{
  "id": 2551462,
  "name": "Maurice Coleman, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Opal L. Dent, as Administrator of the Estate of Random Doty, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Coleman v. Dent",
  "decision_date": "1967-08-31",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 50,326",
  "first_page": "335",
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    "id": 8837,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:06.497151+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Maurice Coleman, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Opal L. Dent, as Administrator of the Estate of Random Doty, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE ENGLISH\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis was an action for \u201chit and run\u201d injuries sustained by plaintiff when, after he had ridden as a passenger in a cab, its door was slammed on his coat and he was dragged for two or more blocks before becoming disengaged, the cab continuing on until it eventually struck a parked car. After a jury trial, judgment was entered for plaintiff against Tim Creed, as the driver of the livery vehicle, and against the Administrator of Random Doty, as the owner thereof, Doty having died prior to trial. Creed did not appeal.\nThe basic point raised by Doty\u2019s Administrator (hereinafter called defendant) on this appeal is that the record does not sufficiently support a conclusion that Doty was the owner of the cab or that there existed an agency relationship between Doty and Creed. There was evidence on these points (which defendant claims was improperly admitted or insufficient in weight to support the verdict), and on the strength of this evidence the trial court, by its instructions, removed from the jury\u2019s consideration any question of agency.\nCreed, himself, was called as a witness by plaintiff under section 60 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 110, \u00a7 60) and testified to both the ownership of the cab by Doty, and his own relationship with Doty as the driver of the latter\u2019s livery cab; he paid Doty $9 per day and kept all fares collected. Defendant makes the point that under Fredrich v. Wolf, 383 Ill 638, 642-643, 50 NE2d 755, and other cases, co-defendant Creed, when called as a witness for plaintiff under section 60, was nevertheless testifying \u201cin his own behalf\u201d against the codefendant Administrator of Doty, within the meaning of the \u201cDead Man\u2019s Act,\u201d and was, therefore, incompetent under the terms of that statute, and his testimony inadmissible as to his codefendant. Ill Rev Stats, 1963, c 51, \u00a7 2. In the abstract this proposition is unassailable, but it can furnish no relief to defendant because of another basic tenent of trial procedure which takes precedence and controls our decision on this point. That is, that a party wishing to question the competency of a witness must do so by the timely raising of such specific objection, stating the grounds therefor, and by obtaining the trial court\u2019s ruling thereon, if any error in the court\u2019s ruling is to be preserved for review. Goldberg v. Capitol Freight Lines, Ltd., 382 Ill 283, 290-291, 47 NE2d 67. None of these things was done by defendant in the instant case. The abstract discloses no objection whatsoever to the testimony of Creed. In examining the record, however (which we may do to support a judgment, though not to reverse it\u2014 Pantlen v. Gottschalk, 21 Ill App2d 163, 177, 157 NE2d 548; Okai v. United Roofing & Siding Co., 24 Ill App2d 243, 247, 164 NE2d 237; and Goodman v. Motor Products Corp., 22 Ill App2d 378, 387-388, 161 NE2d 31), we find that objections had been made to Creed\u2019s testimony but none on the basis of the Evidence Act. Even those objections are, therefore, inadequate to preserve the point now argued. In Spencer v. Burns, 413 Ill 240, 249, 108 NE2d 413, the court said:\nWe do not find that the objection now made in this court was made when the evidence was offered, though several objections were made on other grounds. On review, we have held that specific objections to evidence, based solely on particular grounds, are a waiver of objections to all grounds not specified or relied upon.\nSee also Bonczkowski v. Kucharski, 13 Ill2d 443, 454-455, 150 NE2d 144; and Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill 564, 582, 52 NE2d 229.\nIn the absence of a recorded objection to support her contention, defendant refers us to the post-trial motion in which she stated:\nAs the court will recall (the testimony of Creed was admitted), despite the objections of your movant . . . based upon the so-called Dead Man\u2019s Act ....\nFrom this reference alone, we are asked to take note that such an objection had, in fact, been made in chambers, out of the presence of the court reporter, filling in the gaps in the record by utilizing our \u201cpractical knowledge of the conduct of a trial in the lower court.\u201d This we cannot do. A fundamental failure in the record cannot be compensated for so obliquely.\nA police sergeant testified about his weeks of effort in running down information which led him eventually to the cab, to Creed, and to Doty. He said he had located Doty through the vehicle license registration as the owner of the cab with authority to use it as a public livery. He further testified that in one of his conversations with Doty, the latter bad said that he, himself, operated the cab part of the time and that part of the time it was driven by Creed; that Creed paid him so much to use the car; that Creed then had the use of the car during certain hours and made a living with it.\nAs to the evidence just recited, defendant says that it was insufficient by itself to warrant the court\u2019s action in taking the agency question from the jury. In taking this position, defendant fails to recognize that there was no countervailing evidence whatsoever. We believe that the sergeant\u2019s testimony was probably enough to be determinative of the agency question. But, of course, in the view we take of Creed\u2019s testimony, neither of the two segments of evidence stands alone, as they strongly complement and corroborate each other.\nAdditional points were raised in defendant\u2019s brief, but were withdrawn on oral argument.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDRUCKER and McCORMICK, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE ENGLISH"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Heineke, Conklin & Schrader, of Chicago (John C. Healy and Sandra W. Bixby, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Peter Fitzpatrick, of Chicago (Fitzpatrick, Postilion, Zegiel & Heinemann, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Maurice Coleman, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Opal L. Dent, as Administrator of the Estate of Random Doty, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 50,326.\nFirst District, Fourth Division.\nAugust 31, 1967.\nHeineke, Conklin & Schrader, of Chicago (John C. Healy and Sandra W. Bixby, of counsel), for appellant.\nPeter Fitzpatrick, of Chicago (Fitzpatrick, Postilion, Zegiel & Heinemann, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0335-01",
  "first_page_order": 341,
  "last_page_order": 345
}
