{ "id": 2552885, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. John Gaston, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gaston", "decision_date": "1967-07-20", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 51,264", "first_page": "403", "last_page": "410", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "85 Ill. App. 2d 403" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "212 NE2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill App2d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5293573 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/64/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 NE2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2828193 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 NE2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2824872 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 NE2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill2d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360433 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0398-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 545, "char_count": 9838, "ocr_confidence": 0.625, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2200515686922928e-07, "percentile": 0.5979626611435648 }, "sha256": "0d0acff4d16c080252df03af7a93931c6abc889a95b0af5743d3e681698dbe52", "simhash": "1:a53cf2bfbc0c4cba", "word_count": 1667 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:40.913901+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. John Gaston, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE SCHWARTZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nFour indictments were returned against the defendant, charging him as follows:\nIndictment No. 61-549 \u2014 Armed Robbery\nIndictment No. 61-550 \u2014 Armed Robbery\nIndictment No. 61-551 \u2014 Armed Robbery\nIndictment No. 61-552 \u2014 Assault with intent to Commit Robbery.\nDefendant pleaded not guilty to the charge in Indictment No. 61-551 and on a jury trial was convicted and sentenced to a term of ten years to fifty years in the penitentiary. He then pleaded guilty to the remaining charges and was sentenced as follows:\nIndictment No. 61-549 \u2014 Ten years to life;\nIndictment No. 61-550 \u2014 Ten years to life;\nIndictment No. 61-552 \u2014 One year to fourteen years,\nthese sentences to run concurrently with the sentence in Indictment No. 61-551. The court also increased the sentence on the original charge (No. 61-551) to a term of ten years to life.\nDefendant charges error in the trial of Indictment No. 61-551 in that (1) the court assumed the role of a prosecutor by extensively examining the witnesses, and (2) the prosecutor made statements in his closing argument which were not supported by the evidence and which were calculated to prejudice the jury. Defendant also contends that he was coerced into pleading guilty to the charges in the remaining three indictments because of remarks made by the judge at the time of sentencing on the first charge. His final contention is that the court improperly increased the sentence on the charge in No. 61-551 after he pleaded guilty to the other charges. Because no issue is raised concerning the defendant\u2019s guilt, it is not necessary to detail the facts, but we shall summarize them briefly.\nOn the night of January 12, 1961, the University Liquors at 1003 East 55th Street, Chicago, was robbed of $270 and a wristwatch was taken from the bartender, one Ben Krakover. Eight persons were arrested in connection with the crime, among them the defendant and one Barbara Carter. Krakover and Thomas Jordan, a student present at the time of the robbery, identified the defendant as one of three men who entered the tavern and took the money and watch. John Joyce, a detective of the Chicago Police Department, testified that on the morning after the robbery he saw Barbara Carter wearing the watch at the police station.\nWith respect to the first charge of error relating to the court\u2019s conduct of the trial, the record reveals that the examination of witnesses by the attorneys was interrupted several times by inquiries from the bench, but it is also apparent that the court was merely seeking to clarify the testimony of particular witnesses and that he did so fairly and without prejudice to the defendant. We will not set forth each instance in which the court interjected his own questions into the proceeding, many of them being of a routine nature, but will analyze certain passages particularly relied upon by defendant as having \u201cemphasized weaknesses in the defendant\u2019s case,\u201d and as having \u201cindicated to [the jury] the Court\u2019s hostility towards the defendant. . . .\u201d During the examination by the State of the prosecution witness Detective Joyce, Joyce testified that on the night of the robbery he was assigned to the investigation of another tavern robbery at 934 East 75th Street; that he did not see the defendant until the morning after the robbery, when he saw him at the police station. At that point the court interceded:\n\u201cTHE COURT: As I understand it, officer, you did not arrest the defendant?\n\u201cTHE WITNESS: That\u2019s right, Your Honor.\n\u201cTHE COURT: You did not?\n\u201cTHE WITNESS: Yes, I did not make the arrest.\n\u201cTHE COURT: But you later saw him in the presence of Barbara Carter?\n\u201cTHE WITNESS: Yes, sir.\n\u201cTHE COURT: And Barbara Carter is the girl who was wearing this wristwatch?\n\u201cTHE WITNESS: Yes, sir.\u201d\nThe defendant argues that the court\u2019s question with respect to Barbara Carter\u2019s possession of the wristwatch, alleged to have been taken from the bartender, unduly stressed that element of the prosecution\u2019s case. The questioning was understandable however because of the possibility of confusion arising from Joyce\u2019s testimony that he had investigated another robbery and had not participated in defendant\u2019s arrest. Moreover, despite the repetition of certain answers, it does not appear that particular emphasis was placed on any one portion of the testimony or that the judge revealed a bias as to the answers given.