{ "id": 2557983, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dean J. Deakyne, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Deakyne", "decision_date": "1967-06-13", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 66-116M", "first_page": "338", "last_page": "342", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 Ill. App. 2d 338" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "216 NE2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill2d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2878643 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 NE2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 Ill 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2571335 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/368/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 NE2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill2d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5377462 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 NE2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill App2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5209845 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/24/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 NE2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill App2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5296843 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330, 331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/63/0324-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 426, "char_count": 6649, "ocr_confidence": 0.647, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.3927360243782553 }, "sha256": "8cb945af534aa547d28f53acbc85714841c3aff328d72b4fd62f3e38b3eba516", "simhash": "1:b06d25a4c42b9cd9", "word_count": 1122 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:59.641079+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dean J. Deakyne, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUDGE ABRAHAMSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nA complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Lake County, charging the defendant, and appellant herein, Dean J. Deakyne, with a violation of section 22.01 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic (Ill Rev Stats, c 95%, \u00a7 119.1 (1965)). Deakyne entered a plea of not guilty, waived his right to a trial by jury, and the matter proceeded to trial on May 31, 1966. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found the defendant guilty as charged.\nDefendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment and a petition for probation. The motion attacked the sufficiency of the complaint on the grounds that the complaint failed to charge the defendant with an offense and failed to set forth any facts either in the language of the statute or otherwise that would adequately inform the defendant of the nature and elements of the offense of which he was accused in violation of section 111-3 (a) (3) of the Criminal Code (Ill Rev Stats 1965, c 38, par 111-3 (a)).\nOn June 23, 1966, the court entered an order that denied both the motion and petition and sentenced the defendant to 15 days in the Lake County jail and imposed a fine of $100 and $5 costs. It is from that portion of the order that denied the motion in arrest of judgment that this appeal is prosecuted.\nThe form of complaint used in this case was the Illinois Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint adopted by the Department of Public Safety Division of State Highway Police in 1964. The complaint charged that \u201con the 9th day of April, 1966, at 4:07 A. M.\u201d the defendant did unlawfully operate a 1965 2-door Pontiac, license number PF 2372 (1966) on Half Day at Skokie Highway in Deerfield Township and Lake County in that he was \u201cEluding a Police Officer\u201d in violation of section 22.01 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic.\nSection 111-3 (a) of the Criminal Code provides as follows:\n\u201cForm of Charge.\n\u201c(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by:\n\u201c (1) Stating the name of the offense;\n\u201c(2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated;\n\u201c (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged;\n\u201c(4) Stating the date and county of the offense as definitely as can be done; and \u201c(5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, designate the accused by any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty.\u201d\nIt is obvious that the complaint against Deakyne contained the elements enumerated in subparagraphs (1), (2), (4), and (5). The defendant would have us conclude, however, that the statement \u201cEluding a Police Officer\u201d is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of sub-paragraph (3).\nThe purpose of the section is to assure that an accused is adequately informed as to the precise charge brought against him so that he will be able to prepare his defense and to protect himself from subsequent prosecution for the same offense. People v. Laczny, 63 Ill App2d 324, 330, 331, 211 NE2d 438; People v. White, 24 Ill App2d 324, 330, 164 NE2d 823.\nThe defendant cites a recent Supreme Court case, People v. Griffin, 36 Ill2d 430, 434, 223 NE2d 158, which holds that a verified complaint that charged the defendant with the offense of Reckless Driving in that he drove his vehicle with a willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons and property in violation of the statute was insufficient because it did not state the \"nature and elements\u201d of the crime. That case, and the earlier case of People v. Green, 368 Ill 242, 13 NE2d 278, approved and cited therein, concerns itself with the problem that the charge of Reckless Driving did not tell the defendant what specific acts he was charged with. The court pointed out that the charge of reckless driving against the defendant might include a multitude of different acts: running through a succession of red lights; driving at an excessive rate of speed; driving on the wrong side of the road, etc. It would be essential in such charge that the defendant be advised as to the particular acts that comprised the offense to assure his constitutional privilege against double jeopardy.\nThe same problem does not exist in the charge of \"Eluding a Police Officer\u201d which, although brief, is nonetheless designated with sufficient precision to apprise the accused of the particular act that is the basis of the charge.\nSection 119.1 of chapter 951/2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, (\u00a7 22.01 of the UART) provides that a person must \"willfully\u201d fail or refuse to heed the police officer to be guilty of the offense of \u201cFleeing or attempting to elude police officer.\u201d The defendant argues that the complaint against him was, therefore, fatally defective in that it did not charge him with the \u201cwillfulness\u201d necessary to support the conviction. Presumably, he would require that, at the least, the complaint should have recited that he had \u201cwillfully eluded a police officer.\u201d However, the act of \u201celuding\u201d anything includes, by definition, the element of willfulness that is necessary to prove the offense. It cannot be said that a person \u201celudes\u201d another unless it involves a voluntary effort to avoid or escape that other person. Therefore, the addition of the word \u201cwillfully\u201d would have been redundant and its inclusion was not essential as urged by the defendant.\nWe conclude that the complaint was sufficient to advise the defendant of the precise offense of which he was accused and that, therefore, his motion in arrest of judgment was properly denied.\nWe are also not convinced that the Criminal Code has application to the Illinois Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint. The Supreme Court, on February 15, 1964, adopted an \u201cAmended Rule relating to procedure in traffic cases, quasi-criminal cases and certain misdemeanors. . . .\u201d prepared by the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges. (Ill Rev Stats, c 110, Procedures in Traffic Cases immediately following 101.72.) Paragraph (c) of that Rule expressly provides for the use of that form of complaint and it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Criminal Code has no application. People v. Harding, 34 Ill2d 475, 216 NE2d 147.\nFor the reasons cited, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nDAVIS, P. J. and MORAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUDGE ABRAHAMSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lee, Gieren & Phelan, and William H. Le Vitus, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bruno W. Stanczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, and William G. Rosing, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dean J. Deakyne, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 66-116M.\nSecond District.\nJune 13, 1967.\nLee, Gieren & Phelan, and William H. Le Vitus, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBruno W. Stanczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, and William G. Rosing, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0338-01", "first_page_order": 344, "last_page_order": 348 }