{ "id": 5149391, "name": "Ben Schwartz et al., Appellants, v. Congregation Powolei Zeduck et al., Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Schwartz v. Congregation Powolei Zeduck", "decision_date": "1956-02-01", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 46,709", "first_page": "438", "last_page": "441", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "8 Ill. App. 2d 438" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "80 Pa. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1042305 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/80/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.W.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10203155 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/177/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 A.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 N. J. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 1336989 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/15/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2700531 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/4/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5581589 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/194/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2696160 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0175-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 344, "char_count": 4897, "ocr_confidence": 0.53, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.378806689304061e-08, "percentile": 0.4819238496143984 }, "sha256": "dced21f63c768c2efaef77b4f94fd5b99462f2a8f85fab96184a91be7231a2f8", "simhash": "1:99796f093876ed40", "word_count": 811 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:19:38.117678+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "FEINBERG, J., concurs.", "LEWE, P. J., took no part." ], "parties": [ "Ben Schwartz et al., Appellants, v. Congregation Powolei Zeduck et al., Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUDGE KILEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is a suit to enjoin defendants from violating the zoning ordinance by using property at 4857 N. Hamlin Avenue, Chicago, Ilinois as a school and synagogue. Defendants\u2019 motion to strike the complaint was sustained and plaintiffs appealed from the order dismissing the suit. Defendants have not filed a brief in this court.\nThe property in question is located on the southeast corner of Ainslie Street and Hamlin Avenue in a district zoned for duplex residences. The rest of the property on the east side of Hamlin Avenue is occupied by single or duplex residences. However, immediately across the alley to the east of 4857 Hamlin Avenue is an apartment building.\nThe Municipal Code of Chicago, Chapter 194A, Section 6, provides that uses permitted in a family residence district will be permitted in a duplex residence district. In stating what uses are permitted in a family residence district, Section 5 provides: \u201c(2) On a lot . . . (b) adjoining an Apartment House . . . the following uses are also permitted: Church; . . . Grade, high school or Sabbath school. . . .\u201d Section 3 of the same Chapter further provides that \u201cDistrict boundaries are street lines, alleys, railroad rights of way or. . . .\u201d\nThe question is whether the property on which the school and synagogue are being operated is \u201cadjoining\u201d an apartment building and therefore is a permissive use under Section 5 of the Municipal Code of Chicago.\nThe word \u201cadjoining\u201d is the key word and its meaning is vital to this decision. Our Supreme Court in Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 175, at page 200 referring to the word \u201cadjacent\u201d quoted from People ex rel. Sackmann v. Keechler, 194 Ill. 235: \u201cIt has no arbitrary meaning or definition. Its meaning must be determined by the object sought to be accomplished by the statute in which it is used.\u201d The court pointed out various meanings attributed to the word \u201cadjacent\u201d by Webster; \u201clying near, close, or contiguous; neighboring; . . .\u2019 Synonyms for \u2018adjacent\u2019 . . . \u00e1re \u2018nigh, juxtaposed, meeting, and touching.\u2019 \u201d In the Sackmann case the court equated \u201cadjacent\u201d and \u201cadjoining.\u201d\nIn our present construction of the term \u201cadjoining\u201d we shall be governed by the evident intent of the City Council. When the City Council passed the ordinance here in question it did not, in our judgment, intend a narrow meaning by its use of the term \u201cadjoining.\u201d It did not intend that the lot need actually touch the apartment house use. That it was \u201cnear,\u201d \u201cnext to\u201d or \u201cclose to\u201d the apartment house is sufficient.\nBut plaintiffs argue that the alley between the two lots, according to Section 3, is a \u201cdistrict boundary\u201d and prevents this construction of the term \u201cadjoining.\u201d We would not hesitate, however, to say that one zoning district adjoins another even though separated by an alley. The development of one zoning district may be in part regulated by tbe character of the adjacent district. In fact, it is not unreasonable to base zoning regulations for one municipality upon the conditions or character of an adjoining municipality, La Salle Nat. Bank v. City of Chicago, 4 Ill.2d 253, 257 and cases cited therein. The New Jersey Supreme Court has said: \u201cTo do less [to fail to consider developments in a neighboring municipality] would be to make a fetish out of invisible municipality boundary lines and a mockery of the principles of zoning.\u201d Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N. J. 238, 104 A.2d 441, 446. A subdivision has been held to be \u201cadjoining\u201d a city even though a ten-foot strip of land passed between, Lefler v. City of Dallas (Tex. Civ. App.), 177 S.W.2d 231; and houses were said to be \u201cadjoining\u201d for purposes of a mechanic\u2019s lien statute even when a right of way intervened. Fitzpatrick v. Allen, 80 Pa. 292, 295.\nWe believe that the City Council did consider the neighboring districts in forming Section 5 and that it did intend the terms \u201cadjoining an apartment house\u201d to apply, even though a district boundary passed between the two lots. We further believe that if the Council did not intend this application that it would have clearly so stated.\nTherefore, since the presence of the alley between the two lots does not prevent them from being \u201cadjoining,\u201d the defendants are entitled to the permissive use granted by Section 5 of the Municipal Code of Chicago. Defendants are lawfully using the property at 4857 Hamlin Avenue and therefore plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action. The trial court was correct in so ruling.\nJudgment affirmed.\nFEINBERG, J., concurs.\nLEWE, P. J., took no part.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUDGE KILEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ben Copple, and Meyer Silverstein, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "No brief filed by appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Ben Schwartz et al., Appellants, v. Congregation Powolei Zeduck et al., Appellees.\nGen. No. 46,709.\nFirst District, Third Division.\nFebruary 1, 1956.\nReleased for publication February 24, 1956.\nBen Copple, and Meyer Silverstein, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nNo brief filed by appellee." }, "file_name": "0438-01", "first_page_order": 454, "last_page_order": 457 }