\nDefendant also contends that the court indicated hostility toward him by interrupting an answer he was giving during the course of his own cross-examination.\n\u201cTHE COURT: Well, did she tell the police, in your presence, that you had given her the wristwatch?\n\u201cTHE WITNESS: She most certainly did not; as a matter of fact, after Barbara Carter and I were arrested\u2014\n\u201cTHE COURT: All right, you said no.\u201d\nIt is evident that defendant had answered the question asked of him and had done so to his own advantage. It is not unreasonable to assume that the court\u2019s action prevented the defendant from incriminating himself.\nDefendant cites People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill2d 398, 189 NE2d 295; People v. Kelley, 29 Ill2d 53, 193 NE2d 21; People v. Tyner, 30 Ill2d 101, 104, 195 NE2d 675, and other cases for the proposition that the court may not exceed his role by becoming an advocate for one party or the other, but in each of those cases the court made direct comment on the credibility of witnesses or made attacks on counsel. In People v. Tyner, supra, the court went so far as to say that the witness \u201cwas lying like a goat.\u201d On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the judge does not play the part of an owl, merely gazing at the participants and looking wise. He must observe with care and seek to understand the issues and the testimony. If a question or an answer appears confusing, it is not only his right but his duty to seek to clarify it. Ultimately he may have to pass upon a motion for a new trial and his decision in turn may depend on the confusion or clarity with which questions are asked and answers given.\nIn the instant case the judge did not impugn the credibility of any witness. He acted as a conscientious and capable judge should and there was no error in his conduct of the trial.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that the closing arguments of the prosecuting attorneys were improper because they attributed to defendant the statement, \u201cDon't raise your head or I\u2019ll blow your head off.\u201d The State contends that this argument was permissible as an explanation of the prosecution witness\u2019 failure to remember details of the defendant\u2019s clothing, but this position is not sustained by an examination of the allegedly improper remarks which are set forth as follows:\n\u201cThey [the customers] were told to lie face down on the floor; while back there, this man told one of the witnesses, whom you heard testify yesterday. . . . \u2018Don\u2019t raise your head or I\u2019ll blow your head off.\u2019 That gives you the tenor in this type of case, \u2018Don\u2019t raise your head or I\u2019ll blow your head off.\u2019 \u201d\nDefendant concedes that there is evidence that someone made this threat, but he argues there is no evidence that it was he who did so. The record sustains his contention. The argument of the State\u2019s Attorney was therefore improper, but such error does not necessarily require reversal. People v. Lofton, 64 Ill App2d 238, 212 NE2d 705.\nWhere the defendant\u2019s attorney does not object to the argument deemed improper, the court will not reverse unless it appears that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial. In the instant case defendant\u2019s attorney made no specific objection to the statements in question. The only objection we can find in the record following the argument referred to comes some time after it had been made and seems to relate to other matters. Defendant received a fair trial and his guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The impropriety in the argument on behalf of the State does not constitute a basis for reversal.\nDefendant\u2019s third contention is that he was coerced into pleading guilty on the remaining three indictments because the judge said at the time of sentencing on Indictment No. 61-551 that he \u201cshould have come in and pled guilty. This man is a professional robber. . . .\u201d Evidence had been introduced of two convictions prior to the offense in question, and one of these was for robbery. The remark made was no more than a natural reaction under the circumstances. It is also clear from the record that the judge was solicitous of the defendant\u2019s rights and that defendant\u2019s plea of guilty was made with awareness of the consequences and without compulsion. There was no error with respect to this phase of the trial.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that the court erred by increasing his sentence in Indictment No. 61-551 after the sentencing on the remaining three charges. The increase was from a term of ten to fifty years to a term of ten years to life. No prejudice can result to the defendant from this increased sentence. On the other two charges of armed robbery (Nos. 61-549 and 61-550) defendant was given terms of ten years to life, the sentences to run concurrently with the sentence in 61-551. The sentence in 61-551 was simply another concurrent sentence of ten years to life. Hence the defendant remains eligible for parole after the expiration of ten years less time for good behavior.\nThe judgment is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSULLIVAN, P. J. and DEMPSEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE SCHWARTZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward M. Keating, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.", "Daniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Morton E. Friedman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for defendant in error." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. John Gaston, Plaintiff in Error.\nGen. No. 51,264.\nFirst District, Third Division.\nJuly 20, 1967.\nEdward M. Keating, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.\nDaniel P. Ward, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Morton E. Friedman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for defendant in error." }, "file_name": "0403-01", "first_page_order": 409, "last_page_order": 416 }