegal seizure has been waived. People v. Ikerd, 26 Ill2d 573, 581.\u201d\nIf either the strands of Robert\u2019s hair or the T-shirt was obtained in violation of the Constitution as interpreted by the search and seizure authorities, we are not persuaded that the State may assert a claim of waiver against respondent. The protection against unlawful search and seizure is a fundamental right, and its loss by waiver by a minor would be contrary to the spirit of the \u201claudable purposes of Juvenile Courts,\u201d and calls for the use in a delinquency proceeding of the rule \u201cthe court may, as a matter of grace, in a case involving deprivation of life or liberty, take notice of errors appearing upon the record which deprived the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial, although no exceptions were preserved or the question is imperfectly presented.\u201d People v. McKinstray, 30 Ill2d 611, 616, 198 NE2d 829 (1964).\nHowever, we are not persuaded that the admission into evidence of either exhibit was error. As to the hair, we believe it comes within the guidelines supplied by Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 (1966), where the taking of a blood sample over objection was held not to be a violation against self-incrimination or the product of an unlawful search and seizure.\nAs to the T-shirt, the police officer who identified it testified, \u201cI went to the Urbasek residence and to Robert Urbasek\u2019s room. I took a T-shirt from the closet in the hall which was on the floor in a pile of other soiled clothing, a closet on the second floor directly opposite the bathroom.\u201d \u2022\nIn the absence of affirmative evidence in the record that the officer .entered the home without permission and without a warrant, we find no error here.\nRespondent next contends that the trial court improperly sustained objections to respondent\u2019s expert \u201creading into the record quotations from recognized authorities concerning the reliability of tests performed on dried blood stains.\u201d The record indicates that during redirect examination of respondent\u2019s expert, he was permitted to read the titles of two publications he had with him and which he had read in preparation for his appearance as an expert. He was then asked to refer to the references \u201cthat do go into the reliability of these tests.\u201d The court sustained an objection, and the matter was not pursued.\nRespondent argues, \u201cIt would have been most helpful to the Court at arriving at a proper determination to have had the benefit of these texts, especially since there was such a wide disparity between the margin of accuracy ascribed to these tests, that is, whether or not the tests were in fact 92 percent accurate as maintained by the witness for the People or only from 10 to 20 percent accurate as maintained by the expert witness for the defense.\u201d Cited in support of this contention is Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill2d 326, 211 NE2d 253 (1965), where it is said (pp 335, 336):\n\u201cThe second major contention advanced by the defendant in this court is that it was prejudicial error to permit the cross-examination of its expert witnesses concerning the views of recognized authorities in their fields, upon the ground that the experts did not purport to base their opinions upon the views of these authorities. In support of this contention he relies upon Ullrich v. Chicago City Ry., 265 Ill 338, and City of Bloomington v. Shrock, 110 Ill 219. Those cases hold that an expert witness can only be interrogated about those texts upon which he expressly bases his opinion. The appellate court held that the cross-examination in this case met that test. We do not consider that determination to ascertain whether every detail on cross-examination of each expert witness fits within the rule announced in those cases, for we are satisfied that the rule is not supported by sound reasons, and should no longer be adhered to.\n\u201c. . . To prevent cross-examination upon the relevant body of knowledge serves only to protect the ignorant or unscrupulous expert witness. In our opinion expert testimony will be a more effective tool in the attainment of justice if cross-examination is permitted as to the views of recognized authorities, expressed in treatises or periodicals written for professional colleagues.\u201d\nThe State concedes that the Darling case changed the rules concerning examination of expert witnesses about learned treatises and argues that the Darling case is not in point here because \u201cit is plain that the ruling pertains to the scope of cross-examination.\u201d We agree. As the record discloses that the expert witness for the State did not rely on the authorities in question, nor did respondent\u2019s witness specifically rely on them, we find no undue curtailment of the redirect examination of respondent\u2019s witness.\nFinally, respondent asserts, \u201cA judgment cannot stand unless it is supported by evidence.\u201d The State contends that the finding of delinquency was justified by the evidence.\nThis record indicates that the delinquency hearing was quite extended and all aspects of the evidence were carefully considered by the trial court. The attendant circumstances of the finding of the body and the findings of the microanalyst were substantial evidence and could not be ignored. As the credibility of the witnesses and Robert, and the weight to be given their testimony, was a question for the trial court, who saw and heard the witnesses testify, we find no ground on which to disturb the finding of delinquency made by the trial court, and for the reasons given that judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nKLUCZYNSKI, P. J. and BURMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward F. Vyzral and Herman R. Tavins, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and William J. Nellis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In the Matter of Robert R. Urbasek, Alleged Delinquent Boy. Robert F. Urbasek, by His Mother and Next Friend, Lorraine Urbasek, Respondent-Appellant, v. People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee.\nGen. No. 51,004.\nFirst District, First Division.\nOctober 31, 1966.\nRehearing denied November 29, 1966.\nEdward F. Vyzral and Herman R. Tavins, of Chicago, for appellant.\nDaniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and William J. Nellis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0375-01", "first_page_order": 381, "last_page_order": 394 }